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Abstract 
 
The history of oil well engineering applications has revealed that the frequent 
operational problems are still common in oil well practice. Well blowouts, stuck pipes, 
well leakages are examples of the repeated problems in the oil well engineering 
industry. The main reason why these unwanted problems are unavoidable can be the 
complexity and uncertainties of the oil well processes. Unforeseen problems happen 
again and again, because they are not fully predictable, which could be due to lack of 
sufficient data or improper modelling to simulate the real conditions in the process. 
Traditional mathematical models have not been able to totally eliminate unwanted oil 
well problems because of the many involved simplifications, uncertainties, and 
incomplete information. This research work proposes a new approach and breakthrough 
for overcoming these challenges. The main objective of this study is merging two 
scientific fields; artificial intelligence and petroleum engineering in order to implement 
a new methodology. 
 
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) and Model-Based Reasoning (MBR), two branches of the 
artificial intelligence science, are applied for solving complex oil well problems. There 
are many CBR and MBR modelling tools which are generally used for different 
applications for implementing and demonstrating CBR and MBR methodologies; 
however, in this study, the Creek system which combines CBR and MBR has been 
utilized as a framework. One specific challenging task related to oil well engineering 
has been selected to exemplify and examine the methodology. To select a correct 
candidate for this application was a challenging step by itself. After testing many 
different issues in the oil well engineering, a well integrity issue has been chosen for the 
context. Thus, 18 leaking wells, production and injection wells, from three different oil 
fields have been analysed in depth. Then, they have been encoded and stored as cases in 
an ontology model given the name Wellogy. 
 
The challenges related to well integrity issues are a growing concern. Many oil wells 
have been reported with annulus gas leaks (called internal leaks) on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) area. Interventions to repair the leaking wells or closing and 
abandoning wells have led to: high operating cost, low overall oil recovery, and in some 
cases unsafe operation. The reasons why leakages occur can be different, and finding 
the causes is a very complex task. For gas lift and gas injection wells the integrity of the 
well is often compromised. As the pressure of the hydrocarbon reserves decreases, 
particularly in mature fields, the need for boosting increases. Gas is injected into the 
well either to lift the oil in the production well or to maintain pressure in the reservoir 
from the injection well. The challenge is that this gas can lead to breakdown of the well 
integrity and cause leakages. However, as there are many types of leakages that can 
occur and due to their complexity it can be hard to find the cause or causal relationships. 
For this purpose, a new methodology, the Creek tool, which combines CBR and MBR is 
applied to investigate the reasons for the leakages. Creek is basically a CBR system, but 
it also includes MBR methods. 
 
 vi
In addition to the well integrity cases, two complex cases (knowledge-rich cases) within 
oil well engineering have also been studied and analysed through the research work 
which is part of the PhD. The goal here is to show how the knowledge stored in two 
cases can be extracted for the CBR application. 
 
A model comprising general knowledge (well-known rules and theories) and specific 
knowledge (stored in cases) has been developed. The results of the Wellogy model 
show that the CBR methodology can automate reasoning in addition to human 
reasoning through solving complex and repeated oil well problems. Moreover, the 
methodology showed that the valuable knowledge gained through the solved cases can 
be sustained and whenever it is needed, it can be retrieved and reused. The model has 
been verified for unsolved cases by evaluating case-matching results. The model gives 
elaborated explanations of the unsolved cases through the building of causal 
relationships. The model also facilitates knowledge acquisition and learning curves 
through its growing case base. 
 
The study showed that building a CBR model is a rather time-consuming process due to 
four reasons: 
 
1. Finding appropriate cases for the CBR application is not straightforward 
2. Challenges related to constructing cases when transforming reported information 
to symbolic entities 
3. Lack of defined criteria for amount of information (number of findings) for 
cases 
4. Incomplete data and information to fully describe problems of the cases at the 
knowledge level 
 
In this study only 12 solved cases (knowledge-rich cases) have been built in the 
Wellogy model. More cases (typically hundreds for knowledge-lean cases and around 
50 for knowledge-rich cases) would be required to have a robust and efficient CBR 
model. As the CBR methodology is a new approach for solving complex oil well 
problems (research and development phase), additional research work is necessary for 
both areas, i.e. developing CBR frameworks (user interfaces) and building CBR models 
(core of CBR). Feasibility studies should be performed for implemented CBR models in 
order to use them in real oil field operations. So far, the existing Wellogy model has 
showed some benefits in terms of; representing the knowledge of leaking well cases in 
the form of an ontology, retrieving solved cases, and reusing pervious cases. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
In the domain of oil well engineering, there are many problems that are difficult to solve 
purely by traditional analytical or numerical approaches due to many uncertainties as 
well as numerous simplifications and assumptions. In spite of remarkable advances in 
computing technology, many businesses are still struggling with the problem of 
modelling and accessing data. Particularly, problems related to drilling and oil well 
technologies are not fully solved in spite of long-term activity and a fairly large amount 
of experience and data. Catastrophic blowouts of formation fluids (water, gas, oil) have 
not been eliminated in drilling practice. Less dramatic and more common events like 
stuck pipes, drillstring washouts or mud losses are still common drilling problems. For 
example, the industry usually plans for 5 -10 % of the total drilling time  as contingency 
for problems related to the well instability (Fære et al., 2002). Well leakages during the 
life of the well are another example within the petroleum industry which is not fully 
understood in order to prevent in future wells (Abdollahi et al., 2006). Low oil 
production rates and poor well performance in the many mature oil fields are  
challenging tasks (Abdollahi et al., 2004). All of these examples from the oil industry 
have a nature of surprise and uncertainly, as they involve; formation rock, personnel, 
equipment, tools and other factors. There are many causal connections which can point 
to oil well problems, and the combined effects can be complex. This requires a huge 
amount of time to go through many documents. 
 
Although there are vast databases in each oil company for systemizing, analysing and 
transforming the data can still be improved to extract more information and knowledge. 
Also some drilling and well data are measured indirectly and therefore can be 
inconsistent. Most of the data are used for statistic application without creating 
reasoning to extract and expand the body of knowledge. There are plentiful and valuable 
knowledge hidden behind the data. Human reasoning is needed to translate data to 
information and information to the knowledge. Moreover, the valuable experience 
gained through the cases is generally not stored or systemized in order to reuse in the 
future situations. Knowledge is also lost when experienced people leave the companies. 
The goal here is to find a method to re-use experience from past cases to solve new 
complex problems in oil wells where the traditional mathematical and simulation 
techniques are not capable of solving those challenges alone. This method should 
extract stored and hidden knowledge from the cases and incorporate it with the existing 
knowledge for added value. This method should also be able to transfer and maintain 
valuable experience gained through the problems in the past. Therefore, in addition to 
the existing computing tools or databases, a knowledge-based approach is needed in 
order to be able to reuse the experience and lessons learned from real cases. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) is a recent approach to knowledge-based problem 
solving. CBR is like case mining which enables reasoning based on similar solved 
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problems in the past. So a new problem is solved by remembering one or more similar 
previously solved problems. The strength of CBR is adapting previous solutions for new 
problems in a domain which is not well understood. CBR methodology is not only 
considered as a problem-solver tool; CBR can also maintain the knowledge and enable 
sustained learning. The previous problems or past experience; both failures and 
successes, are encoded as cases, each containing features that are characteristic of the 
problem and its solution. Cases may contain specific knowledge, i.e. knowledge which 
is not common and well known or even has not been fully proven.  Obviously it is more 
efficient to use specific knowledge than the use of general knowledge (well-known 
knowledge like the concepts behind equations and formulas). This is valid for drilling 
and well problems in the petroleum industry which needs both types of knowledge; 
general and specific. Therefore, in addition to pure CBR one requires another method to 
deal with general knowledge for representing the causal rules. In artificial intelligence, 
Model-Based Reasoning (MBR) refers to a method used in expert systems based on a 
model of the physical system. The MBR method is used for modelling the causal 
relationship based on general knowledge (rules). 
 
The main reasons why combined CBR and MBR approaches have been selected as the 
methodology for this study are: 
 
1. The vast scope of the petroleum industry (particularly, drilling and oil well 
engineering problems) is too complex to be described analytically 
2. Huge amounts of data 
3. The most of the drilling and oil well cases contain specific knowledge which 
are valuable to maintain and reuse in  new situations 
4. Traditionally people solve problems by human reasoning in oil well 
engineering, so by incorporating machine reasoning (CBR / MBR) in this 
context this gives added value to human reasoning 
5. Recalling the best practice gained by previous cases either for problem-solving 
or  learning purposes 
6. CBR and MBR can maintain and reuse the knowledge that has been acquired 
7. This methodology has only been used in the petroleum industry to a small 
extent (new area for the research)  
 
1.3 Thesis objectives 
This thesis presents research work which combines two different sciences; information 
technology (IT) and petroleum engineering. The idea is to apply and evaluate the new 
methodology or approach from IT for solving complex problems from petroleum 
engineering. Both these disciplines are fairly extensive, so the attention has been paid to 
specific methods and tasks.  
 
The goal here is to evaluate a CBR tool for specific problem areas within the petroleum 
industry. The CBR tool that is used is called the Creek system which is of the type 
research software. The Creek system has been developed by the Department of 
Computer and Information Science at the Norwegian University of Science and 
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Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim.  This program is in a research and development 
phase (R&D) and is not yet fully commercialized as a tool. Therefore, this thesis 
exemplifies and tests this new method for petroleum applications. This is a rather recent 
approach and only few related pieces of works have been published in the petroleum 
community (Skalle et al., 1998), (Skalle et al., 2000), (Skalle and Aamodt, 2004) and 
(Irrang et al., 1999). 
 
One of the main challenges found during this study is the selection of appropriate cases 
for the CBR methodology. During the study it was found that the cases which are 
valuable for CBR need to be studied in depth by means of human-reasoning before 
implementation into the CBR system. The cases that we use in the Creek system are 
specific cases which need specific data. They are rich in knowledge with a complex 
structure; they are not simple cases such as mere data records. Three projects have been 
implemented as part of this PhD study: 
 
¾ Well integrity study on three oil fields in the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(NCS) 
¾ Field development study in one of the Iranian oil fields 
¾ One specific drilling problem study in another Iranian oil field 
 
The first objective is to extract knowledge through the three research projects by human 
reasoning. The result will be a conceptual level model, in textual form this is referred to 
as a knowledge-level model. The second objective will be to implement and test CBR 
methodology for the transfer and reuse of specific complex drilling and well problems. 
The result will be a formalized model that is interpretable by the computer, referred to 
as a symbol-level model. This methodology explains how to create a general knowledge 
hierarchy (ontology) and transforming cases from text-level to symbolic-level to use in 
CBR system. The combination of cases and ontology will be demonstrated in the Creek 
system (as a framework) and results will be discussed. 
 
The main steps to reach these objectives are: 
 
¾ Performing human reasoning for complex cases through three research projects  
¾ Modelling and formulating cases 
• Constructing a knowledge-level model through the case (ontology) 
• Transforming knowledge-level to symbolic level (formalizing cases) 
¾ Demonstrating the model through the Creek knowledge editor 
¾ Discussing the value of CBR  
 
1.4 Thesis content 
Initially, the subject of the PhD project was defined as “Optimization of Underbalanced 
Drilling (UBD) Methodology”. Later on, due to the lack of UBD data which was 
required as a starting point from the oil companies, the direction of the PhD work was 
shifted to CBR application in oil well engineering. This idea was initiated by my 
supervisor, Pål Skalle, and co-supervisor, Agnar Aamodt. Much of the time was spent to 
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understand and test the CBR system used in this thesis (Creek system) with different 
simple examples in the oil well engineering such as, stuck pipe incidents, mud loss 
incidents, UBD cases, low rate of penetration (ROP) cases. Most of these examples 
were built and tested in Creek to understand the mechanisms involved in the CBR 
processes. These examinations have not been included in this PhD thesis. As the goal 
was to use complex oil well problems of real fields, in parallel to testing CBR, defined 
projects by the industry were studied. The objects of these projects were; 1) to describe 
and define the complexity of the cases 2) to transfer the project study from knowledge-
level (written text) to symbolic-level (codes for input in the CBR system). For these 
purposes three research projects have been done during the study which are presented in 
this thesis. The main project which is given in both knowledge-level and symbolic-level 
descriptions, is “Well Integrity Study” which has been performed for Norsk Hydro. The 
second research study (SPE paper I, is presented in Appendix B) is related to the 
concept of field candidate selection for UBD application. This study is only included in 
this thesis at the knowledge level. The third research project (SPE paper II, is presented 
in Appendix C) and is about a specific drilling problem in which it is difficult to 
understand the causal relationships related to the failure (drillstring washout). This work 
is also included in this thesis at the knowledge level. 
 
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters and 4 appendices: 
   
Chapter 1 gives an overview to the motivation and thesis objectives, and it introduces 
the proposed methodology used in this study. Chapter 2 discuses the concepts of the 
CBR methodology in general terms, and the Creek system as an implementation tool 
used in this thesis. This chapter also addresses the CBR application in the oil well 
engineering domain. Chapter 3 describes well integrity issues as a selected topic to 
exemplify and test Creek as a CBR methodology. Chapter 4 demonstrates the modelling 
of the well integrity issues in the Wellogy model, and the results that are obtained are 
discussed. Chapter 5 presents the complex cases studied in terms of knowledge-level 
descriptions and explains how the case can be derived based on the different types of 
data sources, i.e., research work-based, paper-based, and data-based. Chapter 6 gives 
discussions about application of the CBR method in petroleum engineering and future 
improvements. The descriptions of modelled cases used in the Wellogy are given in 
Appendix A and the two SPE publications are included in Appendices B and C. 
 
Appendix D is a poster prepared and presented at the SPE 2006 Forum Series I and II in 
Dubrovnik on “Low Cost Reservoir Access and Intervention” and “From Casing Design 
to Well Life Prediction?” The poster summarises topics covered in different research 
projects at SINTEF and NTNU and is related to maintained well integrity for different 
operations and situations during a lifecycle of a well (Nordskag et al., 2006). The 
project work was done for Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PTIL) and Statoil.     
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2. Theory of CBR 
2.1 Case-Based Reasoning 
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) is a process to solve problems by adapting the solutions 
that were used to solve old problems (Reisbeck and Schank, 1989). A driller who makes 
an oil well by remembering the previous solution to a stuck pipe problem and adopts 
that solution to the new stuck pipe is using CBR.  In fact, in our daily lives we 
frequently use reasoning from past experiences to solve problems. 
 
In the CBR process, the experiences gained through the previous cases are stored and 
merged with the general knowledge (some general rules and theories) for solving the 
new problem. CBR is also an approach for sustaining learning incrementally since a 
new experience is retained in the case-base or memory (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994).  
 
The general structure of a CBR system is shown in Figure 2.1. Here the general 
knowledge will be a basis for many solved cases and all together build a model for a 
CBR system. A new unsolved case is introduced into the model, and a new solution will 
be retrieved. A CBR system is able to read the unsolved case (as input data), and it 
retrieves the best similar solved case (as output data). The solution of the solved case 
will be suggested and approved for the unsolved case and a new solution will be 
derived. The new solution can be used directly in the new problem, or modified 
according to the differences between the input and output cases. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 A simple schematic for a CBR system1. 
CBR should not be seen as a database, it is more like a knowledge base. Databases 
normally contain digital numbers, symbols, and characters. The data need to be 
transferred to pieces of information. The processed or learned information is called 
knowledge (Aamodt, 2004). For clarification, an example is given in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Footnote 1: This figure was taken from Aamodt’s lecture notes, NTNU, 2004. 
 6
Table 2.1 Typical examples showing how data are transferred to information and 
information to knowledge. 
Data Information Knowledge 
1.1 s.g. Low mud density Low mud density leads to hole collapse 
100 bar Low pore pressure Low pore pressure causes mud loss 
61 $ High oil price High oil price causes more drilling activity 
 
In the CBR process, the knowledge is acquired and captured from the cases (specific 
knowledge) and merged with general knowledge. The combined knowledge is sustained 
and organized in a memory to reuse it for the new problems when needed. When the 
new case is solved it will be added to the case base. In this way the body of knowledge 
will be expanded.   
 
CBR itself is a generic framework and it can be used for different applications where 
the domain has uncertainties and incomplete information. The core of CBR is a 
structural model which it deals with the problem domain. 
 
2.1.1 History  
The concept of CBR has a relatively young history from about 1977 (Pal and Shui, 
2004). The original work related to CBR is widely referred to Schank and Abelson, 
(1977) at Yale. They proposed CBR as a tool for memory organization to store previous 
situations (cases) for both problem solving and learning purposes (Schank, 1982). From 
that time, the CBR activities have increased not only at the research level but also as 
applications in different areas. Aamodt and Palaz (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994) gave a 
philosophical basis for CBR methodology. 
 
SYRUS was the first CBR system developed by Kolodner, (1993) which was used to 
store and retrieve events in the life of Cyrus Vance, who was then Secretary of State of 
the United States. Later on, many CBR systems have been developed for different 
applications. For example, HYPO was developed as a case-based interpretive program 
in the domain of law (Ashley, 1990) and (Ashley and Rissland, 1988). CASEY (Koton, 
1989) and PROTOS (Bareiss, 1988) are other CBR systems which are used in medicine 
domain and auditory diseases respectively. Other early CBR systems can be found in 
Kolodner, 1993. Regardless of which systems are used, CBR can be used in different 
applications, mostly for open theory or weak domains. An open domain is one which 
cannot be realistically modelled, and a weak theory domain is one with uncertainty 
between the important concepts in the domain (Aamodt, 1994(a)). Different applications 
can be modelled by the CBR approach. These applications are; “CBR-planner”, “CBR-
designer”, “CBR-diagnosis program”, “CBR-interpretive program”, “CBR-problem 
solver” (Kolodner, 1993). 
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CBR research is spread all over the world;  several workshops regarding CBR have 
been held in Europe; for instance, (CBR-91, 1991), (EWCBR-93, 1993). Similar CBR 
activities in Asian countries have been running with the different approaches as for 
example in India (Venkatamaran et al., 1993) and Japan (Kitano, 1993). Currently the 
CBR activities are spreading out worldwide and there are trends towards increasing the 
applications of CBR.   
 
2.1.2 Model-based reasoning 
Model-based reasoning (MBR) is another concept in artificial intelligence and is part of 
reasoning methods. In MBR, knowledge is represented using “causal rules” based on 
some general rules or theories. MBR is designed for domains which are fully 
understood (strong theory domains); in contrast, CBR is designed for weak theory 
domains (Kolodner, 1993). MBR deals with the tasks which have large general 
knowledge, whereas CBR emphasizes the cases more. 
 
Some CBR systems deal with the integration of CBR and MBR. The first CBR system 
which emphasized integrating general domain knowledge (MBR) and specific case 
knowledge (CBR) was PROTOS (Bareiss, 1989). Another  is the Creek system 
(Aamodt, 1991). This integration of CBR and MBR has been defined as “knowledge-
intensive” which assumes that cases are enriched with general knowledge (Aamodt, 
2004).  
 
2.1.3 CBR process 
CBR can be considered as a machine which reads a new unsolved case, matches it with 
the many solved cases which have been stored previously in the machine memory and 
retrieves the most similar solved case. Therefore, the output of the machine is a 
proposed solution to the new unsolved case. A simple schematic for the CBR process is 
shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 An illustration showing functionality of CBR. 
The CBR machine can only contain cases without general knowledge (i.e. rules and 
theories). Such a case-base will be poor in the knowledge, and the assessment of 
similarity between unsolved and solved cases will be a simple process, just one by one 
attributes matching. On the other hand, the CBR model can be knowledge-rich and 
integrates general knowledge (theories and models) and cases. This type of CBR model 
is called the knowledge-intensive CBR model (Aamodt, 2004). Such a model will be 
implemented in this study.  
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Whether the CBR model is lean or rich in knowledge, the CBR process can be 
explained in different steps within what is called the CBR cycle. Aamodt and Plaza  
introduced four steps for the CBR cycle as illustrated in Figure 2.3 ( Aamodt and Plaza, 
1994).  These processes are: 
 
1. Retrieving  the most similar previously solved cases 
2. Reusing the retrieved cases by copying or integrating the proposed solution  
3. Revising or adapting the proposed solution 
4. Retaining the new generated solution for future uses 
 
 
General /domain
knowledge
Previous
cases
Retrieve
Reuse
Re
ta
in
Re
vis
e
New 
case
New 
case
Retrieved 
case(s)
Solved
case
Repaired
solution
Learned
case
Problem
Suggested 
solution
Confirmed 
solution
 
Figure 2.3  Cyclic process of CBR (from (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994)). 
Figure 2.3 has been referred to and used in most of the CBR articles and papers. The 
detailed discussions and explanations for each step is given in this reference (Aamodt 
and Plaza, 1994). 
 
However, the main challenge is how to build and implement an engineering domain by 
applying CBR-MBR approaches. Aamodt and Plaza, 1994, sorted these challenges into 
the five areas: 
 
¾ Knowledge representation 
¾ Retrieval methods 
¾ Reuse methods 
¾ Revise methods 
¾ Retain methods 
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These challenges have been explained in detail in the book by Kolodner (Kolodner, 
1993). 
  
The first step in building a CBR model is the “Representation of Cases” as well as 
knowledge. This means how to define and describe the cases in the model in order to 
recall and reuse them for reasoning. The main challenges for case representation are: 
 
¾ Searching and matching process for cases 
¾ Integrating new cases in the existing memory (model) 
¾ Type of data which should be stored in cases, qualitatively and quantitatively 
¾ Organizing and indexing cases for effective retrieval and reuse 
¾ Integrating cases with the general domain knowledge 
 
In the retrieval step (first step), the closest similar solved cases are matched and 
retrieved. This step has been subdivided into three sub-steps; identify features, initially 
match, search and select executed in that order.  Both solved and unsolved cases are 
defined the CBR model as a set of descriptors (features), CBR systems should identify 
features of cases either by syntactical similarities (superficial) or semantical 
similarities. For example, the CYRUS and ARC systems perform syntactical 
similarities, while PROTOS and Creek perform semantical similarities (Aamodt and 
Plaza, 1994). In Creek the CBR process has an explanation engine as a support for 
CBR processes to explain the reasoning (through the CBR processes) for the user or 
giving internal explanation that the CBR system may created during reaching the goal 
of the reasoning tasks. This engine has three subtasks: activate-explain-focus 
(Aamodt, 1994a). These subtasks are illustrated in Figure 2.4. They have initial state 
description (input) and finial state description (output). Activate: making active the 
related features or concepts of the cases within the network knowledge structure 
(ontology). Explain: creating and explaining of derived information within the activated 
knowledge (from last step). Focus: focusing and selecting a conclusion which satisfies 
the goal.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 The CBR process and the explanation engine (Aamodt, 1994). 
In the Reuse step, the focus is on the retrieved case solution for the new case in terms of 
similarities and differences of attributes of the two cases (input & output), and the 
system tries to select and transfer some part of the retrieved case to the new case. 
Therefore, the suggested solution will be derived. In the Revise step, the suggested 
solution will be evaluated and verified. The outcome of the Revise step can be either to 
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use, the retrieved solution directly, or repair it by using the domain knowledge base. In 
the Retain step, the new cases will be evaluated to store in the existing model. 
 
One of the important output parameters from the CBR process is similarity match 
percentage (fraction of 100) between the input case (new unsolved case) and the 
retrieved cases (previous solved cases). The retrieved cases will be ranked based on the 
similarity percentage. The total similarity percentage comprises two matches; direct 
match (syntactical similarities) and indirect match (semantically similarities).  In the 
direct match part, the similarly is exact between the input findings of unsolved case and 
the output findings of solved, one-by-one similarity. However, in the indirect match 
part, the findings between the two cases are not necessarily full similarities like in the 
direct match, but they have different relations between each other (e.g. causal relations, 
associational relations, and structural relations). 
 
In Creek, the match similarity is the function of a number of related findings, 
predictive strength2 (degree of sufficiency), and importance (degree of 
necessity) which will be discussed in Section 2.2.5. The similarity function between 
input and output cases is given  as (Lippe, 2001): 
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Cin and Cre are the input and retrieved cases respectively, n is the number of findings for 
the input case, and m is the number of findings for the retrieved case. The relevance 
factor is a number that represent the combines of predictive strength and 
importance of a finding of a case, and sim(f1, f2) is given by: 
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2.1.4 Case 
In the CBR language, a case is usually denoted by a problem situation or an episode. 
Some situations recur with regularity and the solution of the problem in one situation is 
likely to be applicable in a similar situation. Cases are description of situations, episodes 
which contain valuable knowledge. A case can be considered as special experience 
which is worth to keep in a memory (case-base) for applying in the future.  In CBR 
language this knowledge is called “specific knowledge” (Reategui et al., 1997) and 
(Aamodt, 1994b). Specific knowledge may be defined as part of the knowledge which 
cannot be easily modelled such as general knowledge (known as model-based). 
 
Cases can have different shapes and sizes, for example, they may cover a situation that 
evolves over time (e.g. designing an oil well), or snapshot (e.g. mud losses incident 
during the drilling phase). 
Footnote 2 - This font (Courier New) denotes phrases which are used in the Creek framework and the Oil Well CBR model (named Wellogy). 
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The common elements of any case are: 
 
1. General description of the case 
2. Task of the case (what to achieve / accomplish) 
3. Problem description (set of findings) 
4. Solution description to reflect the task 
5. The final outcome of the solution (the degree of success of the implemented 
solution) 
 
There is a strong integration between cases and general domain knowledge in the Creek 
system (Aamodt, 2004). Figure 2.5 illustrates the generic Creek concept where the cases 
are linked to the general domain knowledge. As seen, general knowledge plays an 
important role in Creek system. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Integration between cases and general domain knowledge (Aamodt, 2004). 
 
2.1.5 Ontology 
In philosophy, ontology is the study of being or existence. It seeks to describe the basic 
categories and relationships of being and existence to define entities within a specific 
domain. Ontology is an organization and calcification of domain knowledge. In the 
recent years, ontological issues are being widely used for the purposes of knowledge 
sharing and reusing (Perez and Benjamins, 1999). Ontologies have been adopted in 
many business and scientific communities as a way to share, reuse, and process the 
domain knowledge. Ontologies are now central to many applications such as scientific 
knowledge portals, information management and integration systems, electronic 
commerce, and semantic web services. Noy and McGuinness (2000) stated that 
ontology is needed for: 
 
¾ To share common understanding of the structure of information 
¾ To reuse of domain knowledge 
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¾ To make domain assumptions explicit 
¾ To analyse domain knowledge 
 
In a simple definition applied in this study, the ontology is referred to as a hierarchical 
structure (entities & relations) representing the Wellogy model structure as a core of the 
CBR system. Therefore, the ontology represents the knowledge base in a format which 
can be used for the CBR purpose. In any ontology design, the goal is to translate the 
knowledge from information (e.g. text and graphs) into symbolic elements (similar to 
indexes in a book) and build it in a hierarchy structure. An illustration showing the 
contents of the ontology is depicted in Figure 2.6. This figure shows that the ontology 
comprises three elements; 
 
1) theory and general rules (denotes general knowledge) 
2) cases or episodes (denotes specific knowledge) 
3) human reasoning based on his / her mind and understanding 
 
Human reasoning 
based on general and 
specific knowledge
Cases or episodes 
(specific knowledge)
Theory and general rules 
(general knowledge)
Ontology
+
+
 
Figure 2.6 Transformation of general knowledge, cases, and human reasoning behind a 
hierarchy structure (called ontology). 
According to Uschold and Gruninger (1996), there are three possible processes for 
developing an ontology: 
 
1. Top-down development process 
2. Bottom-up development process 
3. Combined development process 
 
These three options for developing an ontology are depicted in Figure 2.7. In a top-down 
process, the ontology is developed only by general domain knowledge regardless of the 
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cases, e.g. Drilling may be subdivided into two subclasses Vertical Drilling 
and Directional Drilling. We can further categorize Directional 
Drilling into Horizontal Drilling and Slant Well Drilling and so 
on. In a bottom-up process which is inverse of the top-down process, the ontology is 
only developed based on specific domain knowledge appearing in the cases. The most 
specific entities are extracted from the cases and extend the hierarchy with subsequent 
grouping of these entities into the more general concepts. In the combined process, both 
general knowledge and cases (specific knowledge) are used for building the ontology. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Three different process options for building an ontology: top-down process is only 
based on general knowledge, bottom-up process is only based on case knowledge, 
combined process is based on both general knowledge and case knowledge 
(drawing is based on the concept of  Uschold and Gruninger, 1996). 
2.1.6 History of CBR applied in the petroleum domain 
There are limited published works of CBR / MBR methodology in the oil industry. 
Mendes et al. (2003) described cases (set of attributes) which are encoded by using 
fuzzy and generic algorithm (GA) for the adaptation process. Generally, this approach 
focuses on similarity function based on a mathematical approach and finding the best 
matches between cases without additional machine reasoning. 
 
In the SPE e-library, using the searching function for CBR / MBR, finds only four 
papers. These are mostly related to the database and knowledge-base rather than CBR. 
Skalle and Aamodt (2004) published a paper concerning application of CBR / MBR in 
oil well drilling engineering. In a way this work can be considered as a basis for this 
thesis. 
 
Perry et al. (2004) give a case-based knowledge repository for drilling optimization. 
They provided a software system to enable drilling problems to be queried in a database 
including lessons learned from previous practice. However, this system does not utilise 
the CBR methodology. Aminzadeh (2005) tried to demonstrate an application by using 
artificial intelligence and soft computing methods (neural networks and fuzzy logic) 
used for challenging problems in the oil industry, particularly related to geosciences. He 
examined a combination of human and machine intelligence and soft computing for 
solving problems. Irrgang et al. (1999) present a case-based system for capturing past 
drilled wells to optimize cost and time for planned wells. 
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As can be seen, there are few references for addressing applications of CBR in 
petroleum engineering literature. 
 
2.2 The Creek framework 
2.2.1 Creek overview 
This section discusses the architecture of the Creek system for applying case-based 
reasoning. In this thesis the Creek system and architecture is used as a formal 
framework and knowledge editor. The oil well engineering model considered as a core 
of any CBR System is named Wellogy. The content of the model (mixture of cases and 
ontology) has been developed by the author. 
 
As already mentioned, the Creek system is a CBR system which is being developed and 
implemented by the Department of Computer and Information Science at The 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim by Professor 
Aamodt and his group in NTNU and SINTEF. In the Creek system the cases are 
embedded within the general domain knowledge, so there is strong coupling between 
cases and the knowledge. The Creek system is software which implements the CBR 
method and is used in this study to demonstrate CBR applications in oil well 
engineering. Cases with general knowledge are interpreted and processed by Creek. 
Therefore, Creek is used not only as a CBR tool in this study but also as knowledge 
editor.  
 
The Creek system contains an editor for integrating cases (set of problems / solutions) 
and general domain knowledge. Creek is trying to represent, formulate and store 
specific and general knowledge in a frame-based representation. In the Creek system the 
following operations can be done: 
 
¾ Create and build an ontology such as a hierarchy 
¾ Demonstrate the ontology 
¾ Create relations and strength values between entities 
¾ Build causal relationships 
¾ Model cases 
¾ Tune or adjust the attributes of the case through two parameters; 
“importance” and “predictive strength” i.e. giving the degree of 
necessary and sufficiency respectively for that specific attribute. 
¾ Match processes between cases to find the best solved cases for an unsolved 
case 
¾ Give explanation to justify the retrieved solution 
  
The Creek program is encoded in Java and has been originally designed for solving and 
diagnosing problems. Here the focus is to realize the applicability of the Creek system 
for particular topics within the oil well engineering. How the Creek system has been 
developed or encoded is not the scope of this thesis. However, the details of the Creek 
system and its concepts can be found Sørmo (2004) and Aamodt (1991). 
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In a general description, a Creek model can be seen as a labelled, bi-directional graph 
(Skalle et al., 2005). It consists of entities and relationships (nodes and 
links). The general definition for entity is: entity is an existing or real thing. The 
entities are shown as nodes; the relationships act as links which connect entities. 
Figure 2.8 shows two entities with a relationship and the inverse relationship. To be more 
specific, the entities are names, phrases, glossaries, terms and concepts; for example, 
Drilling, Well, Low Pressure, Low Mud Density, Drilling Bit and 
so on. On the other hand, the relations are expressed as verbal forms such as; 
causes, sometimes causes, leads to, implies and so on. Each relationship has an 
inverse relationship, for example the inverse of “causes” will be “caused by” 
as shown in Figure 2.8. Therefore, the Figure 2.8 can for example represent: 
 
Low Mud Density sometimes causes Stuck Pipe 
Stuck Pipe is sometimes caused by Low Mud Density (inverse relationship) 
 
Relationship
Inverse relationship
Entity A Entity B
 
Figure 2.8 Entities and relationship used in the Wellogy model. 
An example in the Wellogy model is given below for clarifying the concept how an 
ontology is built: 
 
During drilling hole 8-1/2” on a platform in the North Sea in August 2002, the driller 
suddenly noticed a low rate of penetration (ROP). It is assumed that action needs to be 
taken due to this low ROP. In theory there are some parameters which cause low ROP 
as for example; low bit weight, low bit rotary speed, high rock strength and so on. 
According to Equation 3: 
 
2
2 ( )
o
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     (Eq. 3) 
where 
 
 K = constant of proportionality 
 S = compressive strength of the rock 
 W = bit weight 
 Wo = threshold bit weight 
 db  = bit diameter 
 N = rotary speed 
 
Therefore, some general causal relationships can be derived: 
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Low Rotary Speed always causes Low ROP  
Low ROP is led to by High Compressive Rock Strength 
 
and some of the entities can for example be defined  in the ontology as below: 
 
Bit Parameter has subclass Rotary Speed 
Rotary Speed has subclass Low Rotary Speed 
Bit Parameter has subclass ROP 
ROP has subclass Low ROP   
 
So the driller checked all related parameters and did not find any deviations from the 
normal conditions. He also checked rock strength with a geologist and the rock 
parameters were also the same. The driller remembered the same low ROP in a previous 
well. In that case low mud viscosity was the reason for low ROP. An increasing mud 
circulation rate increased the ROP. The drill cuttings will be accumulated around the bit 
due to low lifting capacity in low mud circulation rate. The cuttings will therefore be re-
drilled by the bit and probably bit-balling might occur. This case gives additional 
information that can be added to the ontology as specific knowledge as below: 
 
Low ROP is sometimes caused by Low Mud Circulation 
Rate. Low Mud circulation Rate causes Poor Mud Lifting 
Capacity. Poor Mud Lifting Capacity leads to 
Accumulation of Cuttings at Drill Bit which causes Bit 
Balling. 
 
Then, the acquired specific knowledge will be transformed as entities / relationships and 
finally integrated with the general knowledge into the model which is built into an 
ontology. 
  
The ontology developed in the Wellogy model comprises many entities and 
relationships similar to the above mentioned example. The model represents a logic 
format for a specific domain. As shown the first letter of entities is written as upper-
case, because Creek is a case-sensitive tool, and all relationships are written as lower-
case. All entities in the Creek system should have relationship with other entities; 
otherwise, they would not contribute to the reasoning process. 
 
2.2.2 Top level ontology in Creek system 
A published reference related to petroleum ontology is given by Chen and Chan (2000). 
They presented a basic approach for building an ontology for specific application to the 
petroleum domain by defining 8 steps: 
 
1. Obtain the domain knowledge through either document study or interviews with 
domain experts 
2. Develop an initial ontology design 
3. Choose an ontology editor to create ontologies 
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4. Use ontology tool as a user interface to generate knowledge acquisition 
5. Build a knowledge base 
6. Evaluate and validate  the ontology model by experts or users 
7. Adjust the model with references 
8. Modify and adapt the model 
 
The similar approach has also been considered in the Wellogy model. 
  
The top level of the Wellogy model has been developed by researchers in Department of 
Computer and Information Science at NTNU. The top level of Creek is identical for any 
ontology. Figure 2.9 shows the top level of ontology in the Wellogy model. The top level 
starts with an entity named “Thing”. The definition of the “Thing” is “representing 
anything in the world worth naming or characterizing”. This entity is the root of the 
model. All entities which come later will be a subclass of this entity. The uppermost 
entities at the top level of the Wellogy model are briefly explained below. 
 
“Thing” has two subclasses: “Entity”, “Relation”. Each of these entities have 
their subclasses which are illustrated in Figure 2.9. The definition of entities at the top 
level is given in the “Description box” in the Creek system. “Entity” is a real world 
objects, i.e. anything existing that we want to relate to other things existing. 
 
Figure 2.9 illustrates the top level at the time of adopting Creek as the CBR tool (2002-
2006). Today (2007) top level of Creek may be different. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Top level of ontology model developed in the Wellogy model (Creek framework, 
version 0.96 created at 20/01/2006). 
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2.2.3 Relation 
The entities are inter-linked through relationships in the Wellogy model.  As discussed 
before, relationships represent verbal phrases. Four types of relationships have been 
considered in the Wellogy model: 
 
1. Structural relation; abstract relation class. Captures relationships that structure 
knowledge into taxonomical and other types of hierarchies. 
2. Implication relation; the origin will with some probability be the cause of the 
target. 
3. Associative relation; general association class. 
4. Temporal relation; Relates situations and states through time-dependent 
relationships. 
 
2.2.4 Strengths 
Instead of using relationships consisting purely of numerical values we have applied a 
list of verbs to help understanding the meaning behind retrieved reasoning results. Each 
relation has the strength valve 0 to 1. The allocated value for each relationship is default 
and defined by experts as shown Table 2.2. Thus, the verbs are translated into numerical 
values in the CBR application. 
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Table 2.2 Strength values for relationships used in the Wellogy model. 
Class descriptor name 
Default 
strength 
Inverse name 
Spatial Relation 0.5 Spatial Relation of 
Case Relation 0.5 Relation of 
Causal Relation 0.5 Causal Relation (inverse) 
has instance 0.9 instance of 
has solution 1.0 solution of 
Temporal Relation 0.5 Temporal Relation of 
Functional Relation 0.5 Functional Relation of 
has subclass 0.9 subclass of 
has default explanation strength1.0 default explanation strength of
transfers 1.0 inherits over 
has finding 0.5 finding of 
has comparator 1.0 comparator of 
Structural Relation 0.5 Structural Relation of 
Associational Relation 0.5 Associational Relation of 
Re
la
ti
on
 
has value type 1.0 value type of 
has case task 0.5 case task of 
has outcome 0.5 outcome of 
has lessons learned 0.5 lessons learned of 
has case explanation summary 0.5 explanation case summary of 
has time occurrence 0.5 time occurrence of Ca
se
 R
el
at
io
n 
has case status 1.0 case status of 
indicates 0.4 indicated by 
sometimes causes 0.5 sometimes caused by 
leads to 0.5 led 
implies 0.4 implied by 
has potential 0.2 has potential of 
always causes 0.9 always caused by 
enables 0.5 enabled by 
Ca
us
al
 R
el
at
io
n 
causes 0.7 caused by 
performs 0.5 performed by Functional 
Relation can create 0.5 can be created 
has failure 0.5 failure of 
has repair action 0.5 has repair action of 
has deviation 0.5 deviation of 
has observation 0.5 observation of 
has well name 0.5 has well name of 
has country name 0.5 has country name of 
ha
s 
fi
nd
in
g 
has field name 0.5 ha field name of 
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2.2.5 Tuning the attributes of cases 
In addition to the above strength value for relationships, for any finding of a case we 
need to set two relevance parameters. These are importance and predictive 
strength. The importance of a finding indicates the importance of an observation or 
a finding for predicting or pointing out the cause of the failure.  The importance can be 
set to one of the following values: Necessary, characteristic, 
informative and irrelevant. Where necessary indicates the finding is of 
the highest importance for belonging to the given category, and irrelevant indicates 
the finding is not important. The predictive strength can be set to one of these values: 
Sufficient, strongly-indicative, indicative and spurious. 
Sufficient indicates the strongest predictive strength, and spurious the weakest. Both 
values for importance and predictive strength are numeric constants, i.e. the value 
sufficient for predictive strength sets the explanation strength to some predefined 
numerical value.  
 
Note that predictive strength and importance only are set for cases that are solved. 
When you have an unsolved case you naturally do not have the solution, so it is not 
possible to set values for importance and predictive strength. The expert’s view on what 
type of importance and predictive strength to select is based on theoretical knowledge, 
statistical knowledge or experience. 
 
2.2.6 Computer program 
As already mentioned, the Creek system is used in this study as a modelling tool and 
knowledge editor. This program has been built as in-house software at NTNU and it 
works on most platforms where Java is available. In this section, a brief overview 
representing the use of the software is briefly given in order to enhance understanding 
for readers. For demonstration, the previous example (low ROP) given in Section 2.2 is 
modelled here. However, the two detailed tutorials have been written 
(http://creek.idi.ntnu.no/), the first one is about general guidelines describing how 
modelling is done through the user interface (Brede et al., 2004), and the second one is a 
more specific tutorial for use in petroleum applications (Skalle et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 2.10 illustrates a screenshot of the Creek software after loading, before starting to 
model (blank template). This figure shows the environment of the program used in this 
study. In the menu-bar, Model is used for entering input data for modelling in 
Wellogy. The Model button includes; New Entity, New Relation, New 
Relation Type, and New Case. On the right-hand side of the figure, different 
views for editing and searching inputs can be seen. The Current Frame View 
shows all information of a selected entity in the map view, such as description and 
relationship types for each entity. The Entity List button also shows the list of all 
entered entities in the model which can be looked at and searched when a new entity is 
inserted. 
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Figure 2.10 Screenshot of Creek software (knowledge editor). 
Figure 2.1 depicts how to open a new knowledge model (e.g. low ROP model). 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Creating a new knowledge model (e.g. low ROP failure). 
From the ROP example, the extracted data and information from the case are given as 
semantic entities in two parts; general and specific knowledge as listed in Table 2.3. 
General knowledge contains information which has previously been proven and well 
known as a theory of the concept. The specific knowledge gives information found and 
tied to the case.  
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Table 2.3 Extracted entities from the ROP example. 
Case observations Observations characterising the case 
Drilling Bit Low Mud Circulation Rate 
PDC Bit Poor Mud Lifting Capacity 
Bit Parameter Accumulation of Cutting around the Bit 
Rate of Penetration (ROP) Increase Mud Circulation Rate 
Low ROP Norway 
Rotary Speed North Sea 
Rotary per Minutes (RPM) Well Number 1 
Low Rotary Speed Hole Size 12.25 inch 
Normal Rotary Speed Oil Base Mud 
 
These semantic entities are inserted together with the structural relationships in Creek as 
shown graphically in Figure 2.12. This figure represents the ontology (hierarchy form) 
for the ROP example. The entities are linked by structural relationships; e.g. has 
subclass (green lines in the figure) and has synonym (black line in the figure) 
with the same Strength values, 0.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Representing knowledge as hierarchy form (ontology) for the ROP example in 
Creek (green links = has subclass, black link = has synonym).  
Based on the theories and rules behind the concept of ROP, the causal relationships 
between parameters and findings of the case are developed as shown in Figure 2.13.  The 
different relationships have different strength valves in the model. If a relationship is not 
already found in the model, the new domain relation can be defined and entered as 
shown in Figure 2.13. For example, the following cause model is given for the ROP case: 
 
Low Rotary Speed always causes Low ROP (strength valve 0.9) 
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Low ROP sometimes caused by Low Mud Circulation Rate (strength valve 0.5) - 
(explanation: when the rate of mud circulation is low the drilled formation cuttings will be accumulated 
around the bit, and the bit will re-drill the cuttings and rate of penetration will be decreased). 
Low Mud Circulation Rate causes Poor Mud Lifting Capacity (strength valve 
0.7) 
Poor Mud Lifting Capacity leads to Accumulation of Cuttings around 
Drill Bit (strength valve 0.5) 
Accumulation of Cuttings around Drill Bit causes Bit Balling (strength 
valve 0.7)  
 
  
 
Figure 2.13 Causal connections model (e.g. Poor Mud Lifting Capacity has two 
relationships with Low Mud Circulation Rate (causes has strength valve 
0.7) and Accumulation of Cuttings around Drill Bit (leads to has 
strength value 0.5).  
The final step of modelling is constructing the ROP case in Creek. Figure 2.14 shows 
snapshot of how creating a new case (e.g. Case ROP). 
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Figure 2.14 Creating a new case in Creek (e.g. Case ROP). 
Figure 2.15 shows the case contents after filling the necessary information into the Case 
View. The name of the case is called “Case ROP” with a brief case description box. 
The solution to the failure (Low ROP) was found to be “Increase Mud 
Circulation Rate”.  The 10 findings have been allocated for this case with the 
different strength values. For example, the country is not such important information for 
the failure and solution of the case, so for this finding the strength value is low which 
given by combination of Importance = Irrelevant and Predict 
Strength = Spurious. This gives numerically 0.05 as an overall value (see the 
right-hand side of the figure). 
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Figure 2.15 View of Case ROP (failure = Low ROP, solution = Increase Mud 
Circulation Rate), 10 findings have been allocated for the case with different 
strength valves by adjusting Importance and Predictive Strength. 
2.3 Ontology and cases in the Wellogy model  
Drilling and well cases can contain both general knowledge (rules and theory) and 
specific knowledge (experience), and the attention here is to transfer and reuse the 
combined knowledge in the future situations. So far, the experience is transferred 
manually with many limitations and constrains. For example, one challenge is that 
companies loose the knowledge and skills when a key employee leaves; the second 
challenge for example is the difficulty to remember at once all the relevant experience 
gained in the past cases and reuse it in the new occurring case. Thus, due to these and 
many other challenges, the attention is to use the computer to assist not only to store and 
remember past experience but also to perform artificial reasoning in addition to the 
human reasoning. For applying the machine reasoning (CBR) we need to encode cases 
and human knowledge stored in the brain of engineers to the CBR language. 
 
The codes used in the Creek framework language are called “entities”. In the Creek 
framework, both ontology and cases are represented by “entities” and 
“relationships” between the entities as shown in the previous section; therefore, 
the entities are playing an important role in Creek. How to create and name the 
“entities” is the first and main step in developing and constructing “ontology” and 
“case”. There is no standard yet for this issue, particularly for the petroleum engineering 
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applications. The related challenge is the lack of a unified language for oil well 
engineering. There is now a project running in several large oil companies for 
standardizing wellsite information which is called Wellsite Information Standard 
Markup Language (WITSML), (Companies, 2007). WITSML is a proposed standard 
and unified language for transmitting technical data between oil companies, service 
companies, drilling contractors, and application vendors. As this project is on-going we 
have not used the results of that work for naming the entities. This thesis can be 
considered the first attempt in this matter. The defined rules for naming entities are 
necessary for using the ontology model for upgrading and developing purposes. 
Nevertheless, there are limitations and challenges for defining the unique procedure for 
naming the entities.  
 
2.3.1 Naming entities in the Wellogy model 
During this study the naming of entities has been found to be a challenge and time 
consuming issue when building ontology and cases. A lot of discussions have been done 
on these topics throughout performing this research work. In fact, an entity in the 
Wellogy model is a concept which can be one word or combination of many words such 
as phrases. Each entity has a meaning in each particular domain. The writing format of 
an entity which contains more than one word, e.g. “Drilling Fluid”, needs to be 
clarified. Here are some options: 
 
1. Using space between words and capitalized each word: “Drilling Fluid” 
2. Running the words together (without space) and capitalize each new word: 
“DrillingFluid” 
3. Using underscore or dash or other delimiter in the name: “Drilling-
Fluid” 
 
In this study option 1 has been used. Whatever option is chosen, the aim is to name 
entity phrases as short and meaningful as possible. However, for some entity names 
which are not so clear at first glance, additional words are needed. Some entities which 
represent parameters, the values / attributes are added in addition to the main name of 
that entity, e.g. High Mud Density. However, it is possible to separate values / 
attributes from the main name of the entity by a dash line (-); for instance, Drilling 
Fluid Density-High. 
 
An entity name represents a collection of objects. For instance, entity “Drilling 
Fluid” actually represents all drilling fluids. Therefore, it can be more natural for 
some designers to call the entity “Drilling Fluids” rather than “Drilling 
Fluid”. However, whatever the choice, it should be consistent throughout the whole 
ontology. Most of the entities are written in the singular form in this study. 
 
The entity names in the ontology can be written in a way which is totally depending on 
the developer without any justification. However, when new users want to continue or 
reuse the existing model which has been developed by a former person, they require 
guidelines or a manual for further evolution of the ontology in order to avoiding 
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repetition the naming entities. If repetition in naming entities occurs, the quality of the 
CBR model may be decreased.   
 
The searching function for an entity name in the Creek knowledge editor uses an 
alphabetically sorted list. Therefore, the first letter of the entity is important for the 
manual searching process. As mentioned before, entity names can be a phrase that 
contains words and sometimes numbers. These words have to be defined in the Wellogy 
model somehow to have meaning and also make it easy for later searching. The existing 
ontology has been constructed based on the natural oil well language. This approach has 
some advantages particularly for better understanding for entities that are more common 
in the drilling vocabulary, e.g. “Stuck Pipe”. For other entities which are not used 
frequently in oil the well engineering domain, it has a disadvantage, e.g. 
“Management Inadequate Maintenance Routine”. Moreover, it can also 
be a challenge for well known entity names when they are expanded with suffixes e.g. 
“Stuck Pipe”.  This entity can be renamed or even a new entity can be created by 
another user who later wants to evolve the model, e.g.  “Problem Is Stuck 
Pipe”. Another example is “Mud Density High” which can be named as “High 
Mud Density”. To date, Wellogy is not able to recognize these two entities as one 
entity or even as synonym (because it is not yet built in). Therefore, the current 
searching function may not be useful for new users due to a lack of procedure or guide 
map. 
 
Based on the discussed challenges, some guidelines for naming and indexing entities are 
required before implementing cases or constructing an ontology. The basic rules for 
naming entities used in this thesis are listed as below: 
  
1. Meaningful; the first priority for naming entities is its meaning 
2. Generalization instead of specification; it means that the phrase of entity should 
be created somehow to reuse them in new cases.  Generalization has advantage 
when searching for entities 
3. Predictability 
4. Short and simple as possible 
 
The entity names were formatted by considering the following rules: 
 
1. Single and multi-words entities are allowed 
2. Using space between the words 
3. Capitalized first letters entity name (exception for relationships) 
4. Avoiding digital numbers without having names as entity 
 
When the entities consist of many words such as phrases or clauses, the ordering of the 
words will then become important. It is difficult to create ordering rules which could 
always be valid entirely during the process of creating ontology. However, after testing 
some cases and ontologies in Creek as trial attempts, we have found the following basic 
rules for ordering the words as entities in the Wellogy model. For clarifying these rules, 
we give some examples in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. 
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1. Values or attributes come at the beginning of the entity names (e.g. High Well 
Pressure) 
2. Generally the order of the words for an entity is as follow: value / attributes, 
verbal phrases, tangible object, and non-objects (concepts), (e.g. Very High 
Repeated Bit Balling). 
3. Verbal phases are allowed. Three forms of verbal phrases may be used; 
imperative, participial form and gerund form. Imperative verbal form 
represents task of the case and appear at the first of the entity name 
(e.g. Increase Mud Density). Participial verbal form gives the value to the 
entity (e.g. Increased Mud Density) and gerund verbal form gives the 
meaning to entities as activity (e.g. Increasing Mud Density). 
4. To facilitate of developing ontology, for example, recognizing which entity is 
belong to which main braches or super-class names, designers can level-up 
(subclass) naming entity to help in the searching process. At least two level-ups 
are practical. The level and main entity name is separated by a colon. For 
example, Anger is subclass of Human, and Human is subclass of State; it can 
be level-up as State:Human:Anger. 
5. Using “is” as a connector between words where it is necessary. This helps in 
understanding the meaning of the entity. 
Table 2.4  Examples of ordering the naming entities containing many words. 
Entity Value Object Non-object 
Single word High Well Pressure 
Dual word Very High Bit Type Capillary Pressure 
Multi word NA Bit Type is PDC Total Drilling Time 
Table 2.5 Examples for different kind of entities. 
Entity Examples 
Numbers Year 2002 Hole Size 12-1/4"   
Combination Very High Mud Viscosity 
Temporal Pipe stuck While Connection 
Special Gas Leakage Through Wellhead 
Functional Increased Mud Density Gradually 
Level-up rule State State: Human State: Human: Anger 
Imperative (task) Change Bit Reduce Mud Density   
Gerund (activity) Making Hole Cementing Running Casing 
V
er
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Participial (state) Increased Well Pressure     
 
2.3.2 Ontology development in the Wellogy model 
The uppermost level of the Wellogy model that oil well ontology is started from is 
shown in Figure 2.16. 
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Figure 2.16 Integration of uppermost level of the ontology of the Creek system (student 
version, version 0.96 created at 20/01/2006) and the Wellogy model (the red dotted 
line is the integration line).  
As the content of the cases is melted into the ontology structure, the ontology should 
reflect the case information. Most of the information and knowledge would belong to 
the Symbol node as shown in Figure 2.16. The oil well ontology is extended under the 
following main entities which are subclasses of the Symbol: 
 
¾ Physical object, Tangible Object 
¾ State 
¾ Descriptive Thing, Role Descriptor, Parameter 
¾ Spatiotemporal Entity, Process 
¾ Task 
¾ Case 
 
These main branches used for ontology development of the Wellogy model are 
explained below. 
 
State means [A collection of things at a snapshot of time (non-temporal entity). A state 
may be simple, such as a value of a parameter, or complex, such as a total (static) 
situation. (A collection of things in a temporal extension of time is called an event] 
(TrollCreek, 2007). “Snapshot of time” means a short time period in a time interval, and 
“non-temporal” means describing processes or features which is not changed or 
endured over a period of the time. 
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As the Wellogy model is exclusively based on symbolic entities, all numerical values 
must be translated into the qualitative values, just like the relationships / strengths which 
already have been translated from verb to strength number (e.g. causes has strength 
value o.7). There are several ways of defining the magnitude or level of qualitative 
parameters. In the Wellogy model, each parameter may be defined in five levels as 
shown in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Five levels for describing parameter used in the Wellogy model. 
Level Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 
1 very high very large very long very shallow 
2 high large long shallow 
3 medium medium medium medium 
4 low small short deep 
5 very low very small very short very deep 
  
2.3.3 Oil well cases 
Cases can be defined in many shapes and sizes in the oil well domain. In respect of 
duration of a case built in the Wellogy model, two types of cases can be considered. The 
first case type may cover a short period situation (episode); for example, stuck pipe in a 
specific depth and time (assume 2 days). The second case type can cover a long period 
case; for example, the case for low production performance covers the entire field life. 
The second case type can be sometimes considered as a combination of many situations 
of shorter periods (first type). 
 
From activities and process points of view, a case can be modelled in the Wellogy 
model with different shapes, particularly for oil well drilling. Table 2.7 shows the many 
different time scale for building a case in the oil well drilling engineering domain. 
Table 2.7 Different case shapes used in the Wellogy model. 
Case type Time interval Example 
Case based on field The case covers a rather long period of the field history, years 
Study of low production 
performance- diagnosis 
Case based on well Drill a complete well, months Study of different down-time causes 
Case based on drilled 
hole section Drilling particular hole section, weeks 
Mud losses encounter in a hole 
section 
Case based on geology 
formation 
Drill a particular information interval, 
days 
Hole instability in a specific 
formation 
Case based on bit run From bit running into the hole to bit pulling out of the hole, days 
Study of bit penetration rate 
problems - diagnosis 
Case based on incident From alarm state of the incident to repair and solved the incident, hours or days One stuck pipe incident 
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The structure of cases in Wellogy consists of: 
 
¾ General case description; contains entities which give a general introduction to 
the case which may or may not have minor contribution to the reasoning 
process (e.g. Well Name,  Field Name, Country Name, and so on) 
¾ Case administrative issues: (e.g.  has failure, has task, has 
solution, has outcome, has case status) - this information is 
necessary for all of the cases 
¾ Description of the problem; contains entities which give explanations to the 
problem (e.g. observations, deviations, repair actions, parameter changes, 
activities, alarm and failure states to answer these questions: how, when, where 
the problem happened?)  
¾ The solution of the problem: the solution gives an answer to the task, e.g. the 
task can be to find the cause, and then the solution is the cause of the problem. 
¾ Outcome of solution: gives the degree of success after the implementation of 
the solution 
¾ Texts: texts are given to the case to assist in better understanding the case and 
can be used after case retrieval (e.g. lesson learned, operators explanation and 
recommendation, pointers to relevant databases of the oil company, URLs) 
 
During our study we have found the following procedure for implementing a case in the 
Wellogy model:  
 
1. Reading the document describing the episode carefully and evaluate for 
consideration as a case or not 
2. Specify the purpose of the case; i.e. for what reason we want to store it in the 
Creek memory. This is an important checkpoint because this will affect 
structure and contents of the case later 
3. The case will be abstracted so that it contains the most important parts of a 
case, such as; problem/situation description, solution, and outcome. 
4. Translating text to symbols 
5. Integration of different parts of the case and existing ontology in order to 
facilitate the retrieving process 
6. Building the case and supplementing the Wellogy model (bottoms-up process) 
through the Creek framework. 
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3. Assessment of Well Integrity Cases 
3.1 Motivation 
Well Integrity has been defined by the Norwegian Standard of Petroleum (NORSOK) 
(NORSOK-STANDARD, 2004) as “The application of technical, operational and 
organizational solutions to reduce the risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids 
throughout the life cycle of the well”. This is an effective definition and has been 
adopted by many operators such as BP in Alaska (Anders et al., 2006).  According to 
this definition, the well integrity is important to retain during the drilling and production 
phases. Here, the attention is given to well integrity during the production phase. The 
well integrity has impact on two important issues; safety and efficient oil recovery. 
When one pressure barrier has failed, the well will be closed due to safety reasons and 
as a consequence, if the problem is not repairable, the well will be abandoned and a new 
well must be drilled. Thus, the overall oil recovery will decrease in the long-term 
perspective. 
 
The well integrity problems are a growing concern to several of the Norwegian offshore 
fields as well as other places in the world in terms of safety, well lifecycles; change the 
use of the wells, and overall oil recovery (Abdollahi et al., 2007). Due to growing 
number of mature fields, well integrity management has gained more emphasis in recent 
years. The well integrity goal is to prolong the well lifecycle and sustain oil production 
in an acceptable safe operation in areas where potential economic and HSE 
consequences are high. Annulus well leakage is identified as a typical challenge for well 
integrity for both production and injection wells. Diagnoses, localization and handling 
of different kinds of leaks need a special approach to understand a very complex 
picture. Huge amounts of data need to be addressed and changing operational histories 
and different well components must be included. The result of indirect measurements 
for monitor downhole well conditions for diagnoses and localization of the leaks may be 
inconclusive and uncertain. Different processes are involved in well integrity, for 
instance; human factors, technology, well conditions and so on. It becomes a challenge 
to find correct causal relationships.  
 
A case-based approach for leaking wells is performed based on offshore oil field data to 
understand the complexity of causal relationships related to the well leakages. A 
knowledge-base is built for implementing Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) to improve 
overall well integrity based on leaking and non-leaking wells. For this purpose 
chronological documentation of the well activities, observations, actions and outcomes 
during well lifecycle has been studied.  
 
This chapter discusses well integrity on the basis of experience from many oil and gas 
fields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf gained by SINTEF Petroleum Research 
through a long-term project study (Abdollahi et al., 2006). Initially, the statistic 
approach integrated with human reasoning has been used in this study to understand the 
complexity of causal relationships for the leaking wells. Afterwards, we decided to 
systemize and formulate this study by applying the CBR methodology as computer 
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reasoning through the PhD programme by developing the Wellogy model in the Creek 
system. Therefore, this chapter will first explain and describe the well integrity issues 
textually in the different perspectives such as; leak components, related problems, 
causes, and solutions. Then, the cases will be given as a free text format (knowledge 
level). In Chapter 4, the cases together with the ontology will be defined and translated 
to codes (symbolic level) and implemented in Creek. Finally, the obtained results will 
be analysed and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
After each technical discussion, the important findings and human reasoning behind that 
concept are abstractly given as an example at the end of each paragraph (written in a 
different font). These information will be modified according to the Wellogy model in 
Chapter 4, and they will be used as input data to the model. For all leaking well cases 
which are intended to be modelled in Creek, a textual explanation is given for each case 
in Appendix A.  
 
3.2 Well integrity in knowledge level (free text) 
Totally eight oil fields in the North Sea area have been studied and audited for well 
integrity issues through a research project for Norsk Hydro. These fields are: Brage, 
Grane, Njord, Troll, Oseberg B, Oseberg C, Oseberg East, and Oseberg South. The 
definition of well integrity can be wide. However, in this study, well integrity is limited 
to the internal well leakage issues (i.e. annulus well leaks). Many wells have been 
reported and closed due to the annulus well leaks. Well integrity has been studied for 
the following industrial well applications: 
 
¾ Production wells with and without using gas lift system (i.e. artificial lift for 
boosting oil) 
¾ Water injection wells 
¾ Gas injection wells  
¾ Water Alternative Gas injection wells (WAG) 
 
Symbolic-level 
Name of Operating Area (e.g. Norwegian Continental Shelf) 
Name of the Field (e.g. Oseberg East)  
Well Type (e.g. WAG Well) 
 
The well constructions and components for different well types are explained before 
discussing different well leaks and related causes.  
 
3.3 Well integrity components 
Well construction can be different according to the industrial application of the well as 
well as completion strategy. A typical well construction including major components 
and basic concepts in relation to the well integrity issue for an injection or natural 
production well (e.g. without gas lift system) is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 shows 
a typical production well using gas lift. For a production well using gas lift, the well 
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construction is different (more components involved) compared to for example a simple 
production well (not using gas lift). Therefore, the well barrier philosophy will also be 
different for those two well types. The well barrier issues will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
BMV
TMV
Annulus A
Annulus B
Annulus C
7 " liner
Reservoir
9–5/8 "
Production packer
7" hanger
Cap rock
Completion fluid
13–3/8 "
10–3/4 " Tie-Back
9-5/8 " hanger
18–5/8 "
ASV
BSV
Legend
Production packer
Polish bore receptacle
Downhole safety valve (DHV, BSV)
Tubing and casing hanger and seal assembly
Downhole pressure and temperature gauge (DHG)
Production master valve
Cement sheath
 
Figure 3.1 A typical well construction with important well components related to the well 
integrity for an injection or production well (without gas lift system). 
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Figure 3.2 A typical well construction with important well components related to well 
integrity for a production well using gas lift system. 
 
The annulus leak is defined as the escape of the reservoir and injection fluids through 
the completion and casings tubulars of the well. For simplification, a schematic 
presentation of a simulated well shows the relative volumes, pressure seals, and possible 
leak paths is depicted in Figure 3.3. The relative well volumes which are important for 
leak studies are; completion tubing, annulus-A, and annulus-B. Annulus-A is the 
volume surrounded by the completion string (production tubing) and production casing 
while annulus-B is the volume surrounded by the production casing (liner + tie-back) 
and the intermediate casing, for example 13-3/8”. Depending on the application of the 
well, annulus-A can be either active (dynamic flow and pressure involved for example 
using gas lift) or non-active (static condition for example injection wells). In the gas lift 
wells for example, the gas is pumped through the annulus valve of the wellhead through 
annulus-A and into the completion tubing via the gas lift valve (GLV). Therefore, 
annulus-A is an active volume while annulus-B is an inactive volume. The following 
scenarios for leakage through the annuli may occur: 
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¾ Leak crossing completion tubing to annulus-A, either through the completion 
components (e.g. PBR, GLV, packer) or tubing bodies and connections) 
¾ Leak crossing annulus-A to annulus-B, either through the tie-back system 
(junction between shallow casing and liner as shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2) 
or casing bodies and connections 
 
The casing cements and production packers act as pressure seal elements (well barrier) 
at the deepest part of a well construction, while the “wellhead seal assemblies” and 
“wellhead valves” act as pressure seal elements at the surface of a well construction as 
shown in Figure 3.3. These pressure seal elements must withstand any unwanted leaks 
through these elements during the well lifecycle. Tubing volume is directly exposed to 
the reservoir pressure and temperature when the reservoir fluids start to flow through 
this conduit (blue in Figure 3.3). Therefore, one source of possible leaks can be the 
reservoir fluids which may escape from the tubing volume. Another leak source is 
injected gas lift fluids which flow through the annulus-A (yellow in Figure 3.3). These 
fluids may escape from annulus-A and penetrate to annulus-B. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Leaks between relative well volumes; tubing and annuli (red arrows). 
To meet the well barrier requirements, two surface controlled sub-surface safety valves 
(SCSSV) are needed for gas lift wells; one is placed along to the completion string 
which is called BSV and the other one is placed within annulus-A that is called ASV 
(see Figure 3.4). The typical depths of these two valves are 200-500 m MD respectively 
(ASV is deeper than BSV). These two valves are controlled from the surface by using a 
small hydraulic pipe which is called the control line. The valves are regularly tested to 
ensure that they can withstand the design pressures during the operations (production / 
injection). This test is called the in-flow test. The possible leak paths crossing these 
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valves are shown in Figure 3.4. These types of leaks can be named “leak within one 
volume”. As shown in Figure 3.4, there are three kinds of leaks which might happen; 1) 
leaks crossing the annulus safety valve (ASV), 2) leak crossing the tubing safety valve 
(BSV), 3) leak crossing the X-mas tree (wellhead).  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Leaks crossing within one volume (red arrows). 
 
As a standard, two independent well barriers are required for any operations. Most of 
the internal well leakages lead to the destruction or reduce the functionality of well 
barriers. The NORSOK standard (NORSOK-D-010, 2004) has defined “well barrier” as 
“envelope of one or several dependent barrier elements preventing liquids or gases 
flowing unintentionally from the formation into another formation or to surface”. Based 
on this regulation each well must to be equipped with “two independent” barriers which 
are called “primary barrier” and “secondary barrier”. The “primary barrier” and 
“secondary barrier” are defined as the first and second objects that prevent unwanted 
flow from one source to other sources on to the surface (surrounding). Figure 3.5 
illustrates the well barriers elements and important well components for a typical 
production well using gas lift system. The blue line in the figure refers the primary 
barrier and the red line refers secondary barrier. In the right-hand side of the figure; the 
red box defines secondary barrier elements, the blue box defines primary barrier 
elements and the green box defines legends used in the figure.  
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Production packer
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Cap rock
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Production packer, tie-back packer, ASV packer
Gas lift valve (GLV)
Chemical injection  valve (CIV)
Polish bore receptacle (PBR)
Downhole safety valve (DHV, BSV)
Tubing and casing hanger and seal assembly
Downhole pressure and temperature gauge (DHG)
Production master valves
Reservoir fluids
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Packer fluid
 
Figure 3.5 Typical well schematic for production well with gas lift system showing well 
barriers and important well components related to well integrity. 
Because of the importance of the well barrier concepts, a new well barrier schematic has 
been drawn for better understanding in Figure 3.6. This figure demonstrates a typical 
schematic well barrier diagram for a natural production well (without gas lift) or an 
injection well. The blue and red boxes denote the primary and secondary well barriers 
respectively which function as pressure and flow seal elements between the reservoir 
and surface. For simplicity, the well construction has been drown in three different 
volumes; tubing, annulus-A, and annulus-B. When oil production starts to flow, the 
reservoir fluids fill the tubing volume and the annular volume below the production 
packer. The primary barrier for the two flow paths (i.e. completion tubing and annulus-
A) are the BSV and the production packer as shown in Figure 3.6. However, cross-
leakages can occur from the production tubing (below the BSV) to annulus-A, the 
interval between BSV depth and production packer depth. The main components which 
should withstand such leakages are: the tubing body and connections, PBR, GLV and 
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other completion auxiliaries. These elements are also considered as the primary barrier 
for the production and injection wells. The secondary barriers which function as back-
up seal elements are surface wellhead valves such as master valve or annulus valves 
(shown in the red boxes in Figure 3.6). Another secondary barrier is the 9-5/8” casing 
which function as a seal when a leak crosses from the production tubing to annulus-A. 
In some well designs, tie-back casing may be run to the top liner instead of one piece 
casing. There are connector elements which link the tubing to annulus-A and denote the 
tubing hanger seal and the tubing itself shown in yellow in Figure 3.6.  For example, if 
the tubing hanger seal (located in the wellhead area) is leaking, then a fluid 
communication between the tubing volume and annulus-A will take place. This 
situation is not accepted according to the regulations. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Well barrier diagram for a production or injection well. 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the well barrier diagram for a gas lifted oil production well. In such 
wells, the annulus safety valve (ASV) is used for back-up safety in case of blowing out 
through the injected gas lift. So the ASV is used to increase the overall risk to the 
platform facilities with regard to fire or explosions (Grassick, 1992). Norwegian 
petroleum regulation (PSA) stipulate detailed requirements for the use of ASV in the 
gas lift completions in the Norwegian oil fields  (Petroleumtilsynet, 2005). However, 
the application of annulus safety valves is not only limited to gas lift wells but can also 
can be used in other applications such as dual production wells in order to control the 
annulus flow.  
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Figure 3.7 Well barrier diagram for gas lifted oil production well. 
 
Extracted symbolic-level (examples) 
¾ Completion Components (e.g. ASV, BSV, Casing); as 
physical object  
¾ Well Annulus (e.g. Annulus-A; as Textual Descriptive 
¾ Location of the Leak (e.g. Surface Leak / Downhole Leak 
¾ Annulus Pressure Observations (e.g. Pressure Build-up 
in Annulus A); indicate the leak locations 
 
3.4 Leak observations 
Initially, the leaks are observed at the surface (wellhead area) by continuously 
monitoring the wellhead pressures during the production. Then, the investigations for 
identifying and localizing the leak(s) are established by running the leak detection log 
(sonic and temperature logs). The location of a leak is important to know before 
performing any treatments. However, in many cases there are limitations to detect 
downhole leaks either technically (leakages are too small) or economically (high 
intervention cost particularly in the subsea wells). There are generally two methods used 
to locate the depth of a leak: 
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¾ Pressure modelling study - the intersection point of two pressure gradient 
curves is considered as leak depth where the pressure reaches equilibrium 
(software method) 
¾ Running sonic logs (leakage detector log) 
 
When a leak is located, the in-depth investigations are performed to find the cause or 
causal relationships of the leak in order to repair the existing leak and avoid or mitigate 
such possible leaks in new wells (lessons learned). Leaks tend to show up during 
specific well phases (i.e. installation, production, injections, testing). The time 
references (time distance between installation and leak occurrence) and activity at the 
time of leaks are important to know for making preliminary reasoning to suggest the 
cause of the leaks. Figure 3.8 illustrates these links between the annulus leaks and the 
well activities in different phases. This figure shows that there are three main phases 
that a leak can occur or be discovered during; 1) installation testing, 2) operations 
(production / injection), 3) routine test (in-flow test for BSV and ASV). For instance, 
assume a leak occurs during the installation phase or just after installation (completion 
of the well), the casing corrosion cannot be an issue for such leak, but other reasons 
such as; casing wear, equipment malfunctioning, and insufficient testing procedures, are 
likely. Another situation can be for example during “non-steady state operation”, i.e. the 
operation changes from one state to another state (e.g., start-up gas injection (GI), water 
injection (WI, change rate of oil production, closing the well). These conditions 
obviously change the pressures and temperatures of wells which then lead to high 
thermal and pressure load cycles on the well constructions and cause leakages through 
completion components (packers, PBRs, etc.) and tubular threads.  
 
leak
During operationDuring installation testing During routine test
Steady state operation Non-steady state operation
Shut-in operationVariation of flow rate(vibration)
Start-up operation
(GL, WI, GI)
Thermal and pressure loads
Relative movement of strings
Packer, PBR, Tie-back
Tubular threads
Annulus safety valve
Down hole safety valve
Casing wear
Equipment 
Installation procedure
Corrosion
Fatigue
Fluid chemistery
 
Figure 3.8 Likely cause(s) of the annulus leaks versus well activity (phases). 
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The effect of thermal and pressure loads on a WAG well has been calculated by this 
author (Abdollahi et al., 2006).  Figure 3.9 shows the result of these calculations. The 
smooth lines show the axial loads, without considering bending loads, on completion 
tubing from the surface to the production packer depth in a deviated well for different 
well conditions; landing, setting the packer, pressure testing, water injection, and gas 
injection. The two non-smooth lines are simulation results when considering bending 
effects (due to the actual dog-leg severity) for water injection scenario (blue curve) and 
gas injection scenario (yellowish curve). The calculations show that helical bucking is 
likely to occur at the bottom of the completion tubing (close to the packer) for the gas 
injection scenario. The helical bucking means that high compression loads are applied 
to the completion tubing leading to connection leaks. It should be noted that PBR 
(compensation tool for shortening and lengthening of the completion tubing) was not 
used for this typical well, because it was thought that PBR itself could lead to leakage. 
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Figure 3.9 Axial loads for different well conditions considering bending stress (Abdollahi et 
al., 2006). 
The design and installation of the well are important phases for well integrity issues. 
The low sealability of tubular connections (threads) and insufficient testing procedures 
can be more challenging for wells where the system is gas (e.g. gas injection or gas 
lifted wells) due to higher compressibility compared to oil and water. Sufficient testing 
time is important to compensate for temperature effects. Therefore, the tendency for 
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leaks in the gas lift wells and gas injection wells is higher than for example in 
production wells without gas lift. Typical testing time for most of the wells is around 10 
minutes and testing fluid is generally mud (contain particles) which therefore cannot 
represent real conditions when the system is gas. Casing wear creates casing ovality and 
sometimes cause micro leaks around the production packer which can be controlled or 
minimized during drilling (minimize drillstring rotation). The design envelope for the 
well must reflect real conditions for the pressure and temperature changes during the 
well lifecycle, because the relative movements of the tubular strings take place due to 
high temperature and pressure changes, leading to leaks crossing downhole components 
(packers & PBRs) and tubular connections (tool joints). This effect has been seen in the 
WAG wells (low water temperature and high gas temperature). 
 
Extracted symbolic-level for causal relationship (examples) 
¾ Casing Wear sometimes causes Micro Leak around Packer  
¾ Early Leak indicates Insufficient Testing Procedure  
¾ High Temperature Changes leads to High Thermal Load 
Cycles which causes Tubular Connection Leak 
¾ Helical Buckling indicates High Compression Load which 
leads to Tubular Connection Leak 
  
3.5 Tie-back systems 
The relationship between different tie-back systems and reported leaks has been 
reviewed as part of this study. The six tieback systems have been recognized for the 
studied fields as illustrated in Figure 3.10. These tie-back systems are explained below: 
 
A. This system is the most common design for most of the wells that have been 
drilled and completed from fixed platforms. In this scenario a packer is used at 
the bottom of the tie-back (above the PBR of the tie-back) as a back-up. The 
GLV depth is deeper than the tie-back. 
B. This system is used in pre-drilled wells, i.e. the wells that have been drilled 
from floating rigs and later completed from the fixed platform. 
C. This system is similar to system A, apart from the fact that the position of the 
gas lift valve is placed above the tie-back seal assembly. 
D. This system is not a common design. It has been used only for well E-1 on 
Oseberg East. The tie-back packer was accidentally set before reaching the 
target depth due to running problems. As can be seen, the completion fluid is 
directly exposed to the external 13-3/8”casing.  
E. This system has a one piece casing (no tie-back in the string) 
F. This system is used for injector wells. 
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System A System B System C System E System FSystem D
 
Figure 3.10 Different tie-back configuration systems in fields used in Oseberg East, Oseberg 
South, and Grane fields 
Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the relationship between leak components and tie-
back systems for different well applications for the three fields, in order to find possible 
causal relationships or trends for the mentioned issues. 
Table 3.1 Leak components for different tie-back systems and wells for field Oseberg East (P 
= production well, WAG = water alternative gas injection, E = early leak) -texts in 
red show leak components, casing and tie-back (TB), which may relate to the tie-
back system. 
tie-back system 
Well 
A B C D E F 
E-1 (P)    OK   
E-2 (P)-E     WH/CIV/CSG  
E-3 (P) CSG above ASV      
E-4 (P) TB /PBR (CIV leak)      
E-5 (P)     OK  
E-6 (WAG)      OK 
E-7 (P)     PBR/packer/GLM  
E-8 (P)   OK    
E-9 (WAG)- E     PBR/packer  
E-11 (WAG)-E      GLM 
E-12 (WAG)     OK  
E-14 (WAG)-E      ASV 
E-15 (P) CSG above ASV      
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Table 3.2 Leak components for different tie-back systems and wells for field Oseberg South 
(P = production well, WAG = water alternative gas injection, E = early leak). 
tie-back system 
Well 
A B C D E F 
F-5 (P)   OK    
F-12 (P) OK      
F-14 (WAG)-E PBR      
F-16 (WAG)-E   complex    
F-17 (P)   OK    
F-22 (P) WH      
F-24 (P)   
CSG below 
GLV (CIV leak)
   
F-25 (P)   OK    
F-28 (P)   OK    
F-29 (P) -E   
CSG probably 
below ASV 
   
F-30 (WAG)-E     packer  
 
Table 3.3 Leak components for different tie-back systems and wells for field Grane (P = 
production well, GI = gas injection well, E = early leak). 
tie-back system 
Well 
A B C D E F 
C-5 (P) OK      
C-6 (P) OK      
C-8 (P) OK      
C-9 (P) OK      
C-10 (P)  OK     
C-11 (P)  OK     
C-17 (P)  OK     
C-18 (P)  OK     
C-19 (P)- E  TB     
C-20 (GI)  GI     
C-21 (P)  OK     
C-22 (P)  OK     
C-24 (GI)     OK  
G-25 (P)  OK     
G-26 (P)   -E  WH     
G-27 (P)  OK     
G-28 (P)  OK     
G-40 (P) OK      
 
 
 47
Extracted symbolic-level for causal relationship (examples) 
 
¾ Tie-back System A for Production Wells implies Casing 
Leak for Field Oseberg East 
¾ Tie-back System C for Production Wells implies Casing 
Leak for Field Oseberg South 
 
3.6 Leak classifications 
In order to construct and model the knowledge for leaking well cases in the Wellogy 
system, leakages are classified into three different perspectives: 
 
1. Leak classification based on the relative contained volume of the well as shown 
in Figure 3.3: 
 
¾ Leak crossing from the completion tubing to annulus-A (T to A). Likely leak 
components are; 
o Completion components such as, PBR, GLV. CIV and etc 
o Completion tuning body and tool joints 
o Tubing hanger seal 
¾ Leak crossing from annulus-A to annulus-B (A to B) 
o Tie-back system 
o Casing body and tool joints 
o Casing hanger seal 
¾ Leak crossing annulus-B to annulus-C (B to C) 
o Casing body and tool joints 
o Casing hanger seal 
 
2. Leak classification based on leak components: 
 
¾ Leak through production packer 
¾ Leak through completion telescope joint or Polish-Bore Receptacle (PBR) 
¾ Leak through casing tie-back system 
¾ Leak through tubings or casings body or connections 
¾ Leak through gas lift valve (GLV) or gas lift mandrel (GLM) 
¾ Leak through chemical injection valve (CIV) 
¾ Leak through control line to ASV and BSV 
¾ Leak through down hole safety valves; BSV and ASV 
¾ Leak crossing hanger seals (tubing and casing) 
 
3. Leak classification based on the time of the leak occurrence 
 
¾ Early leak; including leaks that occurred in the early operation phase up to 
approximately one month from the starting time of the production / injection 
¾ Late leak; including leaks happened in the late operation phase, after one 
month from the starting time of the production / injection 
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3.7 Important field observations and trends related to leaks 
In this section, human reasoning is made based on the important findings and trends 
gained from the three studied fields. All kinds of leaks for leaking wells were collected 
for three fields.  Figure 3.11 gives an overview for the three fields. As shown, 8 kinds of 
leaks have been recognized assuming that the severity of leak components increase 
upwards in of the bar chart. 
 
The human reasoning is given below: 
 
¾ Wells in Oseberg East have higher potential for leaks than in Oseberg South 
and Grane. This can be due to the life of the wells, or different operating 
conditions such as; pressure, temperature, corrosion environmental (different 
from the other field). Notice that three fields have artificial gas lifting systems.  
¾ The Grane field is a rather new field; therefore, as expected there are no 
reported casing leaks (the cause of this kind of leak is believed to be corrosion)  
 
 
Figure 3.11 Different leak components for the three studied fields. 
Figure 3.12 gives an overview of the overall well integrity with respect to time of leak 
and application of the wells for three example fields (Oseberg East, Oseberg South, and 
Grane). The early leaks are referred to as leaks which occur just after installation and 
late leaks are referred to as leaks which occur after a long period after installation. This 
chart indicates that the most of leaks for the gas lift wells are considered as late leaks, 
while for injection wells for example they are considered as early leaks. The reasoning 
can be as explained below: 
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In the gas lift wells, the system is more corrosive than the injection wells, and the gas 
lift is exposed generally to the 9-5/8” casings which are non-chrome casing and cause 
low corrosion resistance against the corrosive gas, while 7” completion tubing is more 
robust and equipped with 13 % chrome (high tubular quality). It seems that the gas 
wells suffer from the corrosion effect, while the injection wells suffer from thermal and 
pressure loads in the beginning of the operation phase. 
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Figure 3.12 Early and late leaks for different well applications for three oil fields (Oseberg 
South, Oseberg East, Grane). 
3.8 Important findings and related actions 
Based on the lessons learned and observations from the leaking wells, the important 
findings and related actions are given for different phases of a well. The relations 
between the findings and actions can be used later for building a causal relationship 
model in the Wellogy system for modelling leaking wells. Table 3.4, Table 3.5 and Table 
3.6 summarize the important findings and actions for improving well integrity issues in 
the different well phases: design, drilling, completion, and production. 
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Table 3.4 Findings and actions for improving well integrity regarding leaking wells during 
the design phase. 
Items Finding Action
Connections exposed to excessive compressive forces
due to thermal effect
Utilizing connection with 100 % compression
strength- performing gas sealability connection test
on compression condition
High bending forces due to high dogleg severity cause
excessive compression stress in one side and tensile
stress in the other side of the connections
Simulate the real dog-leg conditions on the
connection performance at laboratory scale.
Simulator program should to be upgraded to reflect
the dogleg factor on connection specifications
Tie-backs (TB) are potential leak location for gas lifted
wells where the GLV is below the TB depth (gas
exposed to TB). This problem has mostly been
observed in wells without TB's packer
If possible, the depth of deepest GLV should be
above the TB to avoid gas exposure to TB
Gas compositions such as CO2, H2S and water are not
within the initial input specification for material
selection in the design phase
PVT of gas of GL should be checked before final
design. The use of 13 % CR CSG is recommended
for CSG which are exposed to gas lift
In most gas lifted wells, the hanger seals were
elastomer seal type which are not qualified for gas
system
Metal seal for both tubing and casing hanger seal
are recommended for wells whenever the fluid is
gas (gas lifted wells & gas injections)
WAG wells
WAG wells may be exposed to large load cycle effects
because of changing temperature and pressure within
a short period. This causes extra axial loads on
completion and inner casings and tie-backs
The critical conditions should be considered in the
design phase. Simulation at laboratory scale is
needed for connection performance when
temperature and pressure are cyclically changed 
Casing 
string
Gas lift well
Design phase
 
 
Table 3.5 Findings and actions for improving well integrity regarding leaking wells during 
drilling and completion phase. 
Finding Action
Packer installation problems and in some wells micro-
leaks around the packer were observed
Log the casing wear to map the important
parameters- Minimize rotation time in casing and use
hard-banding drill pipe.
Mandatory training of best practice casing handling
and running
Specialized service for tubular handling
Dope-free connections to eliminate contamination
Measure casing wear to establish data
Consider hard banding
Introduce new pressure test fluid for wellheads, N2
Increase pressure testing time
Perform FEA on tubulars with significant wear
patterns in order to calculate remaining strength
properties
Perform sensitivity testing of packers inside casing
(liner) which are exposed for wear
ASV leaking due to deposition of material on seal area Improve washing procedure
Poor connection make up procedures
Casing wear
Procedure for pressure testing
Drilling and completion phase
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Table 3.6 Findings and actions for improving well integrity regarding leaking wells during 
production phase. 
Items Finding Action
Verify fluid compositions over time
Dry gas by an extra heat exchanger
Production phase
Wet gas plus CO2 lead to corrosive environment
Gas lift 
wells
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4. Modelling of Well Integrity Cases in Wellogy 
The leaking well cases which have been generally discussed in Chapter 3 are evaluated 
and modelled in the Wellogy model in the Creek framework.  So far cases have been 
presented and evaluated in a text format as explained in the previous chapter, and also in 
the form of references (documents and database). That part of the analysis is named 
knowledge-level (KL). In the Chapter 4 - upcoming process which is named symbolic-
level (SL), the cases are encoded into the Wellogy model. The textual information and 
summarized information is given for each case in Appendix A. 
 
4.1 Process of establishing the symbolic level 
The following steps are done chronologically for creating a case and building / 
expanding the ontology used in the Wellogy model, and made possible in Creek system: 
 
1. Design a database template for all leaking well cases (KL) 
2. Perform human reasoning based on all cases to find relevant knowledge (KL) 
3. Select knowledge-rich cases, i.e. cases containing enough information (KL) 
4. Define basic features which are identical for all cases, e.g. “failure” and “task” 
entities (KL) 
5. Produce a preliminary case structure in Excel before implementing in the 
Wellogy model (Kl - SL) 
6. Create ontology based on the gained knowledge from the cases according to the 
combination process, i.e. top-down and bottom-up process (SL) 
7. Build cases in the Wellogy system (SL) 
8. Group solved cases based on similar solution (SL) 
9. Establish causal relationships between entities (SL) 
10. Perform qualify control of the model by evaluating the case match results (SL) 
 
Totally 45 wells from 4 oil fields, leaking and non-leaking wells have been studied and 
analysed at the level of human reasoning to find causal relationships. 18 leak-wells have 
been selected for modelling for the Wellogy model. 12 leaking wells are solved cases 
and the rest are unsolved cases.  
 
4.2 Selection of knowledge-rich cases 
18 out of 28 reported well leaks are considered as case because sufficient data and 
information for these cases were available to build cases. The knowledge-rich cases 
mean that those cases which have sufficient explanation to the problem and solution 
parts and investigation activities for diagnosis of such leaks have been performed. Some 
cases had limited data; therefore, it was difficult to explain either the problem or 
solution parts. These types of cases were not selected for modelling. The following data 
sources and reports have been screened and studied for leaking wells before starting to 
build cases: 
 
¾ General oil well documents 
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¾ Incident and unconformities reports 
¾ Well-site observations in relation to leaks  
¾ Annulus pressure observations (detected in production reports) 
¾ Leak detection log reports 
¾ Well observations after repairing the leaks 
¾ Investigation and post-analysis reports (indirect observation) 
¾ Final well reports; to look to the initial well constructions and possible 
deviations related to the installation phase 
¾ Daily drilling reports 
¾ Completion and hand-over reports 
 
4.3 Identical features of the cases  
All cases have the same Failure and Task in the Wellogy model. The Failure for 
all cases is a leakage problem, and the entity name of the failure is defined as “Well 
Leakage Failure”. The Task plays an important role on the structure of ontology 
and cases, so this step of modelling is important. There are two possible options for 
considering Task for the leaking well cases: 
 
1. Finding the cause of those leak incidents where the leak components and 
locations have previously been localized. The goal of this task is to treat 
existing leak(s) and to improve design specification for future wells. Although 
in some cases the leak was localized, it was difficult to conclude on the main 
reason behind the leak because of the involvement of combined effects. 
2. Systemizing leaks for finding the location of the leaks for those cases where the 
leak point was still uncertain. For some of the leaking wells, the noise logs 
were run and results were inconclusive. It is crucial to find the location of leak 
before any actions. 
 
Since the early days of developing CBR applications, diagnosis of problem cases was 
one of the relevant areas for application in weak domains (Kolodner, 1993) and (Magro 
and Torasso, 2000). Option 1 was found more suitable for the Wellogy model because 
the existing database better supported the chain of causal relationships of the failure 
rather than classification location of the leak.  In addition, the oil company has stated 
the interest to knowing the direct cause or related causes of the leakage to take this 
knowledge into account in the design phase for the new wells. Option 2 is also possible 
to model in the Wellogy in order to assist unknown or hidden leaking well components. 
The reasons for having unknown leak well components can be either due to the size of 
leaks (small) which are impossible to detect by means of the existing technology, or due 
to cost reasons, particularly in subsea wells. 
 
4.4 Preliminary case structure and production 
After a study of a huge database for the well integrity issues, the important findings 
have been systemized and mapped on basis of possible factors which most likely caused 
the leakage(s). Because many cases were available, first, the statistical approach and 
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human reasoning were applied to find an overall trend to answer this question: “why did 
many leaks occur in many wells in the specific fields?” In Figure 4.1 we have 
summarized the most important factors, observations, and parameters. As shown in this 
figure, the upper part contains basic case information or case administration, the middle 
part gives general case attributes which has no or minor impact on the reasoning 
process, and the lower part contains specific information and knowledge which support 
problem and solution explanations. 
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Well Name
Well E-2
Well E-3
Well E-4
Well E-7
Field Name
Field OSE
Field OSS
Field Brage
Time Reference After Completion
Early Leak
Late Leak
Activity During Leak
Completion Installation
Production
Injection
Flow Testing
Leak  Status 1
Surface leak
Downhole leak
Leak Status 2
Single Leak
Multiple Leak
Well Application
Oil Producer (OP)
Oil Producer with Gas LiftOPGL
Gas Injection (GI)
Water Injection (WI)
Water Alternating Gas Injection (WAG)
Place of Leak
Leak From Tubing To Annulus-A
Leak From Annulus-A to Annulus-B
leak from Annulus-B to Annulus-C
Leak Components
Leak Through BSV
Leak Through ASV
Leak Through Tubing Packer
Leak Through GLV
Leak Through CIV
Leak Through GLM
Leak Through Wellhead Seal Assembly
Leak Through PBR
Leak Through Tie-back
Leak Through BSV Control Line
Leak Through ASV Control Line
Leak Through Casing Body
Leak Through Casing Connection
Leakage Rate
Very Small Leakage
Small Leakage
Medium Leakage
Large Leakage
Casing Wear
Casing Wear Not-Measured
Casing Wear Measured
Very High Casing Wear
Very Low Casing Wear
Medium Casing Wear
Well Trajectory
Well Depth
Shallow Well Depth
Medium Well Depth
Deep Well Depth
very Deep Well Depth
Vertical Well
Slant Well
Horizontal Well
Gas Lift Quality
High CO2 Content in GL
High H2S Content in GL
High Water Content in GL
Low CO2 Content in GL
Low H2S Content in GL
High Water Content in GL
Well Condition Just Before Leak
Unsteady State well Condition
High Thermal Variation
High Pressure variation
Production Rate Variation
Injection Rate Variation
Steady State Well Condition
Casing and Connection
13% Cr Casing
Low Cr Casing
Non Cr Casing
Top VAM Thread Type
BTS Thread Type
Case
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Case Failure
Well Leakage
Case Status
Solved Case
Unsolved Case
Processed Case
Solution of Case (Cause of Leak)
Corrosion Reason
High Corrosive Well Fluids
Low Equipment Quality Reason
Low Casing Resistance
Low Connection Sealablity
Low Packer Tolerance
Wrong Wellhead Seal Assembly
Installation
Casing Wear
Low Make-Up Performance
Imperfect Pressure Test
Task of Case
Localizing The Leak Point
Finding Leak Cause
Outcome of case
Fully Successful
Partially Successful
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Figure 4.1 The most important findings related to the leaking wells. 
 
A preliminary case production template has been developed in Excel before transferring 
and encoding in Wellogy. Clustering cases in one sheet helps to explain cases correctly 
when they are fairly given the similar number of features. The template can be found in 
Appendix A. In this template the basic case characteristics have the same amount of 
information to some extent. 
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4.5 Ontology of well integrity 
To start building ontology for the leaking wells, the top level (root of the ontology) of 
the Creek system is required. Figure 4.2 illustrates the top level which has been 
implemented by Department of Computer and Information Science, NTNU (version 
0.96 created at 20/01/2006, newer version has subdivided this into three subclasses: 
Entity, Relation (between entities) and Description Thing (description of 
entities)). As shown in the figure Thing is the root of the model and has two basic 
subclasses; Entity, and Relation. To develop an ontology for any engineering 
applications, the Entity node is the starting point. All new entities for the cases should 
be linked to the Entity node and all defined relationships should belong to 
Relation. The Entity itself has the following subclasses as shown in Figure 2.9: 
 
(URL, Symbol, Class, Number, String, No Value, and Case) 
 
The designers of the Creek framework (Sørmo, 2006) cited that all the findings of the 
CBR ontology model should be direct or indirect sub-classed / instanced of Symbol or 
String in order for the system to know how to treat and compare. The Wellogy model 
is developed on the Symbol node, because Creek will attempt to use causal 
relationships to compare findings for the reasoning and matching process. The 
uppermost entities used for the model of leaking well cases are: 
 
¾ Case Status - gives the status of the case and has three options: solved / 
unsolved / processed 
¾ Physical Objects - covers the equipment and materials used in the case 
¾ Descriptive Thing - mainly has three uppermost subclasses; Result, 
Textual Descriptive and Role Descriptor. 
o Solution: the solution is a subclass of Result. In this branch the 
solutions to the reasoning task are given. These solutions are allocated to 
the solved cases 
o Outcome: the outcome is a subclass of Result. Here, the degree of 
successes of the solution to the solved case is given; e.g. 
Successfully Solved / Partially Solved 
o Textual Description: in this branch the entities which describe some of 
the findings of the cases are given. For instance, the description of well 
annulus name (annulus-A, annulus-B), time of case occurrence, well 
names, and field name are given in this line. 
o  Parameter: the parameter is a subclass of Role Descriptor and 
consists of Observable and Unobservable / Measurable and 
Immeasurable / qualitative and quantitative parameters, related to the 
subject of the model (e.g. well integrity) are given in this branch.  
¾ State Descriptive - describes the state of the entity and has three subclasses; 
normal, alarm and failure states. In this branch, the descriptions of the problem 
/ failure are generally given.  
¾ Spatiotemporal Entity - All activities of cases are sub-classified under 
Process which is subclass of Spatiotemporal Entity. 
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¾ Task Descriptive - process and activity related to the task of the model are 
subclasses of this branch. 
¾ Task: in the task line, the identifications related to the purposes of the cases are 
given. There can be some options, for example, finding the diagnosis of 
failures, solving the problems, finding the root cause of the failures and 
classifying the failure. 
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Figure 4.2 The main parts of ontology constructed in the Wellogy model (the line relations = 
has subclass). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates some parts of the ontology which has been developed based on 
merging of general domain knowledge and cases for leaking wells in the Wellogy 
model. As shown, the process development is a combination of top-down and bottom-
up processes which was discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Generic concept
General 
knowledge domain
Cases
 
Figure 4.3 Some part of integration between general domain knowledge and cases in the 
Wellogy model (the red lines show the development process is top-down, and the 
black & green lines show the bottom-up development process). 
4.6 Relations 
All kinds of relations used in the Wellogy model are subclasses of Relation as 
shown in Figure 4.4. The relations are divided into these groups:  
 
¾ Causal Relation - gives the relation strength to entities which have 
contribution in the causal relationships. The strength value is between 0 and 1 
(the weaker strength has lower value and stronger strength has higher value.  
This relations are (the numbers are strength value); always causes (0.9), causes 
(0.7), leads to (0.5), enables (0.5), sometimes causes (0.5), indicates (0.4), 
implies (0.4), has potential (0.2). 
¾ Structural Relation - these type of relations are used in the hierarchy of 
ontology and normally the strength value is close to 1. There are only two 
structural relations; “has subclass” and “has instance”. 
¾ Case Relation - gives administrative relations to the case; has outcome, has 
case task, has case status, etc.  
¾ “has finding” - gives the specific relations to finding of the case such as “has 
repair action”, “has case task”, “has observation” and 
“has failure”. 
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Figure 4.4 Different kind of relations used in the Wellogy model (the relation line = has 
subclass). 
The strength value for all relations in oil well engineering domain was given in Table 2.2. 
 
4.7 Tangible objects for leaking wells cases 
The screen shot of the Tangible Object for the leaking well model is shown in 
Figure 4.5. The Process Material and Equipment involved in the leaking wells 
have been collected and classified in a hierarchically format, and belong to the 
Physical Object. The Tangible Object has two main subclasses; 
Facility and Process Materials. The Facility contains Drilling and 
Downhole Equipment and components, whereas Process Material contains 
generally Drilling and Well Fluids, and generated Drilling Cuttings. 
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Figure 4.5 Physical object model for leaking well cases modelled in Wellogy. 
4.8 Modelling of the parameter for leaking well cases  
Figure 4.6 demonstrates modelling of the “Parameter” for the leaking well cases. The 
“Parameter” entity contains both qualitative and quantitative parameters. As the 
model is mostly built for the purpose of leaking wells, most of the findings (parameters) 
are related to the well integrity and particularly to leaking wells. 
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Figure 4.6 Modelling of “Parameter” for leaking wells in Wellogy. 
 
4.8.1 State and task modelling 
Figure 4.7 depicts the modelling for State. The description of the leak wells is given to 
this entity. The State entity has many subclasses. The main subclasses are; “Normal 
State, Human State, Alarm State, and Failure State. Normal State 
describes normal conditions (e.g. Hole Condition Is Normal). Human State 
also describes states of human or human factors connections with the problem of the 
case, and it covers both normal and abnormal states only related to the human. Alarm 
State is not a failure state, but it can be considered as indications of the failure state. 
For instance, High ROP can be considered as alarm state for Well Kick. In the 
Alarm State situations the processes and activities are not interrupted, in contrast of 
Failure State where all routine processes and activities turn to a new situation. 
Failure State covers abnormal set of situations, conditions, and episodes which 
occur during the time interval of the case. In this condition, all processes are turned to 
the failure mode, i.e. the time is spent on solving the failure. For instance, Well 
Leakage Failure, and Stuck Pipe are typical examples of Failure State. 
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Figure 4.7 State for leaking well cases modelled in Wellogy. 
As shown in Figure 4.8, the Task Descriptive has two subclasses; Single Task 
and Combined Task. The Single Task refers to a specific and unique task which 
is expected to achieve, while in Combined Task more than one task are expected.  
As discussed previously, task is the objective of a CBR model which can be for 
example; solving, diagnosis, root cause, and classify of a failure.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Task model for leaking well cases in Wellogy. 
 
4.8.2 Textual description 
Figure 4.9 shows the Textual Description model for leaking well cases. As 
illustrated in this diagram, those parts of the ontology which explain the case textually 
can be modelled below this branch. The textual entities which are giving more 
information about cases are inserted below the Textual Description entity. For 
instance, name of a country, a field and a well, type of a well, special well descriptions, 
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and text boxes which explain the case characteristics are given in Textual 
Description. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Textual Description model for leaking well cases used in Wellogy (blue line = has 
subclass, green line = has instance). 
4.9 Case production for leaking wells 
Based on the database for leaking wells, two types of cases are modelled. The first case 
type is solved cases (12 cases). In these cases, the leak components have been generally 
discovered and fully proven, and repair actions have been executed for most of them. 
The task is identical for all cases and defined as Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages. The unsolved cases, 6 cases, the leak components are unknown or have not 
yet been fully proven. 
 
Table 4.1 shows a general template for constructing leaking well cases. The technical and 
process administration parts are fairly the same for solved, unsolved, and processed 
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cases. 10 to 15 observations have been allocated for each case. The number of given 
observations are dependent on the available information for each case. 
Table 4.1 Template for case structure of leaking wells. 
Format Type of case information (relation type) Value 
Name of case   
Well name   
Field name   
Wellhead Location Platform / Subsea 
Time of leak   
Technical 
administration 
Country    
Failure of case Well leakage through annuli 
Case statues Solved / unsolved / processed 
Task of leak (option 1) Finding cause of leak 
Task of leak (option 2) Localizing leak location 
Process 
administration 
Outcome of case  The result of applied solution 
Observations type 1 5 to 8 observations for describing the failure 
Sy
m
bo
lic
 c
od
e 
Observation 
Observations type 2 5 to 8 observations for describing the task 
Case description Short written text about the case 
Explanation   
Solution (to task)   T
ex
t 
Conclusion 
Experience (lessons learned)   
 
The 12 solved cases have been categorized into 5 groups based on the found solutions 
(causes) as shown in Table 4.2. These groups are: 
 
1. Group A: the cause for this group is wrong material selection for TBG and 
CSG seal hanger. These group are divided into three subgroups; group A-1 
contains three cases, wells A-4, A-6, E-7, where the cause for all three is 
Carbon Steel CSG Hanger Seal. Subgroup A-2 contains one case, 
well E-2a, and the cause is Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal. Subgroup A-
3 also contains one case, well E-4, and the cause is Elastomer TBG 
Hanger Seal. All three subgroups have been reported as wellhead leak or 
surface leak. The location of the leak is illustrated in Figure 4.11. 
 
2. Group B: the cause for this group is Non-Chrome Casing. This group 
contains two wells; E-3 and E-15b. For the gas lift well, the production casings 
and tie-backs (9-5/8” - 10-3/4”), the high resistance casing for corrosion are 
needed, because the gas generally contains corrosive components such as CO2, 
H2S. The casings which meet this requirement should have high percentage of 
chrome e.g. 13 %. However, due to some reasons as for example changing well 
application during well lifecycle, the Non-Chrome CSG was used for some 
gas lift wells. The leak occurred downhole of the well and fluid crossing the 
casing caused fluid communication from annulus-A to annulus-B. 
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3. Group C: this group is similar to the group B in matter of leak component 
(casing). However, the reason or “cause” for this group is Scale 
Inhibitor in GL. This group contains two wells, E-4 and F-24. In both 
wells the line of chemical injection valve (CIV) failed and scale inhibitor was 
mixed with the gas lift and pumped through the annulus A. This caused a 
reduction in the pH of the gas lift and accordingly a speed-up in the corrosion 
rate of the casing and tie-back. 
 
4. Group D: this group contains well E-9 and F-30. The cause for this group was 
found as High Thermal and Pressure Loads during 
Operation. For these two cases, the leak occurred just for a short time after 
start-up operation (production / injection) which found as a common practice 
for the WAG wells. 
 
5. Group E: this group contains only one case, well F-14. The cause for this group 
is considered as Insufficient Integrity Pressure Test. This 
case has leaks in completion components such as GLV and PBR as shown in 
Figure 4.11. The cause of this kind of failure was considered as insufficient or 
incomplete pressure test during installation. Generally, integrity pressure test is 
performed when completion string is installed. The test fluid is normally 
drilling fluids (mud) which contain particle which may seal small leak points 
and accordingly it could not see the leak during installation. Moreover, the 
pressure test period is about 10 minutes which is short to detect small leakages. 
Table 4.2 Categorizing the cases based on solutions (causes) and with respect to the location 
of the leaks. 
Cases (leaking wells) Problem Location of leakage Task Solution
A1 A-4, A-6, E-7 Wellhead hanger seals (carbon steel CSG seal) Carbon steel CSG seal
A A2 E-2a Wellhead hanger seals Elastomer CSG hanger seal
A3  E-14 Wellhead hanger seals Elastomer TBG hanger seal
E-3, E-15b Casing / tie-back Non-chrome casing
E-4, F-24 Casing / tie-back Scale inhibitor in GL
E-9, F-30 Completion components (packer/PBR)
High thermal and pressure 
loads during operation
F-14 Completion components (packer/PBR)
Insufficient integrity pressure 
test
E-2b, E-11, E-15a, F-16, F-22, F-29 Uncertain Should be found
E
Unsolved cases
Group
S
ol
ve
d 
ca
se
s
B
C
D
Well integrity 
failure
Finding cause of 
well leakage
 
 
Figure 4.10 shows all solved and unsolved cases which have been modelled in the 
Wellogy model. As shown the 7 solutions have been obtained for the 12 solved cases. 
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Solved cases
Unsolved cases
 
Figure 4.10 Solved cases with the solutions and unsolved cases modelled in Wellogy. 
 
Figure 4.11 shows schematically different leak locations and different causes for group 
A-E.  
 
 
Figure 4.11 Grouping leak locations and causes. 
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Figure 4.12 shows the important part of the ontology structure and showing integration of 
general knowledge and cases. As discussed before, in the Creek system, CBR and MBR 
are combined together and build a single ontology model. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Ontology structure showing integration between general knowledge (top) and cases 
(bottom) in the Wellogy model. 
Figure 4.13 shows a screen shot of 12 solved cases in the Wellogy model. The failure is 
identical for all cases, Well Leakage Failure as shown by the red lines. The 
seven (7) solutions (i.e. causes for the failure) are linked to the cases indicated by 
brownish lines. Each solution can have some causal relationships which are given in the 
“causal relationship model” as shown in Figure 4.14. These relationships enhance the 
reasoning process to find closest solutions for the unsolved cases.  
 
  
 69
Group A1
Group B
Group C
Group D
Group E
Group A2
Group A3
 
Figure 4.13 Screen-shot of the Wellogy model for solved cases; groups, and solutions for one 
similar failure. 
4.10 Causal relationships 
The centre of the model in Wellogy is causal relationships. These 
relationships are created based on the findings for the solved cases. The proven 
knowledge and information in relation to solved cased are encoded and the links 
(relations) with different strength valves are established. Figure 4.14 shows a screen shot 
of causal relationships for leaking well cases modelled in Wellogy. 
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Figure 4.14 Causal relationship for leaking well case in the Wellogy model. 
 
Totally 113 causal relationships between entities have been defined. By exporting the 
Wellogy model to an XML file, we can sort all causal relationships and demonstrating 
them in tables. The outputs of XML file for causal relationship are given in Table 4.3 to 
Table 4.8 for different types of causal relations. These tables give the list of causal 
relationships with different strength values established for the leaking well cases. As 
previously mentioned, the relation type for each strength-value can be defined as 
direct-relation and inverse-relation, e.g. causes and caused by 
has the strength value 0.7.   
Table 4.3 Causal relationships when the relation is “always caused by” (strength value 
= 0.9) modelled in Wellogy. 
From entity Relation type To entity
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) always caused bInsufficient Integrity Pressure Test
High Casing Ovality always caused bHigh Casing Wear Rate
Increased Casing Corrosion Rate always caused bLow pH of Gas Lift Well  
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Table 4.4 Causal relationships when the relation is “causes” and inverse relation “caused 
by” - (strength value = 0.7) modelled in Wellogy. 
From entity Relation type To entity
Bit RPM Variation caused by Stick Slip
Drillstring Washout caused by Fatigue
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) caused by Short Pressure Test Time
Excessive Compressive Load caused by Heating Well By Injecting Gas
High Casing Wear Rate caused by High Total Bit Rotation
High Pressure Load  Cycle caused by High Well Pressure Changes
High Thermal and Pressure Loads During Ocaused by High Well Pressure Changes
High Thermal and Pressure Loads During Ocaused by High Well Temperature Changes
High Thermal Load Cycle caused by High Well Temperature Changes
Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B caused by Low pH of Gas Lift Well
Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B caused by Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal
Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal caused by Low Sealability of WH Hanger Seal Against Gas
Leak Crossing Tubing Hanger Seal caused by Low Sealability of WH Hanger Seal Against Gas
Leak Crossing Wellhead seals caused by Low Sealability of WH Hanger Seal Against Gas
Low pH of Gas Lift Well caused by Scale Inhibitor Injection With Gas Lift Instead of CIV
Low pH of Gas Lift Well caused by Wet Gas lift
Stick Slip caused by Sticky Formation
Carbon Steel Hanger Seal causes High Corrosive Rate of WH Hanger Seal
Carbon Steel Hanger Seal causes Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Carbon Steel Hanger Seal causes Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Changing Well Application (GI-WI) causes Cooling Well By Water Injection
Cooling Well By Water Injection causes Excessive Tension Load
Corrosion causes Drillstring Washout
Drillstring Vibration causes Drillstring Washout
Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal causes Low Sealability of WH Hanger Seal Against Gas
Elastomer TBG Seal Type causes Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Elastomer TBG Seal Type causes Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Elastomer TBG Seal Type causes Low Sealability of WH Hanger Seal Against Gas
Excessive Tension Load causes Leak Crossing Tubing PBR
Excessive Tension Load causes Leak Crossing Packer
High Amount of CO2 in Gas Lift causes Low pH of Gas Lift Well
High Casing Wear Rate causes Leak Crossing Packer
Increased Casing Corrosion Rate causes Leak Crossing Casing
Leak Crossing Tubing Hanger Seal causes Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A  
 
 72
Table 4.5 Causal relationships when the relation is “sometimes causes” and 
“sometimes caused by” - (strength value = 0.5) modelled in Wellogy.  
From entity Relation type To entity
Carbon Steel CSG sometimes causes Leak Crossing Casing Body
Carbon Steel CSG sometimes causes Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Carbon Steel Hanger Seal sometimes causes Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Carbon Steel Hanger Seal sometimes causes Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal sometimes causes Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Elastomer Hanger Seals sometimes causes Wellhead Seals Leak
Excessive Compressive Load sometimes causes Leak Crossing Casing Connections
High Pressure Load  Cycle sometimes causes Leak Crossing Casing Connections
High Total Bit Rotation sometimes causes Medium Casing Wear Rate
High Well Pressure Changes sometimes causes Leak Rate Is Inconsistent
High Well Temperature Changes sometimes causes Leak Rate Is Inconsistent
Insufficient Integrity Pressure Test sometimes causes Leak Crossing Tubing PBR
Insufficient Integrity Pressure Test sometimes causes Leak Crossing Tubing Connection
Low Corrosive Casing Resistance sometimes causes Medium Casing Wear Rate
Bit Balling sometimes caused by Sticky Formation
Clay Swelling sometimes caused by WBM
Decreasing Stick-Slip sometimes caused by Increasing Well Depth
Drillstring Twist Off sometimes caused by Poor Surface Recognition
Drillstring Twist Off sometimes caused by High Bit Torque
Drillstring Twist Off sometimes caused by Drillstring Washout
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) sometimes caused by High Thermal and Pressure Loads During Operation
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) sometimes caused by Pressure Test with Mud
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) sometimes caused by Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) sometimes caused by Elastomer TBG Seal Type
Excessive Compressive Load sometimes caused by High Bending Stress
Excessive Compressive Load sometimes caused by High Pressure Load  Cycle
Excessive Compressive Load sometimes caused by High Thermal Load Cycle
Excessive Compressive Load sometimes caused by Observed Slug Flow
Excessive Tension Load sometimes caused by High Pressure Load  Cycle
Excessive Tension Load sometimes caused by High Thermal Load Cycle
High Bending Stress sometimes caused by High DLS
High Casing Ovality sometimes caused by Medium Casing Wear Rate
High Stick-slip sometimes caused by Shallower Well Depth
High Thermal Load Cycle sometimes caused by Lifted up Wellhead After Starting GI
Insufficient Integrity Pressure Test sometimes caused by Pressure Test with Mud
Insufficient Integrity Pressure Test sometimes caused by Short Pressure Test Time
Leak Crossing Casing sometimes caused by Medium Casing Wear Rate
Leak Crossing Casing Body sometimes caused by Medium Casing Wear Rate
Leak Crossing Casing Connections sometimes caused by Low Performance Mack-Up Torque Connection
Leak Crossing Packer sometimes caused by Low Packer Tolerance
Leak Crossing Packer sometimes caused by Medium Casing Wear Rate
Leak Crossing Packer sometimes caused by Packer Depth Is In Free Cement CSG
Leak Crossing Tubing Connection sometimes caused by Short Pressure Test Time
Leak Crossing Tubing Connection sometimes caused by Pressure Test with Mud
Leak Crossing Tubing PBR sometimes caused by Short Pressure Test Time
Leak is Not Detectable sometimes caused by Slow  Build-up Rate  
 
Table 4.6 Causal relationships when the relation is “leads to” and inverse relation “led 
to by” - (strength value = 0.5) modelled in Wellogy. 
From entity Relation type To entity
Carbon Steel CSG leads to Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Carbon Steel CSG leads to Increased Casing Corrosion Rate
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) led to by Short Pressure Test Time
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) led to by Pressure Test with Mud
Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B led to by Oil Producer With Gas Lift  
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Table 4.7 Causal relationships when the relation is “implies” - (strength value = 0.4) 
modelled in Wellogy.  
From entity Relation type To entity
13 %-Cr CSG implies High Corrosive Casing Resistance
Carbon Steel CSG implies Low Corrosive Casing Resistance
Changing Well Application implies High Well Pressure Changes
Changing Well Application implies High Well Temperature Changes
Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) implies Leak Discovered Drilling / Installation
Gas Injection Well implies High Well Temperature Changes
Gas Injection Well implies High Well Pressure Changes
High Leak Build-up Pressure implies Leak Crossing Casing
High Leak Build-up Pressure implies Leak Crossing Casing Tie-Back
Late Leak (Years After Completion) implies Leak Crossing Casing
Late Leak (Years After Completion) implies Leak During Injection
Late Leak (Years After Completion) implies Leak During Production
Leak is Not Detectable implies Low Leak Rate
Low Leak Build-Up Pressure implies Wellhead Seals Leak  
Table 4.8 Causal relationships when the relation is “indicates” and inverse relation 
“indicated by” - (strength value = 0.4) modelled in Wellogy. 
From entity Relation type To entity
Changing Well Application indicated by Producing With Unsteady State Condition
Downhole Leak indicated by Testing Wellhead Seal Is OK
Drillstring Washout indicated by Pump Pressure Drop
High Total Bit Rotation indicated by Long TD
Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B indicated by Pressure Build-up in Ann.-B
Leak Crossing Casing indicated by Pressure A & B Are Not Same
Leak Crossing Casing indicated by Pressure A&B Are The Same Trend
Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal indicated by Leak Rate Is Inconsistent
Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A indicated by Pressure Build-up in Ann.-A
Leak Crossing Wellhead seals indicated by Testing Wellhead Seal Is Not OK
CIV Failed indicates Scale Inhibitor Injection With Gas Lift Instead of CIV  
 
4.11 Cases in the Wellogy model 
The 18 cases have been encoded in the Wellogy model. Figure 4.15 shows as an example 
for the solved case “well E-2a”. As shown in this figure, there are two views; Case 
View and Current Frame View. These two views are fairly similar. The 
additional findings can be seen in the Current Frame View. These additional findings 
represent entities which are not belonged to has finding; e.g. has case task, 
has lessons learned, has time occurrence, and has case 
explanation. These kinds of findings which act as administrational findings for the 
case may not contribute in the reasoning process as well as and matching results. 
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Figure 4.15 Case view in the Creek interface for case “well E-2a”- solved case (left view = 
Case View, right = Current Frame View). In the Case View, the degree of 
importance and predictive strength are given to the findings. In the Current 
Frame View, this degree is converted to numbers.  
In addition to the symbolic entities, the cases also contain text explanations for fulfilling 
the case story. This text information is given to enhance understanding the case and can 
be used after they are retrieved as best similar candidate case. The following texts are 
given for the cases: 
 
¾ Case Description - the free text is given in a text-box which has been provided 
in the view of the software as a heading of the case which can be seen in 
“Case View” or “Current Frame View” describes or introduces the 
case. 
 
¾ Case Explanation - this free text is given in a defined entity which is given 
only for this purpose (i.e. not for reasoning reason). For instance, Exp.E-2a is 
an entity used for explanation of well E-2a. This text explanation gives more 
detail about the failure of the case. This entity can be seen in Figure 4.15. 
 
¾ Lesson Learned - this free text is also given in a defined entity. For instance, 
LL E-2a denotes lessons learned from well E-2a. This text is supporting the 
solution and also giving recommendations and actions for the case. This entity 
can be seen in Figure 4.15. 
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4.12  Test procedure for CBR results  
In order to obtain better results, a high number of cases should be constructed in the 
Wellogy model. When all cases with ontology are built in the Wellogy model and 
causal contentions are made, the model can be tested. Cases are grouped with solved 
and unsolved cases. Solved cases which have the same failure can be regrouped based 
on solutions. Assume we have 14 cases, 12 solved and 2 unsolved cases as illustrated in 
Figure 4.16. 
 
 
Figure 4.16 Case matrix for showing test procedure (C1 to C14 are cases numbers, P1 is 
defined problem for cases which is the same for all cases in three groups, S1-S2-S3 
are solutions to group A, B, and C respectively). 
 
Figure 4.17 shows a flow chart and decision tree for test procedure when cases and 
ontology are modelled in a CBR model. This procedure has been applied for cases in the 
Wellogy model. 
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Figure 4.17 Flow chart for test procedure to increase the quality of cases in the Wellogy model. 
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4.13 Improving case quality 
The cases have so far been modelled and inserted in the Wellogy model individually 
(i.e. without considering other similar cases).  The mentioned test procedure should be 
performed when the preliminary Wellogy model (cases and ontology) is developed.  In 
order to increase the reliability and quality of the model, the solved cases are needed to 
be checked and modified if needed for the numbers and role of attributes for each case. 
For this reason, the modelled solved cases are grouped manually based on similarity of 
the solutions. As already mentioned, in this model the solutions are the causes of 
failures). Since the findings are basically given according to the existing date (free-text-
base), a querying and screening process is needed to go through for the contents of cases 
by experts. This process to some extent is similar to the Conversation Case-Based 
Reasoning (CCBR) (Gu, 2006) where designers of the case interview experts to achieve 
a sufficient level in respect of information to complete the case. Finally, the weight-
values are given to the findings of the cases in respect of degree of importance and 
prediction strength of the findings. This value is yielded by combination of 
importance and predictive strength provided in Creek. The role of 
importance and predictive strength on findings of a case in the model was 
shown in Figure 4.15. 
 
Based on the above discussion three steps have been established for improving case 
quality: 
 
Step 1: model the cases individually in Wellogy as a free-text-base 
Step 2: screen and modify the cases by considering them as groups 
Step 3: tune the attributes of cases based on the degree of importance and 
            predictive strength 
 
These processes have been performed for all cases, and the results for the example wells 
have been shown in Figure 4.18. The solved case E-2a considered as an input case and 
matched with other solved cases. The best matched cases were: wells A-4, A-6, E-7 and 
E-14. These cases belong only to a single group: group A, (wellhead seal leak). 
However, wells A-4, A-6, E-7 belong to the subgroup A-1 in which the cause is 
Carbon Steel CSG Seal. Well E-14 belongs to the subgroup A-3 where the 
cause is Elastomer TBG Hanger Seal. From Figure 4.18 we can see that 
similarity match percentage is increased when the quality of the cases are improved by 
going through step 1 to 3. For case Well E-7, however, the match percentage is 
decreased. This reveals that the quality process (step 1 to 3) causes similar cases to 
converge while the different cases diverge. 
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Figure 4.18 Case-match result for one input case (well E-2a) and four output cases (wells A-4, 
A-6, E-7, E-14). 
Radar charts are used to display the matched results for the cases. The solved cases are 
renamed to their related group name for a better evaluation, e.g. cases A-4, A-6, and E-
7. E-2a and E-14 are temporary renamed as group A. Then one solved case (e.g. well E-
2a) is used as an input case, and then the case library is searched for the best matched 
cases. Figure 4.19 shows the result for group A (input case is E-2a). This figure shows 
that the four best matched cases belonged to the same group. The other groups have 
lower similarity percentages. Similar results have been obtained for the groups C and D 
as shown in Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21. 
 
 
 
 79
Group A (case E-2a)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
A
A
A
A
E
C
B
B
D
D
 
Figure 4.19 Radar chart showing high similarity percentage for group A (input case belong to 
group A), and lower match for group E (1 match), group C (1 match), group B (2 
match) and group D (the 2 lowest match). 
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Figure 4.20 Radar chart displays match results when the input case is from group C. The 
result shows that the closest cases are from the groups B & C. The results are reasonable because 
both Groups B & C are fairly similar from the perspective of the leakage path (i.e. casing / tie-back 
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leak). Notice that there are only two cases in group C. The remaining cases have the lowest 
matches. 
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Figure 4.21 Radar chart displays match results when the input case is from group D. The 
result shows that the closest case belongs to the same group D. Notice that there are only two cases 
in group D. The remaining cases have the lowest matches. 
 
4.14 Result of matching cases 
In this section the obtained results from the Wellogy model for matching cases (6 
unsolved and 12 solved cases) are discussed. We will consider the results of the best 
matched cases for the unsolved cases. First, the result view and related parts are 
presented through the one unsolved case, and then the results for the 5 unsolved cases 
are discussed. The obtained results for these cases are evaluated and examined by 
human reasoning as a crosscheck. 
  
4.14.1 The view of match result 
Figure 4.22 shows the complete screen shot of the result for the case match when the 
unsolved case is well E-11, and the retrieved case is well E-9. The blue shows direct 
match, while the red and grey show indirect match.  For the direct match, the 
input findings and retrieved case findings are exactly the same for the input and 
output cases. On the other hand, for the indirect match, the findings of the cases 
do not have direct relations, but they have indirect relations produced from the causal 
relationship model which is built through the general domain model. 
 81
D
ire
ct
 m
at
ch
In
di
re
ct
 m
at
ch
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
D
ire
ct
 m
at
ch
In
di
re
ct
 m
at
ch
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
 
Figure 4.22 The result of case match showing; direct match (blue), indirect match (red), and 
unmatched findings when input case (unsolved case) is well E-11 and retrieved 
case is well E-9. 
Figure 4.23 illustrates the case description for input and output cases in the Creek 
framework. The failure of the two cases is identical, Internal Well Leakage 
Failure. As shown in the figure, the weight-values of findings for solved cases are 
different, while the weight-values for the findings of the unsolved case are identical 
(0.5). This is due to the nature of solved and unsolved case. For a solved case, the case 
designers know which findings are important or not so important and they give the 
weight values to the findings, while for an unsolved case the importance of the findings 
are uncertain. As already explained, the digital numbers for weight values denote the 
combination of the degree of Importance and Predictive Strength.  
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Figure 4.23 Case description in the Wellogy model for unsolved case (left) and solved case 
(right). 
Figure 4.24 show the match result and network connections (relationships) between the 
input case (E-11) and the output case (E-9). For each pair of entity (input finding / 
retrieved finding) for indirect match (red and grey in Figure 4.22), a reasoning 
explanation for each pair of indirect findings is retrieved according to the causal model 
as shown in the right side of Figure 4.24. At the bottom of Figure 4.24, a set of best 
retrieved solved cases is shown and sorted from highest to lowest match percentages 
(left to right). In this version of Creek, there is no limitation for users to accept or reject 
the delivered results of the solved cases.    
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Figure 4.24 Matched results and network relations between input case (E-11) and output case 
(E-9). A reasoning explanation for each pair of indirect match findings is retrieved 
on basis of causal model of Wellogy (e.g.  WAG Well and High Thermal Load 
Cycle).  
4.14.2 Unsolved case E-2b 
Figure 4.25 shows the view of case E-2b and retrieved solved cases. The result of the 
match is summarized below: 
 
1. Similarity percentages of the three best matching cases: 57 %, 53 %, 51 % 
2. Roughly 1/3 of the total match percentage is indirect match (red part in the 
figure) 
3. The proposed solution: Carbon Steel Hanger Seal 
4. The three best matching cases belong to one group: group A1 
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Figure 4.25 Case view of E-2b (unsolved) and similarity percentages of the retrieved solved 
cases. 
Discussion on the obtained results: 
 
Case E-2b is a late leak incident in which the leak crossed from annulus-A to annulus B. 
Therefore, the leak components can be either of type CSG or Hanger Seal. As the leak 
occurred in the late phase of production the Elastomer Casing Hanger Seal 
may not be the cause of the leak. On the other hand, the type of Casing is 13 % Cr, so 
the low quality of CSG may not be the main reason or cause for the leak. A possible 
reason for the leak can be Carbon Hanger Seal, because: 
 
1. Leak occurred in late phase 
2. Casing had good quality 
3. Oil producer with Gas lift, i.e. the system was corrosive and casing hanger may 
not be high Cr percentage to resist against the corrosion 
 
However, the case match percentage of such leaks is still low and it means that other 
reasons may exist; for example, tie-back system failure. 
 
Conclusion 
The three best matching cases are similar in terms of kind of problem and they all have 
one solution. This means that the results taken from the Wellogy model is reliable. The 
model also has remembered and retrieved particular knowledge which has not been 
directly given to the cases. The contribution of this indirect knowledge to the total 
similarly match percentage is 1/3.     
 
4.14.3 Unsolved case E-11 
Figure 4.26 shows the case view of input case (E-11) and retrieved solved cases. The 
result of the match is summarized as below: 
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1. Similarity percentages of the three best matching cases : 61 %, 57 %, 50 % 
2. The proposed solution retrieved from best similar cases is: High Thermal 
and Pressure Loads During Operation 
3. Roughly 1/3 of total match percentages of the best matching cases are indirect 
matches (red colour part in Figure 4.26) 
4. The two best matching cases belong to one group: group D 
 
 
23 %24 %24 %30 %34 %49 %50 %57 %61 %
 
Figure 4.26 Case view of E-11 (unsolved) and similarity percentages of the retrieved solved 
cases. 
Discussion on the obtained result: 
 
Case E-11 is an early leak which is crossing from tubing to annulus-A. 
Leak crossing PBR and GLV (completion components) were reported. The well 
application is WAG which leads to high thermal and pressure changes. Leaks were 
observed during operation, a short period after start-up. Thus, a strong suggestion of 
reason of the leak is High Thermal and Pressure Loads, which is fully in 
agreement with the two best matching retrieved solved cases (E-9 and F-30). 
 
4.14.4 Unsolved case E-15a 
Figure 4.27 shows the case view of the input case (E-15a) and retrieved solved cases. The 
matching result is summarized below: 
 
1. Similarity percentages of the three best matching cases : 74 %, 69 %, 69 % 
2. Most of the match percentages are direct matches (blue colour part in the 
figure) 
3. The proposed solution from all three cases is: Carbon Hanger Seal 
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4. The three best match cases belong all to one group: group A1 
 
48 %51 %52 %53 %56 %58 %69 %69 %74 %
 
Figure 4.27 Case view of E-15a (unsolved) and similarity percentages of the retrieved solved 
cases. 
4.14.5 Unsolved case F-16 
Figure 4.28 shows case view of the input case (E-16) and retrieved solved cases. The 
result of matching is summarized below: 
 
1. Similarity percentages of the best matching cases: 66 %, 55 %, 43 % 
2. The first retrieved case has 1/3 indirect match while the next two retrieved 
cases have ½ indirect match 
3. The proposed solution from the first solved case is: Insufficient 
Integrity Pressure Test 
4. The first best matching case belongs to group E (group E only contains one 
case) 
 
Discussion on the obtained results: 
 
Case F-16 is an early leak and a pressure build-up was observed in annulus-A. The well 
is of type WAG application, and a leak was discovered just after injection start-up. A 
special observation was seen; “lifted-up wellhead after starting gas injection”. If we 
refer to human reasoning for this case, we can conclude that the reasons behind the leak 
are: 
 
1- Pressure test during installation does not fulfil the requirement for real 
operation condition. The pressure test is too short (10 minutes) and the test 
fluid is mud (contains solids). Small leaks may not be seen during the 
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installation test. However, when gas injection starts the hidden leaks can be 
visible clearer, because of nature of gas to become leak in junctions and seal 
areas. The gas can penetrate through the leak points better that oil and water. 
This discussion agrees with the solution of the first retrieved case (case F-14) 
2- High thermal and pressure changes can cause movement in the well 
construction (as rising of wellhead was seen after stating gas injection). This 
relative movement sometimes cause leak through completion components such 
as PBRs, GLVs and packers. This discussion agrees with the solution of the 
second best retrieved case (case E-14). 
 
32 %33 %37 %40 %41 %41 %43 %55 %66 %
 
Figure 4.28 Case view of F-16 (unsolved) and retrieved solved cases. 
Summary of matching of unsolved cases 
 
The overall match results for the 5 unsolved cases and the three best matches for each 
case are shown in Table 4.9. The results reveal that the model has potential to become 
reliable, because the three best retrieved cases belong to the same group for two of the 
unsolved cases E-26 and F-22. 
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Table 4.9 The match results for five unsolved cases and match percentages for the best three 
retrieved cases for each unsolved case. 
Unsolved case Closest cases Match % Group
A-6 57 A1
A-4 53 A1
A-7 51 A1
E-9 61 D
F-30 57 D
E-14 52 A3
E-7 74 A1
A-6 69 A2
A-4 69 A3
F-14 66 E
E-14 56 A3
A-4 43 A1
A-4 63 A1
E-7 53 A1
A-6 51 A1
F-22
E-2b
E-11
E-15a
F-16
 
 
The Wellogy model only contains 12 solved cases. The recommendation is to collect 
and construct more cases from the same area (e.g. well integrity and leakage cases) in 
order to improve the Wellogy model. Around 50 knowledge-rich solved cases could be 
enough to have a robust CBR model. Another area that can improve the Wellogy model 
is the quality of the cases in respect of data and information. Some cases were explained 
with limited descriptions by persons who observed and documented the case. The case 
builders need information to explain the case correctly (both problem and solution 
parts). Therefore, Wellogy can be improved by focusing on the following items: 
 
¾ Increasing the number of solved cases (the knowledge body of the concept will 
be also expanded). 
¾ Increasing the quality of cases (solved and unsolved) by giving a precise and 
complete explanation to the case. This can be prepared by case observers and/or 
reporters who directly involve the case. 
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5. Assessment of Research Project Cases 
This chapter presents the study of three engineering problem areas in terms of 
knowledge-level (i.e. give the valuable knowledge in text before translating to the 
symbolic-level). The objective of this chapter is to show some complex tasks (called 
cases) within the petroleum engineering domain from a practical point of view. It shows 
how the important and valuable information can be extracted from practical work which 
can be stored in the Wellogy model for the later reuse. It explains how the cases can be 
derived based on the different type of data sources i.e., database, research work-based, 
and scientific paper-based. The first case is of database type and performed for a 
complete oil field. The task of this case is “giving a new and correct technology advice 
for a production problem case”. The recommended technology is Under-Balanced 
Drilling (UBD) and applies to optimizing production and minimizing drilling problems 
(Abdollahi et al., 2004). The second case format is concerning a specific drilling 
problem (drillstring washout) which is constructed based on operator company files 
(Abdollahi et al., 2003). The third case category is concerning wellbore stability 
problems and based on a published scientific paper. 
 
5.1 UBD cases 
Underbalanced drilling (UBD) is a rather new drilling procedure which has been 
recently applied in different oil and gas reservoirs. In the UBD condition, the well 
pressure is intentionally kept lower than the reservoir pore pressure. Therefore, it is 
expected that the reservoir fluids (oil, gas, and water) will flow to the well bore during 
drilling; therefore, the well control becomes important in such procedure. Controlling 
the formation damage induced by the drilling fluids, high drilling rate (ROP), and 
avoiding mud losses, are the main arguments for performing UBD techniques 
(McLennan, 1997).  
 
UBD also offers other benefits more than avoiding formation damage and producing 
high ROP; for example, efficient well placement in fractured reservoirs and determining 
reservoir behavior while drilling for a better well completion (Abdollahi et al., 2004). 
An efficient completion strategy could be chosen later when the reservoir behaviour is 
well known while drilling. This is a great advantage of applying UBD. The UBD 
method is not yet common drilling practice for most oil operating areas. In the Middle 
East, where the reservoir formations are fractured carbonate, UBD has recently been 
applied (Murphy et al., 2006 and Hooshmandkoochi et al., 2007).  
 
As a part of the PhD programme, a study on the UBD applications was conducted in a 
fractured carbonate oil field in Iran. This project was integrated with a project study 
performed in SINTEF Petroleum Research in Trondheim during 2002-2005. The result 
of this study was presented at the SPE/IADC Underbalanced Technology Conference 
and Exhibition held in  Houston, Texas in 2004 (Abdollahi et al., 2004), (the full-text 
article is given in Appendix C). The goal here is to model this study for producing a 
case in the Wellogy model implemented in the Creek knowledge editor. 
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5.1.1 Knowledge level 
The Dehluran (DH) field is a fractured carbonate field located in the south-western part 
of Iran close to the Iran-Iraq border. The field is around 45 km long and 8 km wide with 
an average reservoir thickness of 300 m (Taghavi, 2007). The field was discovered in 
1970 and 22 wells have been drilled so far. Only 13 wells have reached the reservoir 
target. The rest of the wells have been abandoned due to serious drilling challenges like 
high salt pressure and also due to the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988). The infill drilling 
programme for developing the DH field which has been done as plotted in Figure 5.1. 
The overall field production performance so far has shown an unreasonable low oil 
production rate. The production history for each well in the field is shown in Figure 5.2. 
This figure reveals that some wells produced for a short period and then became 
depleted or even dry; e.g. wells DH-11, DH-14, DH-18, DH-20 and DH-21. There are 
only a few wells with reasonable oil production rates and from which it has been 
produced oil for a rather long period (years), e.g. wells DH-2 and DH-5. 
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Figure 5.1 Infill drilling programme in the DH field versus time. 
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Figure 5.2 Cumulative oil production for each well in the DH field (SINTEF, 2004). 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 indicate that the increasing numbers of wells in the field (infill 
drilling solution) have not improved the total oil production rate, although the oil 
reserve volume is high. This was an important indication for the operating company 
(NIOC) to take action for further development. They stopped the development for a 
period and did not drill more wells until a comprehensive research study was performed 
to diagnose the problem. A comprehensive study was performed for the field by 
SINTEF Petroleum Research and provided a Master Development Plan (MDP) to 
upgrade the field. 
 
Human reasoning is applied to see the similarities and dissimilarities of the wells in 
respect of production rates (high, medium, and low rates). The used drilling method and 
well construction were identical for all wells for the entire field. Mud parameters, casing 
points and completion strategies were similar for most of the wells. Based on geology 
and petrophysical logs all the wells were completed within the same oil bearing zone 
with the same rock properties. The drilling data have been studied and audited and mud 
losses encountered in the pay zone are plotted for each well as shown in Figure 5.3. The 
small red dots with the numbers are the location and the name of the wells. The red 
circles around the some wells denote that mud losses occurred during the drilling in the 
oil-bearing zones (productions zone). While the blue circles refers to wells which 
produce oil with reasonable rates. 
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Figure 5.3 Dehluran field map showing wells with reporting mud losses (red circle) and good 
production wells (blue circle). 
As the matrix permeability was so low, in a range of few milli-darcy, the natural 
fracture networks are obviously dominating the production rate. Fracture networks in 
the reservoir rocks have high flow conductivity to the mud losses which can be 
observed during drilling. This high conductivity can be also seen during production 
(Van Golf-Racht, 1982). Mud losses were encountered and reported for some wells 
where the well intersected the fractures. The severity of the mud losses into the 
formation depend on the opening and extension of the fractures as well as mud 
parameters (e.g. viscosity and solid content). As shown in Figure 5.3, good producer 
wells are those wells which showed mud losses during drilling. This observation 
strongly proves the effect of fracture networks on capability of production of the wells. 
In addition to this observation, results from a production log tool (PLT) run in well DH-
5 revealed the contribution of those layers where mud losses occurred as shown Figure 
5.4. The PLT log showed that 95 % of the total well flow was produced from one 
perforation (perforation number one in Figure 5.4). The second perforation interval 
produced only 5 %, and the rest of the intervals did not contribute any at all. 
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9Match between PLT and mud loss
9Totally 2600 bbl was lost in 5 fracture events
9Only one fracture contributed in production
Perforation From (m) To (m) Flow %
1 4050 4061 95 1 4056 230
2 4066 4071 5 2 4083 350
3 4119 4125 0 3 4169 128
4 4174 4183 0 4 4297 56
5 4186 4191 0 5 4335 103
Production test
Drilling mud loss
Fracture Depth (m)
Normalized Mud loss 
rate (bbl / day)
1
9 - 5/8 ''
2875 m
5 ''    
4390 m
packer @ 2558 m
Top pay = 3823 m
All depths are in measured depth
RKB = 192 m
1
2
23
3
4
4
5
5
 
Figure 5.4 Well sketch with perforation intervals and mud losses depths vs. contribution of 
fractures.  
Because the drilling mud losses were found important observations for the 
determination of the reservoir characteristics, the mud losses were plotted versus well 
depth as shown in Figure 5.5. The net thickness of the pay zone was about 300 m and 
2600 bbl mud was totally lost in this interval (about 250 bbl/day). Figure 5.5 gives the 
total mud losses for entire drilled formation. 
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Figure 5.5 Total mud losses encountered in the reservoir formation of well DH-5. 
Figure 5.5 shows the actual recorded daily mud losses versus well depth within the 
reservoir section. However, in order to localize the fracture depths as a function of the 
mud loss rates, the differences of the mud losses are needed to plot which is shown in 
Figure 5.6. Peak mud losses represent fractures when the drill bit hits the fracture 
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networks. It is assumed that the rate of mud loss into the previous fracture networks 
remains close to constant until the new fracture networks are intersected. Obviously, the 
total mud loss will be shared by the two sets of fractures. Figure 5.6 describes the 
differential mud loss which is defined as the difference between the old and new 
observed losses given by: 
 
differential new oldQ Q QΔ = −       (Eq. 4) 
 
The differential mud losses can be both positive and negative. If the well intersects new 
fractures the differential mud loss will be positive. On the other hand, if the losses are 
treated by lost circulation materials (LCM), the differential mud losses would be 
negative.  Figure 5.6 shows only positive differential mud losses which denote fracture 
networks. 
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Figure 5.6 The differential mud losses during drilling versus fracture depths. 
Although the mud losses are good indicators for localizing fractures and determining 
reservoir permeability, the mud losses lead to formation damage which impact long-
term well production impairment. During overbalanced drilling most of the fractures are 
plugged by the mud filtrations and LCM.  To make all the fractures producible, it is 
required to perforate all the fractured intervals and stimulate the different fracture 
systems individually. The successes of later stimulation activities in the micro-fractured 
reservoirs are extremely low. 
 
The important conclusion for this field was a lack of reliable methods and tools for 
predicting fractures networks before drilling the well for better well placement in the 
reservoir formation. Optimized well direction and placement in the pay zone in respect 
to the fracture networks pattern is very important.  Experience has shown that predicting 
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and characterizing the fracture network prior to drilling is very difficult due to 
technology and modelling limitations and uncertainty. 
 
Based on stated field observations, the UBD technique is therefore an interesting option 
for enhanced data acquisition, avoiding reservoir impairment and achieving completion 
contingency for optimized well production. UBD can be performed by different fluids 
(mud) and procedures as listed below (McLennan, 1997): 
 
¾ UBD fluids 
o Dry air  
o Nitrogen 
o Natural gas  
o Mist 
o Stable foam 
o Stiff foam  
o Gasified liquids 
 
¾ UBD Procedure 
o Flowdrilling 
o Mudcup drilling 
o Snub drilling 
o Closed systems 
 
These different types of UBD techniques have been discussed by McLennan, 1997. For 
the DH field case, for some reasons Flowdrilling was recommended. Flowdrilling is a 
UBD technique where the well is left flowing while drilling. This technique is 
applicable for reservoirs with sufficient pore pressure to overcome the hydrostatic 
pressure in the well. The reservoir pressure gradient for DH field was measured to 0.464 
psi / ft (~ 1.12 kg / l).  Thus, the reservoir fluids can easily flow to the well bore when 
the mud is for example water. As the reservoir formation is fractured the influx of 
formation fluids to the well bore is noticeable. By monitoring the well bore pressures 
and flow rates versus drilling depth, fractures networks can be precisely localized and 
production capacity can be determined. Safety issues related to hole collapse and 
surface handling of the fluids need to be clearly defined. However, many producer wells 
have been completed in same area as open-hole completion (bare-foot) and producing 
oil for many years without indication of hole instability. 
 
5.1.2 Human reasoning 
According to the above discussion important observations and relationships can be 
abstractly made based on human reasoning as summarized below: 
 
Fractured reservoirs imply high fracture permeability. 
Oil production in fractured reservoirs is dominated by fractures. 
Carbonate reservoir indicates dense rock with low matrix permeability. 
Vertical wells cause low chance of intersecting steep fractures. 
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Increasing number of drilled wells leads to increase production rate, 
but this did not happen as expected. 
Some drilled wells were dry (no production) due to lack of hitting the 
fracture networks. 
The fractures can be plugged by drilling mud when drilling 
overbalanced.  
Predicting the fracture networks before drilling is difficult. 
Different production behaviours in one field can indicate the 
importance of the fracture networks. 
In conventional drilling method (overbalance drilling) hitting the 
fracture networks are not easily seen when crossing them. 
By applying UBD method, the fractures can be observed while drilling 
in the reservoir section, due to increase reservoir fluid influx into 
the wellbore 
By recognizing the fracture networks while drilling, a better 
completion strategy can be achieved. 
 
5.1.3 Case production 
According to the mentioned procedure for case production, the UBD case can be 
modelled as shown in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Initial design of the UBD case which can be implemented in the Wellogy model. 
Relation type Entity 
general findings Iran, Onshore field, SPE 85327 
has failure Low Oil Production Rate 
has task Finding Correct Technology Candidate  
has solution UBD Technology (characterizing fracture while drilling) 
Low Oil Production Rate (low oil recovery rate) 
Carbonate Reservoir 
Reservoir with Natural Fracture Networks 
Hole Size 8-1/2” 
Conventional Vertical Wells do not Improve Oil Production 
Mud Losses Happen 
Dense Reservoir Rock 
Fast Well Pressure Decline  
Moderate Reservoir Pressure 
Formation damage 
has observation 
Fracture Networks dominates Production 
Infill Drilling (increase drainage points) 
Stimulation (well cleaning) has repair action 
Acidizing 
has case status Processed case 
has outcome Pending (since solution has not yet been tested) 
lesson learned 
Many wells were similarly drilled in the same reservoir, but some wells showed a 
low production performance. Some wells only produced for few days. The reservoir 
characterizations were the same according to the petro-physical logs and sample 
cores. The specific observation is that the when pressure draw-down (difference 
between reservoir and well pressure) was high the oil rate decreased suddenly. This 
could be due the fractures are closed when pore pressure decreased suddenly. 
Another observation which could be playing an important role of the fracture 
networks were relation between mud losses and oil production. Good oil producer 
showed mud losses during drilling. 
has action 
Fracture networks are considered important for oil production, and forecasting 
facture networks before drilling is impossible. UBD method can be applied to find 
the fracture networks during drilling and implement better completion strategy for the 
well. Flowdrilling (i.e. let the well flow while drilling, one of the UBD techniques) 
can be planned in order to monitor reservoir characterizations 
 
 
5.2 Drillstring washout 
As in the last section the goal here is to produce a case in accordance with the Wellogy 
model from a published paper written by the author (Abdollahi and Skalle, 2003). The 
full paper is given in Appendix C. In this section, the only symbolic level is given for 
implementing the case in the Wellogy model. 
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5.2.1 General description of the case 
A high number of drillstring washouts have been experienced in a specific geology 
formation in some onshore oil fields in the southern part of Iran. As a consequence, rig 
time as well as well cost is increased dramatically because of many trips to replace 
washout pipes, or in the worse case, fishing operations necessary to recover twisted 
drillstring. This problem happens in a specific formation at a rather shallow depth, 
before reaching reservoir formation. Figure 5.7 shows a typical well schematic when 
drilling into the hazardous formation. 
 
Top depth ~ 1000 mTVD
Bottom depth ~ 1700 mTVD
20" CSG ~ 70 m
Hazardous formation
Hole size = 17.5 inch  
Figure 5.7 Schematic of the well when drilling into the hazardous formation. 
5.2.2 Problem description 
The title of the problem for this case is named “Drillstring Failure”. This problem has 
been experienced not only in Iran but also in different fields in the Middle East area 
(Kriesels et al., 1999). This problem normally occurs in hard and sticky formations 
which lead to intensive vibrations. During drilling of the 17-1/2” hole size (the same as 
the bit size), in the hazardous formation (formation M1), a series of washouts occur. In 
some wells the frequency of failure is high, i.e. few metres drilling interval between 
reported washouts, from 10 to 70 failures per well. This problem is limited to the 
specific fields and specific formations. The other important observation is that this 
problem only occurs in one part of the field.  The formation lithology contains sticky 
clay which is very sensitive to water (absorb water from the mud). Salty water, water 
based mud (WBM), is used with density and viscosity typically 1.2 kg/l and 7 cp 
respectively. 
 
When drilling depth reaches the top formation M1, washouts start. Firstly, the washout 
is seen by monitoring the mud pump pressure. Obviously, when a washout occurs a 
pressure drop can be seen, and the amount of this pressure drop will be a function of the 
size of the washout. This is a primary and important signal to the driller’s crew to stop 
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drilling and perform further investigations. The driller turns the rotary-table off and 
pulls the drillstring a few metres off the bottom.  The surface mud circulating system is 
checked for any possible surface leaks before pulling drillstring out of the hole (POOH). 
The drillstring is physically checked during POOH, and practically all washouts are 
discovered by eye. In some cases, bit balling in sticky clay is observed. 
 
The shape of the washouts is similar to the cracks either vertically or perpendicularly to 
the axis for the drillpipe as shown in Figure 5.8. Cracks perpendicular to the pipe axis has 
a length up to 1/4 pipe diameter and most of them are observed in the slips area (below 
the tool joint box). Most of the cracks parallel to the pipe axis occur in the middle of the 
pipe (pipe body). Approximately one third of the cracks were parallel and two-thirds 
perpendicular to the drillpipe axis.  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Crack direction and relative position. 
 
5.2.3 Causal relationships 
The possible factors (causes) affecting drillstring failures have been looked into in many 
resources, and especially  a comprehensive database on drilling provided by API / 
IADC,  (Seshadri and Allwin, 1992). The most important causes which lead to 
drillstring failures are listed in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Factors causing drillstring wash-outs (Seshadri and Allwin, 1992). 
Factors which affect drillstring 
failure (DSF) 
Severity level Comment 
Chemistry issues 0 (no concern) Non-corrosive environment 
Tortuosity 1 (potential) Variation of rock hardness 
Fatigue (cyclic stress) 1 (potential) Vertical well (but not straight) 
Pipe quality (internal upset 
length) 
1 (potential) 
Failure in slip area related to stress concentration 
in internal upset 
Rock hardness 2 (no critical) Gray stick marl 
Bit & BHA selection 3 (influence) Mass-imbalance - bit cutter concentration 
Axial vibration (bit bounce) 3 (influence) Due to stick-slip (coupling effect) 
Lateral vibration 3 (influence) Due to drillstring whirl (coupling effect) 
Accurate bit parameters 3 (influence) Critical WOB & RPM to avoid stick-slip 
Torsional vibration (stick-slip) 5 (critical) Due to sticky clay and WBM 
Mud type 5 (critical) WBM induces swelling problems 
Sticky rock 5 (critical) Sticky clay induces stick-slip 
 
Some of these factors have been discussed in detail in Appendix C. 
 
5.2.4 Human reasoning 
According to the above discussion the important observations and relationships can be 
abstractly made based on the human reasoning as summarized below: 
 
Drillstring washouts were seen in particular area in the 
field / geology. 
Drillstring washouts were seen in a particular geology 
stratigraphy. 
After completing the drilling in hazardous formation the 
drillstring washouts were not seen in the beneath 
formations. 
Similar BHA and drillpipe were used for the whole field. 
 
Based on the above observations the following reasoning can be derived: 
 
The quality of the drillpipe is not an issue. 
The corrosion may not be an issue either because of non-
corrosive environment. 
The washout problem is obviously related to the regional 
geology / formation type. 
 
The following important observations tied to the above reasoning were seen: 
 
The formation was sticky. 
Bit balling problems were seen. 
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High vertical and lateral vibrations were seen. 
Mud was WBM and formation type was clay / Shale. 
Swelling of clay was observed leading to additional 
drillstring torques. 
 
5.2.5 Case model 
This case has not been fully solved; however, some of the tested methods have been 
partly successful, especially the application of downhole motors, where we saw a failure 
rate decrease of approximately 25 - 30 %. Therefore, this case can be considered as 
unsolved case. As already discussed in the previous chapters, the case should contain: 
 
¾ General case description 
¾ Problem and relevant observation 
¾ Special findings 
¾ Repair actions and activities 
¾ Solution of problem 
¾ Outcome 
 
Based on the above discussion the Table 5.3 has been given for entities and their 
structural relationships (i.e. subclass, instance, part relations). 
 
Table 5.3 Structural relationships for the finding entities of the case in the Wellogy model. 
Entity 1 Relationship Entity 2 
Field A is instance of Field Name 
Well A-18 is instance of  Well Name 
Well A-18 is part of Field A 
Country Name is instance Iran 
Drillstring Failure is subclass of Failure State 
Finding Cause of Failure is subclass of Task 
Processed Case is case status of Case 
WBM is subclass of  Mud Type 
Shallow Well Depth is subclass of Well Parameter 
Hole Size 17-1/2” is subclass of Well Parameter 
Sticky Clay Formation is subclass of Geology parameter 
High Drillstring Vibration is subclass of Well parameter 
Drillstring Fatigue is subclass of Drillstring Failure 
Drillstring Corrosion is subclass of Drillstring Failure 
Drillstring Twist-off is subclass of Drillstring Failure 
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Table 5.4 shows some of the causal relationships for the case. 
Table 5.4 Causal relationships for the drillstring failure case in the Wellogy model. 
Entity 1 Strength relationship Entity 2 
Drillstring Washout has synonym Drillstring Crack 
Drillstring Fatigue causes Drillstring Failure 
Corrosion causes Drillstring Failure 
Hard Rock Drilling leads to Drillstring Vibration 
Drillstring Vibration causes Drillstring Fatigue 
Sticky Formation sometimes causes Stick-Slip 
Stick-Slip causes Drillstring Vibration 
WBM sometimes causes Clay Swelling 
Shallow Well Depth sometimes causes Higher Stick Slip 
Sticky Formation sometimes causes Bit Balling 
High Bit Torque sometimes causes Drillstring Twist Off 
Poor Recognition of  Drillstring 
Washout 
sometimes causes Drillstring Twist Off 
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Table 5.5 shows the case at the symbolic level 
Table 5.5 Case representation at a symbolic level for Wellogy application. 
Relation type Entity 
has failure Drillstring Washout 
has task Finding Cause of The Failure 
has solution Stick-slip Vibration 
Sticky Clay Formation 
Shallow Formation 
WBM  
Hole Size 17-1/2” 
High Number of Washout 
Washout in One Formation 
has observation 
Washout in Slip Area 
has after failure observation Mud Pressure Dropping 
Using OBM 
Using Stiffer BHA 
Using Mud Motor 
Using Corrosion Inhibitor (2 % by volume) 
Changing Bit Type 
Using Downhole Shock Absorber 
has short-term repair action 
implement in well plan 
Avoiding Critical RPM 
Full statistic analysis in hazardous formation 
Reducing BHA weight 
has further investigation 
action 
Downhole vibration monitoring to measure the severity of vibrations in different 
modes 
has case status Processed case 
has outcome Partially Solved 
lesson learned 
Vibration (stick-slip) has been found to be one of the main factors leading to 
drillstring failure (crack or washout). Since the failure happened in only one 
specific formation, not observed in upper or lower formation with same 
drillstring and same parameter, we can say that poor pipe quality is not the reason 
for the failure. Drillstring vibration in the torsional mode is the most probable 
reason of the failure due to two reasons: 1) failures occur only in one specific 
formation 2) Formation rock is sticky which lead to stick-slip vibration. 
However, the problem is complex and combined effects are involved 
 
5.3 Borehole instability cases 
Additional cases are given to realize how to produce case for CBR application in a 
different perspective, because case production has been a challenging task for many 
users and researchers who are trying to implement CBR, especially in the petroleum 
engineering domain. Two cases concerning borehole instability are produced. The 
selected case is produced here based on a published paper (paper-based). 
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5.3.1 Hole instability case 
This case is produced on basis of a published SPE paper concerning the hole instability 
problem (Russell et al., 2004). This case is built for the purpose of experience transfer 
like all other cases which are considered as knowledge-rich cases. The usefulness for 
the user of this case can be for example “solving a problem during execution of a 
sidetracking drilling plan” or “improving drilling efficiency” of sidetracked wells in the 
North Sea area. The case will show some operational observations or “red flags” which 
have been experienced during sidetracking in a depleted reservoir in the area.  Most red 
flags were unforeseen in the initial well design due to many geology uncertainties.  The 
purposes of the case can be summarized as: 
 
1. To learn about a specific challenges when drilling a sidetrack through a faulted 
and partially depleted formation  
2. To improve a sidetrack well plan to overcome such challenges 
3. Introducing the specific failures  mechanism (hole instability) for sidetracking 
applications 
4. To exemplify case production in the Creek framework  
 
5.3.1.1 Knowledge level 
Summary 
A sidetrack well was planned to be drilled from an existing well in North Sea (UK 
sector) by Shell UK in 2002. Sidetracking operation was exposed to a low reservoir 
pressure and complex geology area (faults) encountering many operational challenges 
such as stuck pipe, and mud lost circulation. The two sidetrack legs failed. The operator 
learned from the two incidents and applied the gained experience for a new attempt. 
They succeeded in completing the job in the third trial. A simple sketch of the well legs 
is shown in Figure 5.9. 
 
The solution for the third trial was: 
 
¾ Change the well path  in order to avoid crossing the faults and shortening the 
well path  
¾ Improve mud performance in order to meet hole stability objectives 
¾ Increase human awareness and improve well monitoring during execution of 
the plan 
 
These suggestions were based on the experience gained from the two previous 
sidetracks.  
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Faults
1. Original well
2. Two failed sidetracks 
3. Succeed sidetrack
1
2
3
D E F
80 feet  throw
 
Figure 5.9  Illustration of the three well paths and transforming of episode to symbolic codes. 
Summary of the problem 
Several mud losses were observed in the Lower Ness formation in Block D during the 
first sidetrack. Two reasons for mud losses were considered; a) low reservoir pressure 
and b) faults. Attempts to reduce the losses were made by pumping pills and reducing 
the mud weight. A long section was drilled at an inclination angle greater than 90 deg. 
A significant, unexpected throw across the main D/E fault of approximately 80 ft was 
then encountered. This resulted in strong steering corrections to get the well path back 
to the Upper Ness reservoir sands. Increases in torque-and-drag were observed in the 
Upper Ness in Block E were dealt with by circulating the hole clean. The bottom hole 
assembly (BHA) became stuck unexpectedly while moving the drillstring prior to a 
make-up pipe connection.  The mechanism that caused the stuck-pipe incident was not 
clear. Possibilities considered were differential sticking (because of depleted reservoir 
pressures), geometrical sticking (caused by steering corrections), poor hole cleaning 
(indicated by increased torque-and drag), and borehole collapse. The attempts to free the 
stuck pipe failed, thus the well was abandoned. 
 
Repair action based on first failed sidetrack 
The second sidetrack was followed with the similar plan as the first sidetrack. The mud 
losses were experienced again and drilling time was increased once more due to 
equipment failures. High slip-stick and increasing torque-and-drag were then observed. 
Total depth (TD) was called early because of deteriorating hole conditions. The trip out 
of the open hole took around 4 days and was characterized by the excessive mud losses, 
overpulls, and packing off the annulus. When the drillstring was out of the hole, an 
additional delay of five days was incurred because of breakdown of the draw-works. On 
attempting to re-enter the hole, it became apparent that the second sidetrack was lost. 
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Gained experience from the two failed sidetracks 
 
¾ The Mid-Ness shale indicated low compressive shear  
¾ High wellbore offset was in the form of eccentricity from the main well path. 
Figure 5.10 shows offset measured in the study case. These measures were taken a 
short time after the well was drilled. High wellbore offset can be the cause of 
high wellbore side forces and stuck pipe. The reason of the wellbore offset is 
believed due to slightly relative movement of two faults. 
¾  The sudden mud losses were observed in fractures and faults  
¾ Due to the low reservoir pressure, the jump of pore pressure from the depleted 
reservoir to the normally pressured shales has caused a reduction the fracture 
gradient in the intersecting interval. As a result, the shale fractured and mud 
losses were experienced at mud weights lower than those used to drill the early 
development wells before reservoir pressure depletion had taken place. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Illustration showing wellbore offset, i.e. eccentricity due to a geology fault (Russell 
et al., 2004). 
Reasons for failure 
The cause of the failure was unexpected movement on the fault. Fault throw was also 
recognized as a reason for wellbore offset (degree of eccentric) and heavy mud losses. 
Russell et al. (2004) suggest that “the exact mechanism for the creation of the offset is 
difficult to determine, but could have been caused by minor movement made possible by 
hydraulic lubrication of the faulted material in the interval”. However, it is unclear 
what they mean by hydraulic lubrication. It is possible that the mud loss changed the in-
situ pore pressure and effective stress. The change in the reservoir pressure promoted 
wellbore instability. 
 
Solution for the third sidetrack 
They altered the well path to avoid the hazardous fault area. The new well path was 
drilled through only one reservoir block at a much lower inclination. An integrated 
technical team was established to perform a careful operation plan and monitor this 
challenging well. 
 
Outcome of the solution 
The third sidetrack was drilled with success. 
 107
Reference 
The reference can be addressed as an entity; for instance, for this case the reference is 
SPE 90373 (Russell et al., 2004). 
  
5.3.1.2 Symbolic level 
Complete case in word format 
The findings of the case “Hole Collapse 01” are shown in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6 Findings of the case Hole Collapse 01. 
Relation type Entity 
has pointer SPE 90373 
has case characteristic UK 
has date of occurrence Year 2002 
has case characteristic Shell UK 
has case characteristic Tern Field 
has case characteristic Well TA-18 
has new well objective Injection well  
has activity Sidetracking 
has activity Tripping in 
has failure Wellbore failure  
Has task Improve Well plan 
has observation Horizontal Well 
has observation Shale Fm 
has observation Sandstone Fm 
has observation Narrow Reservoir Target 
has observation Multi Reservoir Target 
has observation Reservoir P Low 
has observation Long Open Hole Time 
has observation High Drillstring Torque 
has observation High Drag 
has observation Natural Fracture LC 
has observation Difficult Re-entry Condition 
has observation Stuck Pipe 
has observation Hole Collapse  
has observation LC 
has observation High Well bore Eccentric 
has observation Difficult Re-entry Condition 
has deviation Deficient Geology Forecasting 
has deviation Horizontal well 
has deviation Unexpected Fault Throw 
has initial repair activity Increasing Pump Rate Stepwise 
has initial repair activity Reducing MW gradually 
has initial repair activity Overpulling 
has initial repair activity Pumping LCM Pill 
has initial repair activity New Sidetrack 
has solution Change Well Path 
has solution Avoid  Faults 
has outcome  Successful Outcome 
 
Has experience and pointer 
has summary  Hole Collapse 01 Summary 
a) History of the incidents 
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b) Reasons for occurring of the incidents 
c) Repair actions and solutions 
 
has experience  Hole Collapse 01 lessons learned (LL) 
a) Lessons learned from the incidents 
b) Recommendations 
  
has pointer (similar as reference)  SPE 90373 
 
Figure 5.11 shows snapshots of description of the Hole Collapse 01 Summary 
and Hole Collapse 01 Lessons Learned (LL) for case “Hole 
Collapse 01” in the Wellogy model. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Textual descriptions for “Hole Collapse 01 Summary” (left) and “Hole 
Collapse 01 LL” (right). 
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5.3.1.3 Representing the complete case in the Wellogy model 
Figure 5.12 shows the contents for case “Hole Collapse 01” in the case view (left) 
and frame view (right). As already explained, in the case view, the degree of 
Importance and Strength Value is given to each finding of the case by a couple 
of textual phrases (e.g. Informative, Indicative)  , while in the frame view, 
these two phrases will be converted to a digital number varied 0 to 1.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 Contents of the case “Hole Collapse 01” in both views; case view (left) and frame 
view (right).  
The extracted new entities 
The existing Wellogy model has been searched to enter the new entities by using 
“searching tool”. This step should be performed precisely to avoid repetition for 
inserting entities. The new entities are listed Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 The new entities (left column) which represent the Hole Collapse 01 and their 
relations to the existing entities which have already been found in the Wellogy 
model (right column). 
from Entity  Relationship to Entity 
Drilling Operational Data has subclass Drilling Time 
Drilling Time has subclass Long Open Hole Time 
Case Description has subclass Reference 
Reference has subclass SPE Paper 
SPE Paper has instance SPE 90373 
Well Characteristic has subclass Date of Occurrence 
Date of Occurrence has instance Year 2002 
Drilling Description has instance Drilling Operation Description 
Drilling Operation Description  has subclass Re-entry Condition 
Re-entry Condition has subclass Difficult Re-entry Condition 
Fault Description has subclass Active Fault 
Fault Description has subclass Unexpected Fault Throw 
Well inclination has subclass Horizontal Well 
Terne Field has part Well TA-18 
Operators Name has instance Shell UK 
Improve Well Plan has subclass Change Well Path 
Improve Well Plan has subclass Avoid Faults 
Axial movement after stuck has subclass Drillstring Over-pull 
Operation Complexity Underrated has subclass Deficient Geological Forecasting 
 
Definition of the new entities: 
Each new entity can be explained in the Wellogy model. This explanation is given in 
order to define the entities (i.e. findings of the case). Each entity has a textual 
description box provided in the Creek knowledge editor. The following findings for 
Hole Collapse 01 are defined and given as examples: 
 
Drill Time 
“Drilling Time” is defined as cumulative time for drilling activities which cover 
both productive drilling time and non-productive drilling time.  
Pointer 
“Pointer” is additional information stored outside of the Wellogy model. It can be; 
URLs, SPE paper, research reports, books, etc. 
. 
Time of Occurrence 
“Time of Occurrence” is the time at which failure occurred. This entity is 
obviously not referring to the date of the published the paper or the constructed case. 
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Active Fault 
This entity defines a geological event. A large or small formation moves quickly along 
its fault plane. If this fault is crossed by a drilling well, the wellbore change its geometry 
and it can be observed while drilling. 
 
Unexpected Fault Throw 
This entity refers to a situation when faults are thrown more than indicated by 
expectation or forecasting. This is normally an issue when drilling through complex 
geology (faulted rocks and formations). Corrective measures may be needed. 
 
Shell UK  
Shell is a company name and has an instance of “company name”. If a company has 
several branches in a different region, an extension name of the region is added to the 
company name, e.g. “Shell UK”.  
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The new causal relationships for the case 
The new causal relationships found for case “Hole Collapse 01” is given in Table 
5.8. 
Table 5.8 The causal relationships for the case “Hole Collapse 01” 
Entity Relationship Entity 
Hole Collapse causes Poor Hole Cleaning 
Difficult Re-entry Condition caused by Thick Mud Cake 
Thick Mud Cake caused by LC 
Difficult Re-entry Condition caused by High Wellbore Path Eccentricity 
Difficult Re-entry Condition indicated by High Drag   
Difficult Re-entry Condition sometimes caused by Active Fault  
Difficult Re-entry Condition always caused by Hole Collapse 
Hole Collapse occasionally caused by Long Open Hole Time 
High Wellbore Path Eccentricity occasionally caused by Unexpected Fault Throw 
Active Fault  causes High Wellbore Path Eccentricity 
Faulted Fm causes High Wellbore Path Eccentricity 
High Open Hole Time sometimes caused by Waiting on Equipment / Material 
High Open Hole Time sometimes caused by Waiting During LC Repair          
Hole Collapse occurs in Shale 
Pipe Stuck Alarm sometimes caused by Unstable Shale Fm  
High Drag sometimes caused by High Dog Leg Severity 
High Drag   sometimes caused by Dog Leg 
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Figure 5.13 shows the network of the causal relationships for the case “Hole 
Collapse 01”. The different relationships are shown by the different colours. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Some part of the new causal relationships for the case “Hole Collapse 01” in 
the Wellogy model. 
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6. Discussions 
This chapter discusses issues that have been found important during the implementation 
of the Wellogy model for the oil well engineering domain. 
 
6.1 Task of cases in the oil well domain 
In the oil well knowledge domain different problems can be modelled which are 
difficult to explain by mathematical approaches due to the complexity and uncertainties 
of the process. The role of an engineer in solving a problem by reasoning is important. 
People continuously gain experience through solving oil and gas well problems on a 
daily basis. However, people are moving around and knowledge may be lost or at least 
not stored in a systematic way.  Oil well cases which contain knowledge can be found 
either in the mind of the workers or written down as texts and documents. They are not 
stored systematically in order to reuse them in future application. 
 
A recurring question when we talk about CBR modelling is what types of cases within 
oil well engineering should be stored for the CBR model? Before answering this 
question, we need to list the repeated problems observed in the domain. When this list is 
provided, the causes behind each problem should be derived. The history of oil and gas 
wells has show that most of the repeated problems in this domain are due to incomplete 
information (data) or uncertain conditions of the media. It is difficult to measure most of 
the downhole data needed for different applications for the oil well engineering domain. 
Imagine, the behaviour of the formation rock (i.e. physics and chemistry of the rock) is 
complex and uncertain. It is worth pointing out that the formation rock is an important 
component of the oil well domain. Abnormal pore pressures, stuck pipes, lost 
circulations, fluid blowouts, low oil production recoveries; all have connections to the 
rock behaviour. 
 
Another problem is the downhole well condition and monitoring. Small hole diameter 
(typically 6 inch), long distance to the surface (typically 6000 m), and high temperatures 
and pressure, lead to some challenges in terms of measuring the correct information  in 
order to diagnose oil and gas well problems. Typical examples in this context are well 
leakages. It is difficult to install permanent and reliable tools along the well construction 
to continuously record the data and diagnose the well diseases. 
 
With this background, it can be mentioned that the task of the cases modelled in 
Wellogy is important to be defined prior to creating the model. The diagnosis of 
problems in the oil well domain is more important than its solutions. A CBR model 
which deals with the diagnosis of problems can be called CBR-diagnosis. In the 
Wellogy model implemented for the leaking well cases, the task was defined as “finding 
the cause”. Obviously, when the causes of the problems are found, the solutions can be 
fairly straightforward for the engineer. 
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6.2 Matching results 
The matching process between two selected cases is non-symmetric process. It means 
that the matching percentages between two cases, input and output cases, are different. 
For instance, the Case A has 60 % similarity to the Case B, but in opposite direction, it 
will not be the same percentage. 
 
When the matching function is activated in the Creek knowledge editor, the retrieved 
cases are ranked according to the match percentages. This result is the first indication 
for the users to choose and examine the output case (solved case). However, as the 
number of findings of the cases are given in an open set and unconstrained way (i.e. 
some cases have a higher number of information and some have lower number), a high 
match percentage with a solved case may not necessary mean it is the case which most 
resembles the unsolved case. The users need to go through the solutions of the solved 
cases to verify the result. The retrieved solutions can be either used directly or adjusted 
(repaired) by aquatically using the causal relationships defined in the Wellogy model. 
Generally this part of the process is called “revising” in the CBR cycle. We have 
already shown that the retrieved case solutions with the highest match percentage were 
to some extent the most reasonable solutions when comparing with the human 
reasoning, after minor adjustment and repair to satisfy human reasoning.  
 
Another point is about the quality of the unsolved cases. The attributes of the unsolved 
case have a default strength valve of 0.5 and unchangeable in the Creek framework. 
However, in the real world, when describing a problem for an unsolved case by a set of 
entities, some entities are more important than others. 
 
6.3 Human dependency on the CBR model 
At least three times during the implementation of the CBR model human judgments are 
needed: 
 
1. When giving the strength values to the different causal relationships in the 
model 
2. When giving the degree of Importance and Predictive Strength for 
findings of the solved cases 
3. The number of findings given to the cases 
 
These parameters are given to the model according to human expertise. Cases can have 
unlimited / undefined number of findings (features). Hence, the number of findings 
would be accounted for in the match percentage (Eq.1), so the result of the model would 
be affected by these parameters. Although more findings given to the cases are 
advantageous, because they improve the explanation of the case, they should be 
provided for the similar cases with the rather same amount (same number of findings). 
As explained before, the findings of cases can be divided into the three categories; 
 
1) Basic case findings 
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2) General case findings 
3) Findings which directly or indirectly explain the problem and solution of the case 
The first two categories can have almost the same number of findings; however, the 
third category can have different number of findings depending on both the availability 
of case information and of the case builder. 
 
The strength values which are given for causal relationships between two entities also 
depend on the case builder expertise. The values as discussed before vary between 0 and 
1. Generally, the causal relationships modelled in the CBR tools play the same role as 
mathematical operators. Let us go back to Eq. 3 for drilling rate of penetration: 
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     (Eq. 3) 
 
Causal relationships can be derived (the relationship strengths are given as verbs - bold 
font): 
 
For the N parameter (bit rotation speed) the following causal relationships can be given: 
 
High N always causes / causes / leads to / sometimes causes High ROP 
 
For the W parameter (rock strength) the following causal relationships can also be 
given: 
 
High W always causes / causes / leads to / sometimes causes High ROP 
 
As seen, it is possible to define different strength values between the two parameters. 
This is entirely up to the case builders. However, as the equation shows, the effect of W 
on ROP is higher than N. Therefore, it is logical to give a higher strength value to the W. 
Similar evaluation has already been considered in the Wellogy model. 
 
Note that the causal relationships are not only physical / mathematical equations, but 
they can also be facts and broader understanding relationships between two concepts 
which engineers find when solving the case. For instance, for the ROP example given in 
Chapter 2, the driller found low mud circulation rate was the reason for low ROP, he 
could therefore establish such causal relationships in the CBR model; 
 
Low GPM causes Poor Lifting Capacity 
Poor Lifting Capacity causes Cutting Accumulation around the Bit 
Cutting Accumulation around the Bit causes Low ROP 
 
These types of relationships are created based on the observations taken from the real 
cases which may be difficult to model in a mathematical format. This is part of the 
knowledge which is called specific knowledge elicited through the cases. 
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The degree of importance of the findings for solved cases are expressed by combination 
of two phrases in Creek; degree of Importance and Predictive Strength. 
There are no general rules for giving these characteristics to the findings of the solved 
cases; however, the Importance generally refers the degree of importance of a 
finding tied to the solutions of the case, and the finding has been reported many times in 
many similar cases. For instance, Pressure Build-up in Annulus-B is an 
important finding for the leaking well cases representing a leak crossing from annulus-A 
to annulus-B. Because this finding has been reported for all similar cases, this finding 
will get a high degree of Importance. However, the Predictive Strength 
indicates how significant a finding is when predicting a problem solution. For instance, 
Non-Chrome Casing has high Predictive Strength, but since it has not 
been reported for all similar cases, it will get low Importance degree. This type of 
giving weights on the findings of cases is recommended to perform when the cases are 
clustered according to the similarities between them. In the Wellogy model these issues 
have been regarded by clustering cases in the five groups based on the solutions. 
 
6.4 Conversational CBR 
As the case designer is not the same as the people who directly solve the case, the case 
components will entirely depend on the builders’ expertise. Therefore, it is highly 
recommended to develop a format or defined template for each application which the 
case information and its findings should be filled in. This was done to a certain extent 
for the Wellogy model by developing a table as shown in Table 4.2. After building this 
preliminary case structure, separate tables can be provided for the cases individually as 
shown in Appendix A. 
 
In this context, conversational CBR (C-CBR) may have an advantage. In recent years 
the development of C-CBR has extended the applicability of CBR to facilitate  case 
construction (Aha et al., 2001). By applying C-CBR, users may construct the case 
incrementally through a question-answering scheme (Gu, 2006). Generally cases are 
described and documented by people who directly involve to the case. They may not 
give the full description to the case. When a case is constructed by the case builders 
(who may not directly involve to the case) additional information may needed which 
could be not covered in the text document provided by other people. For this reason, C-
CBR may be helpful, because the C-CBR method can provide a dialogue for describing 
cases in a defined template. For instance, for a Stuck Pipe case the following typical 
pair of questions / answers can be provided as shown in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 Example showing C-CBR for a typical stuck pipe case.  
Questions Answers 
Kind of stuck pipe Collapsed formation 
Type of formation Shale 
Mud type Water based mud 
The time of stuck During pipe connection 
Hole clearance Low 
Mud  circulation rate Low  
Rate of penetration before stuck High 
Mud viscosity Low In
fo
rm
at
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n 
be
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Returned cutting on shaker Low 
Circulation after stuck Restricted circulation 
Drillstring rotation after stuck No rotation 
Drillstring movement (up / down)after 
stuck 
No movement 
In
fo
rm
at
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n 
af
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r f
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Pump pressure Increased 
From these questions and answers, the cause for the problem can be concluded. For instance, the hole collapse due to inappropriate 
hole cleaning can be the solution (cause) of the case. 
 
 
6.5 Future improvements 
6.5.1 Found constrains for constructing the Wellogy model 
Since we are not able to apply conditional relation links like “IF” and “THEN”, some 
entities are extended in terms of creating long phrase when naming entities to fulfil the 
meaning of the entity. For instance, some entities are extended just in order to complete 
the meaning for answering to; “where”, “how” and “when”. Here are some examples: 
 
¾ “High Drilling Time in Open Hole” - means that time consumption 
was high during drilling in an open hole section before running the casing - 
answer to the “where”.  
¾ “Stuck Pipe While Tripping” - means that the pipe got stuck while 
tripping out or into the hole - answer to the “when”.  
¾ “Annular Well Pressure Increased Gradually” - means that the 
pressure trend in the well annulus is slowly rising- answer to the “how” 
 
During developing the Wellogy model, some different subjects within the oil well 
engineering domain have been embedded into the Wellogy model; for instance, UBD, 
well integrity, through tubing drilling (TTD), lost circulation, and stuck pipes. It seems 
when the model is expanded with different tasks (i.e. problem-solving, finding the 
cause of a problem) the functionality of the system with respect to the naming entities 
and developing causal relationships needs to be implemented precisely. Generalization 
of naming the entities, entities which could deal with the different subjects in one 
domain, could improve the efficiency of the model.  
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Within the case time period, several activities or actions may be happening at the same 
time, and it is worth retaining this information in the case content. They are usually 
defined in the case to describe how / when / where the problem happened, and how / 
when / where the solution was achieved. When several activities are given in a case, 
there is no chronological system to show the ordering of activities; for instance, first 
Drilling, second Getting Stuck Pipe, third Apply Over-pull of 
String, and fourth Circulating LCM Pill. Such action-outcome chain 
processes may be significant to follow to enhance the reasoning and understanding 
process. 
 
During the development of the Wellogy model, it was sometimes necessary to search 
for entity names or concepts. Searching function used in Creek only looks for the first 
letter of the first word of the entities. However, as most of the entities contain more than 
one word, the searching for a concept is not so simple. For instance, we want to search 
for “Mud”, and this entity in Wellogy is for example named as “Drilling Mud”, the 
searching function may not find this entity. For this purpose, we had to transfer the 
Wellogy model to an XML file in several steps during the development of the model. 
The XML file is then downloaded in an Excel or Word file to use the search functions 
to find the target entity. 
 
Cycling or looping of entities must also be avoided. There would be a cycle in the 
hierarchy when for example entity “A” has subclass “B” and at the same time “B” has 
subclass “A”.  
 
6.5.2 Combined relationships 
For the causal relationship model, multi-entities which yield one outcome (e.g. IF A & 
B & C exist THEN D occurs with a high probably) in the Creek framework (university 
version) was not implemented. Up to now, the existing model only links one entity to 
another one for expressing the causal relationship; for instance, “High Mud 
Density” sometimes causes “Mud Loss” (weak relationship). However, another 
option can be; IF “High Mud Density” and “Formation is Naturally 
Fractured” exist at the same time, both conditions cause “Mud Loss” (stronger 
relationship). These types of relations are needed for the oil well engineering domain. 
Table 6.2  shows an example for combined relationships for a causal relationship. 
Table 6.2 Examples of combined causal relationships. 
Income 
entity 
Relation name Relation strength (assumed) Outcome Remarks 
A sometimes causes 0.4 
B sometimes causes 0.4 
C sometimes causes 0.4 
can be modelled in the 
Creek framework 
A + B causes 0.7 
A + B + C always causes 0.99 
D 
recommended in the 
future 
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6.5.3 Sustaining success and failure attributes for the cases 
Most of the attributes or findings which are allocated for the cases are attributes which 
describing failures such as indicative observations and alarms, for example, “Low 
Chrome Casing” causes “Casing Corrosion” which causes “Casing Leak”. 
Here, the “Low Chrome Casing” is a negative finding. On the other hand, we have 
sometimes a positive finding; for example, “High Chrome Casing” which causes 
increase in “Casing Resistance against Corrosion”, which finally leads 
to reduction of the chance of “Casing Leak”. By giving such finding to a leak well 
case, those cases with the solution of “Casing Leak” due to “Non-Chrome 
Casing” will be retrieved with low similarity percentages. Therefore, the result of the 
model will become more reliable by retrieving the closest similar retrieved cases. These 
kinds of relationships have not been implemented in the Wellogy model yet. In the daily 
human life, normally success characters or positive observations are useful for 
deductive and inductive reasoning. This issue was discussed and realized too late to 
implement it in this study. So the recommendation is to use success characters in 
addition to failure characters for better reasoning results. 
 
6.6 CBR system background information for engineers 
When implementing a new case in an existing ontology, a defined procedure or 
guideline is needed for naming new entities which are found in a new case. It is also 
difficult to remember previous similar entities (similar with respect to semantic) which 
already exist in the model and should be allocated for a new case. Therefore, repetition 
of similar entities with respect to the meaning can occur. If similar entities 
(duplications) are renamed and entered into the model, it could cause a reduction of the 
quality of the model in term of causal relationships. As Creek understands the name of 
entities (i.e. the form of writing of the phrases), it will treat two entities with the same 
meaning differently. The solution to this problem is to use one of the entities as a 
synonym to the other one. 
 
Another point is locating the correct place (branch) in the hierarchy (ontology) for 
inserting of a new entity found in a new case. This can mostly happen in a rather large 
ontologies (i.e. model with the thousands entities). Therefore, integrating of the cases 
and existing hierarchy model is needed to create a sophisticated CBR model. However, 
the two-dimensional graph in the Creek software is sometimes helpful. 
 
For petroleum engineers to be working on CBR applications, the users need to fully 
understand the functions of the CBR systems and tools (e.g. the Creek framework). The 
users should know how the CBR system deals with the components of the model (e.g. 
Wellogy). The requirements of the model and case structures should be defined by both 
parties. For this reason, the new users and students in petroleum engineering who 
choose this topic for research should have CBR courses. The focus should be put on 
CBR functions such as; retrieving, reusing, revising and retaining from a practical point 
of view. 
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6.7 Further applications of CBR in petroleum engineering 
Different cases in the petroleum engineering domain have been examined and modelled 
in the Wellogy model. These cases cover rather complex oil well problems. They are 
complex, because they are difficult to predict, understood, model, and solve. The typical 
examples in the oil well engineering domain are well integrity in terms of leakage 
during the life of the well, mud loss circulations, and stuck pipe during drilling phase. 
The benefits of using the CBR approach for such problems are: 
 
¾ Remembering  and recalling similar cases; if the number of cases in case 
memory are high (around hundred cases), the trend can be obtained by use of  
CBR model 
¾ Storing and connecting different parts of the knowledge for a specific problem;  
in this way CBR model can provide additional information to the unsolved case 
¾ Compensating missed and forgotten information and data of the case 
 
As discussed before, if the human factor is taken away, the causes of most of the oil 
well problems are related to the lack of understanding rock behaviour or unpredictable 
behaviour. Therefore, the   CBR approach is advantageous to use for problems which 
are induced by rock and geology formations. Generally, a well trajectory intersects 
different geological layers or formations. Each layer has different behaviour and 
reactions observed while drilling. One option is to follow one typical problem which is 
repeated in many wells (e.g. stuck pipe) in a specific geological layer. Then, many cases 
can be constructed for one particular problem in a CBR model. The cause (solution) of 
these cases is not necessarily identical. The solved cases contain for instance the 
successful solutions to many stuck pipe problems in a typical layer. The cases may have 
different and similar sets of information which the CBR model would be able to store 
similar cases for an unsolved case (input case). Based on this discussion the structure of 
a case can be defined with a different time scale. Table 6.3 shows the possible options for 
different case structures in order to model cases within the oil well engineering domain. 
Table 6.3 Five options for case structure with in the oil well engineering domain. 
Case types based on time interval Example 
Bit run Low ROP cases 
Geology layer Lost circulation / stuck pipe cases 
Hole section Drill string washout case 
Well Well leakages / well productivity 
Field Technology candidate for the fields 
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7. Conclusions and Future Works 
The main objective of this study was to demonstrate and analyse some complex 
problem-cases within the oil well engineering domain through the CBR methodology. 
For this purpose, a CBR model called Wellogy was implemented which contains 
ontology and many selected knowledge-rich cases from different areas all within the oil 
well engineering domain. Based on the model and results, the following important 
conclusions and recommendations for future works can be made: 
 
1. Selection of appropriate case candidates applied with the CBR tool was the first 
main step in the process of building the Wellogy model. 
2. To obtain a reliable and an efficient CBR model, many cases are needed. We 
suppose that at least 100 solved cases for knowledge-lean cases and around 50 
for knowledge-rich cases are required. In the Wellogy model, we only succeeded 
to build only 12 solved cases due to the lack of data. 
3. For completing the Wellogy model the following steps were followed for the 
case production: 
 
a. Selection of suitable case candidate 
b. Definition of the task for the case before starting to built it 
c. Describing and analysing the case and specifying the human reasoning 
behind (this part of study was called knowledge level) 
d. Putting attention in describing the case problem correctly and completely 
as much as possible. The solution part can be defined abstractly and 
needs to establish some relationships between solution and problem 
findings 
e. Expanding the knowledge level for the case by integrating case 
information and general knowledge for the case (i.e. rules and theories) 
in the hierarchy format (ontology) and establishing causal relationships 
f. Indexing the case by creating vocabularies (i.e. terminologies) and 
abstracted phrases. This representation of the knowledge level was called 
the symbolic level 
g. Building cases in a preliminary template and then clustering them with 
the other similar cases 
h. Encoding and inserting cases in the CBR knowledge editor and linking it 
with the existing ontology 
i. Improving the quality of the cases by tuning and modifying the strength 
values of the findings of cases 
4. Different types of cases in the oil well domain were considered in the Wellogy 
model. Single episode cases are defined as cases that occur and are solved within 
a continuous time interval, and normally this period is short (less than one 
week). Stuck pipes, lost circulations, drillstring washouts, and well leakages are 
case-examples which can occur in a single episode. Some cases consist of multi-
episodes and last for a rather long time (months or even years); for instance, 
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when building a case for low production diagnoses for an oil field, or when 
studying of hole instability in a specific geology layer and specific drilling hole 
size in an area. 
5. Obtained results from the Wellogy model were carefully audited by human 
reasoning. The retrieved solutions of the 5 unsolved cases for leaking well cases 
agreed with common sense. 
6. The overall efficiency of the model can be measured by both selected CBR tool 
and CBR model. 
7. For applying CBR methodology the case candidate should have the following 
characterizations: 
a. It should be a repeatable problem in many similar cases 
b. As many factors are involved in the case problem it is difficult to build a 
comprehensive and explicit mathematical model 
c. The case can be defined despite incomplete information and lack of data, 
but this may be sufficient to find causal relationships 
8. More research activities regarding implementation are needed before utilizing 
the model in real operations (i.e. user driven). 
9. Close cooperation is needed when merging two different sciences (i.e. 
information technology and petroleum engineering). The future for this type of 
interdisciplinary merging looks very promising. 
10. It is recommended to define and develop different templates for case production. 
The templates should reflect the tasks and contents of the cases. Such tasks of 
cases can be: failure diagnosis, solving problems, planning tools, and 
interpretive tools.  
11. Transforming the knowledge-level to the symbolic-level for the production case 
is a time-consuming issue. The defined templates may help in this matter. In 
addition, some guidelines for naming entities can be beneficial to some extent. 
12. In order to extract experience from documents and texts and build cases within 
the oil well engineering domain, case builders require some level of expertise 
and field experience.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  Appendix A gives case explanation to 18 leaking well cases. The 
case explanation presents case history briefly in text for leaking well cases. Then, a 
table for each case is provided which is considered as a preliminary template for the 
case production before modelling in the Wellogy. 
 
Appendix B: SPE/IADC paper 85327, which was prepared for presentation at the 
SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology Conference and Exhibition held in Abu 
Dhabi, UAE, 20-22 October 2003. The title of the paper is “Case Study: Abnormal 
Drillstring Washout and Fatigue Experienced when Drilling Hazardous Formation in 
Iranian Oil Field”. 
 
Appendix C: SPE/IADC paper 91579, which was prepared for presentation at the 
2004 SPE/IADC Underbalanced Technology Conference and Exhibition held in 
Houston, Texas, U.S.A., 11-12 October 2004. The title of the paper is “Underbalanced 
Drilling as a Tool for Optimized Drilling and Completion Contingency in Fractured 
Carbonate Reservoirs”. 
 
 
Appendix D: A poster prepared and presented at the SPE 2006 Forum Series I and 
II in Dubrovnik on “Low Cost Reservoir Access and Intervention” and “From Casing 
Design to Well Life Prediction?” (Abdollahi et al., 2006). The poster summarises topics 
covered in different research projects at SINTEF and NTNU and is related to 
maintained well integrity for different operations and situations during a lifecycle of a 
well. The project work was done for Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PTIL) and 
Statoil. 
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Appendix A Explanation of leaking well cases  
Representation of leaking well cases 
Totally 18 cases (12 solved and 6 unsolved) from three fields; Oseberg South, Oseberg 
East and Brage, are modelled: 
 
¾ Oseberg East 
o 7 solved cases (wells: E-2a, E-3, E-4, E-7, E-9, E-14, and E15b) 
o 3 unsolved cases (wells: E-2b, E-11, E-15a)  
 
¾ Oseberg South; 
o 3 solved cases (wells: F-14, F-24, and F-30) 
o 3 unsolved cases (wells: F-16, F-22, and F-29) 
 
¾ Brage 
o  2 solved cases (wells: A-4 and A-6) 
 
The operational data was limited to explain the full story of the leaks. The Synergy 
system used by the operating company is a system for reporting incidents, deviations 
and unconformities. We have used this system for preliminary leak investigation. These 
types of reports do not fully cover the leak history. Therefore, complementary reports 
have been studied in addition to the synergy reports. Here, we will give the description 
of the cases in text format. Before modelling case in Wellogy, they have to be presented 
in sheets as a preliminary case-format. Then they are modelled in Wellogy model as 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
Well E-2a 
Well E-2 was completed as an oil producer with gas lift in May 1999. A fluid 
communication was observed between annuli-A to annulus-B in May 1999 during the 
well completion. As a consequence, the gas lift system was not used.  A one piece 9-
5/8” x 10-3/4” production casing was used (without tie-back). In May 2003, two leaks 
were reported from tubing to annulus-A which was related to the SRL seal (wellhead 
seal assembly) at the surface and downhole related to the CIV. The CIV leak was 
repaired by installation of a dummy. The reference for this case in Synergy System is 
“Synergy 518430 dated 14.04 2005”. Case E-2a is presented in symbolic form in Table 
A.1. 
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 Table A. 1 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-2 (solved). 
Format Value Comments
Name of case Case E-2a
Well name Well E-2
Field name OS E potential of leak
Wellhead Location Platform Wellhead easy to detect
Time of leak Time of Leak: May 1999
has pointer Synergy 518430
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of Leak
Outcome of case No further Problem
Observations 1 Early Leak (Few Days After Completion) has relation
Observations 2 Leaking from Annulus-A to Annulus-B
Observations 3 Slow Build-up Pressure Rate
Observations 4 Well Purpose: OPGL
Observations 5 Pressure Testing After Completion Installation there is relation between activity and leak
Observations 6 Discovered Leak By Testing Wellhead Seal
Observations 7 Leak Through Casing Hanger Seal Assembly
Observations 8 Elastomer Casing Hanger Seal Type
Observations 9 Small Leakage Rate
Observations 10 Single Leak easy to detect
Observations 11 (rep. act) Activity: Testing Hanger Seal Assembly- Not Ok
Observations 12 Medium Well Depth 4364 mMD
Observations 13 Slant Well
Observations 14 Surface Leak This has relation with repair action
Observations 15 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 16 Leak is Detectable
Solution to task 1 Elastomer Casing Hanger Seal Type potential for leak when system is gas
Solution to task 2 Use Metal to Metal Casing Hanger Seal
Action Use Metal to Metal Casing Hanger Seal
Case description
Well E-2 was completed as an oil producer with gas lift
in May 1999. A fluid communication was observed
between annuli A to B in the same time during the well
completion
Explanation
This leak was discovered at the surface during wellhead
test after installation of completion string. This type of
leaks are easy to detect especially for platform wells,
because they are touchable. This leak occurred in the
early phase before put in production. As finding of the
leak is rather easy, so the case does not need more
observations.
Solution (to task)
Not Fit for Purpose Wellhead Seal Assembly. The
solution can be for example changing wellhead seal type
or cancelling gas lift operation (changing well purpose)
Experience
The important lesson learned for this case is to use
metal-to-metal wellhead seal assembly instead of
elastomer seal, when the well is put to use for gal lift
application
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
S
ym
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Solution to
tasks)
 
 
Well E-2b 
In March 2005, a pressure build-up with a rate of 1.5 bar / 10 day was noticed in 
annulus-B and stabilized at 80 bar. Pressure in annulus-C was measured to 9 - 10 bar 
and may be due to fluid expansion. This leak was considered as medium to small leak 
rate. Cameron did a wellhead pressure test without observing any leaks which could be 
related to the wellhead. It seems that the leak could be related to a casing leak. The well 
is now producing with a close monitoring of annulus-C. An internal evaluation is 
planned. Case E-2b is presented in symbolic form in Table A.2. 
. 
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Table A. 2 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-2 (unsolved). 
Format Value Comments
Name of case Case E-2b
Well name Well E-2
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak Time of Leak: March 2005
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Unsolved 
no tie-back
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 2 High Pressure Leak 80 bar
Observations 3 Very Small Pressure Build -up Rate 1.5 bar / 10 day
Observations 4 Pressure Build-up in Annulus-B
Observations 5 Oil Producer 
Observations 6 Low Fluid Leak Rate 2.46 l / day (calculated.)
Observations 7 13% Cr 9-5/8" Casing
Observations 8 Tie-Back System E
Observations 9 Very Low Pressure Difference A-B 4 bar
Observations 10 Casing Connection- Non VAM
Observations 11 Medium Well Depth 4364 mMD
Observations 12 Slant Well
Observations 13 OPGL
Observations 14 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 15 Leak During Production
Observations 16 (act) Activity Just before Failure- Steady State OP
Case description
This well was completed in May 1999 and leak was observed in
March 2005. This case is an unsolved case, because the leak has
not been confirmed yet. The pressure build-up was seen in
annulus B. There is not gas lift operation, so the annulus-A was
filled by NaCl water (brine). The casing is 13% Cr and there is no
tie-back for this well (System-E) 
Explanation
Pressure build-up on annulus-B is 15 bar /25 days (2.46 l / day)
assuming annulus-B is filled with water/brine, and this is in
agreement with seen fluid during bled-off. Due to different pressure
in tubing (18 bar) and annulus-A (60 bar), it was concluded that
there is no communication between these two annuli. The fluid in
annulus-A was NaCl brine (1.2 s.g) and 1.55 sg OBM in annulus B.
It is believed that the leak could be below ASV through 9-5/82
casing due to wellhead pressure manipulating
Possible solution (to task) 1- Fluid expansion, 2- Casing leak (either through connection orcasing body)
Experience
As the leak rate is very small, the pressure build-up could be due
to fluid expansion. There is an ongoing investigation to find the
leak location
Relation-type
Observations
Conclusion
Te
xt
S
ym
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
 
 
Well E-3 
Well E-3 was completed as an oil producer with gas lift in 2002.  A 10-3/4” tie-back 
was run. A pressure build-up was observed in annulus-B during December 2005 with a 
leak rate of 1.5 to 2.5 bar / 6 hour. The pressure in annulus-B was stabilized at 82 bar 
while the pressure in A was 127 bar. Leak inspection was performed and the leak is 
believed to be below the ASV through the casing body or connections. The intersection 
depth of two pressure profiles of annuli-A & B is at 528 m and has been recognized as a 
possible leaking point by Hydro. The future plan is to run detection log (TecWel, see 
http://www.tecwel.com/) to verify the suspected leaking point. The well is currently 
closed. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 592762 dated 
5.1.2006”. Case E-3 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.3. 
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Table A. 3 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-3 (solved). 
Format Value Comments
Name of case Case E-3
Well name Well E-3
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak Dec. 2005
has pointer synergy 592762
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved 
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Pressure Build-up in Annulus-B
Observations 2 Medium Pressure Build-up Rate 1.5 ~2.5 bar / hr
Observations 3 Medium Pressure Leak 82 bar
Observations 4 Pressure A & B Are Not Same (127-82) bar
Observations 5 (rep. act) Testing wellhead Seal Assembly - Ok downhole leak
Observations 6 OPGL
Observations 7 Carbon Steel Casing P-110
Observations 8 NSCC CSG Connection NSCC
Observations 9 Deep Well Depth 6792 mMD
Observations 10 Slant Well
Observations 11 Tie-Back System A TB and deep GLV
Observations 12 Late Leak (Years After Completion) no connection to installation
Observations 13 Downhole Leak
Observations 14 Pressure A&B Are The Same Trend
Observations 15 Leak During Gas Lift Period
Observations 16 Producing With Steady State Condition
Observations 17 Long Directional Well
Observations 18 Wet Gas lift
Observations 19 Leak During Production
Wellhead Seal Ok
Leak Crossing Casing
High Amount of CO2 in Gas Lift
Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 20 (act) Activity Just before Failure- Unsteady State OPGL
Case description
Well E-3 was an OPGL and completed in 2002. A pressure 
build-up was observed in annulus-B during Dec. 2005.
Explanation
The well started production in June 2002. The three SPMs
operated on Sep. 2002, feb. 2003 and Nov. 2004 from top
depth to bottom depth. Gas lift rates in annulus-A showed
that before leak occurred, the injection rate was zero and
seemed there was no gas injection. However, in the mid
Dec. 2005 gas injection was resumed. The pressure chart
shows that the pressures in annulus-A and annulus-B
followed each others. But the two pressure were not the
same. The leakage point was not verified, but the plan was
to run noise log for this issue.
Solution (to task) Carbon steel leak, the possible leak could be through the 9
5/8" casing (below ASV) due to corrosion
Experience
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
Sy
m
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
 
 
Well E-4 
Well E-4 was completed as an oil producer with gas lift. The production started in 
September 1999 without the use of gas lift. A possible deformation of the tubing was 
detected in May 2001. In October 2002 the gas lift system was put into use through the 
GLV number 1. In December 2003 the GLV number 2 was also put into use. A 
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hydrocarbon leak through the BSV control line was observed in December 2003 
(Synergy 20265 dated 13.12.2003 (11:24)). 
 
 
TecWel’s WLD was run in June 2005 and following leak were observed: 
Leak: T-A = PBR @ 2901 m MD (2898 m MD?) 
Leak: A-B = 1780 m MD (tie-back casing) 
 
A pressure build up in annulus-B was observed in July 2005.  No available 
documentation has been found on which actions were made. Another leak was noted in 
the BSV control line in December 2005.  A leak between the tubing to annulus-A and 
annulus-A to annulus-B with a rate of 0.27 lit / min. was also reported. 
 
Cameron performed a pressure test and communication between annulus-A to annulus-
B was reported at the topside. A leaking cavity was found around the 10-3/4” seal 
assembly. The well was converted to water injection with a WHP = 100 bar, but with no 
further report on the leak status. The mentioned reason for the barrier failures is BSV 
through control line, probably collapsed PBR and leakage through the casing below the 
ASV. The well is permanently closed from November 2005 and the future plan is re-
complete the well. This case has been considered as unsolved case. The chemical 
inhibitor was directly injected through annulus-A instead of CIV, because it was failed. 
The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 589098: 20.12.2005”. Case 
E-4 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.4. 
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Table A. 4 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-4 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-4
Well name Well E-4
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak June 2005
has pointer Synergy 589098
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case Fully Successfull
Observations 1 Downhole Leak
Observations 2 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 3 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 4 Leak Through Casing Body
Observations 5 (rep. act) Running Leak Detection Log
Observations 6 Carbon Steel CSG
Observations 7 NSCC CSG Connection
Observations 8 Medium Well Depth
Observations 9 Slant Well
Observations 10 Corrosive Gas Lift
Observations 11 Tie-Back System A
Observations 12 OPGL Well Application
Observations 13 Gradually Increased Leak rate Over the Time
Observations 14 CIV Failed
Observations 15 Wet Gas lift
Observations 16 Increased Leak Rate Gradually
Observations 17 Slow  Build-up Rate
Observations 18 Leak During Gas Lift Period
Observations 19 High Amount of CO2 in Gas Lift
Observations 20 Low pH of Gas Lift Well
has diviation Scale Inhabitor Injection With Gas Lift Instead of CIV
Observations 21 (act) Activity Just before Failure- Unsteady State OPGL
Case description
The leak is sever leak, i.e. fluid communication between annulus-A and annulus-B
through 10 3/4" tie-back CSG at depth 1780 mMD. This leak is late leak, after some years
of production, and this means corrosion reason could be possible reason for the cause of
leak. The well is closed for intervention.
Explanation
Specific observation: chemical inhibitor for scaling was directly mixed and pump with
gas lift through the annulus-A, instead of injecting through CIV line. This cause to
increase rate of corrosion. The history of production and gas lift is: start production
without gas lift on Sep. 1999, SPM1 on Oct. 2002 and SPM2 on Dec. 2003.
Solution (to task) Scale inhibitor injection in GL (Corrosion)
Experience
As leak was detected by log at depth of 1780 mMD of 10 - 3/4" tie-back, and leak
occurred after some years of production, the possible reason for the leak could be
corrosion. This reason is also supported by the above explanation about using chemical
inhibitor in annulus-A which increases the rate of corrosion.
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
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Well E-7 
Well E-7 was completed as an oil producer with gas lift. The casing configuration 
departs from a regular casing program as a simplified casing configuration has been 
used. The production without the use of gas lift was started in March 2001. The gas lift 
system was started in October 2002 through the GLV number 1 and the GLV number 2 
was added in August 2005. 
 
A WLD was run in June 2005 and following leak observations were made: 
SABL packer @ 2875 m MD - production packer 
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PBR @ 2867 m MD 
GL mandrel 3 
GL mandrel 2 
 
A pressure build up in annulus-B was observed in August 2005. Cameron did a 
wellhead pressure test and a leak was observed in the 10-3/4” seal assembly (topside 
leak). A wrong seal type had been used and was the cause for communication between 
annuli-A & B.  
 
The well is permanently closed with a plug below the production packer. The future 
plan is to re-complete or to perform a sidetrack. Although there are obviously several 
leak happened though completion components (tubing to annulus), but the leak crossing 
annulus-A to annulus-B through the wellhead seal assembly is consider as a case in the 
Wellogy model. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergies 589536 
and 592509, August 2005”. Case E-7 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.5. 
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Table A. 5 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-7 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-7
Well name Well E-7
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak August 2005
has pointer Synergies 589536, 592509
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Surface Leak
Observations 2 Multiple Leak
Observations 3 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 4 Leak Wellhead Seal Assembly
Observations 5 (rep. act) Testing wellhead Seal Assembly - Not Ok
Observations 6 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 7 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 8 Tie-Back System E
Observations 9 Medium Well Depth
Observations 10 Slant Well
Observations 11 Leak During Production
Observations 12 Elastomer Hanger Seals
Observations 13 OPGL Well Application
Observations 14 Increased Leak Rate Gradually
Observations 15 13 %-Cr CSG
Observations 16 Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Observations 17 Carbon Steel Hanger Seal
Observations 18 Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal
Observations 19 Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal
Observations 20 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 21 (act.) Activity Just before Failure- steady State OPGL
Observations 22 (act.) Running Leak Detection Log
Case description
This case is about leakage through seal assembly in wellhead area, similar as case E-2a.
Although this type of leak would be occured close to time of starting production, this leak-
casue occured in the late phase, i.e, after some years of production. After further invistication,
it was revealed that wellhead seal assembly type was not 13% CR. So, corrosion of wellheas
seal could be happened after some year of production.The WLD (well leak detector) log was
run and a possible leak also found below ASV through CSG (leak between annulus-A and
annulus-B); however, this leak is uncertain yet. Due to many leaks crossing completion tubing,
PBR, Packer, GLMs, the well is closed for further intervention.
Explanation
This well is an OPGL and started production in March 2001. Gas lift started to use through
SPM1 and SPM 2 on Oct. 2002 and Nov. 2003. A pressure build-up was observed in annulus-
B on August 2005.
Solution (to task) Not Fit for Purpose Wellhead Seal Assembly. The solution can be for example changing
wellhead seal type or cancelling gas lift operation (well application deviation)
Experience (LL E-7)
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
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Well E-9 
Well E-9 is completed as a WAG well. The casing configuration departs from a regular 
casing program as a simplified casing configuration has been used. A leak through the 
tubing was observed in August 2004 as water contaminated with gas. The leak was 
reported across the production packer (SABL-3) and a straddle packer was set in 
November 2004. Another leak was observed across the PBR in December 2004. There 
is an exception from PTIL to continue water injection with low pressure (76 bar at 
wellhead). The well is currently injecting water and the future plan is to set another 
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straddle over the PBR. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 
594660, August 2004”. Case E-9 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.6. 
Table A. 6 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-9 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-9
Well name Well E-9
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak August 2004
has pointer Synergy 594660
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Pending / no further problem
Observations 1 WAG Application
Observations 2 Leak Crossing Tubing PBR
Observations 3 Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Observations 4 High Pressure Load  Cycle
Observations 5 (rep. act) Running Leak Detection Log
Observations 6 Slant Well
Observations 7 High Thermal Variation
Observations 8 Changing Well Operation: GI to WI
Observations 9 Sidetrack well
Observations 10 Multiple Leaks
Observations 11 Downhole Leak
Observations 12 Long TD
Observations 13 Carbon Steel CSG
Observations 14 High Thermal and Pressure Loads During Operation
Observations 15 High Well Pressure Changes
Observations 16 TB System E
Observations 17 High Total Bit Rotation
Observations 18 Long Directional Well
Observations 19 Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 20 Leak Crossing Packer
Observations 21 High Well Temperature Changes
Observations 22 Leak Just After Start-up Injection
Observations 23 Low Packer Tolerance
Observations 24 Leak Discovered During Operation
Observations 25 (act) Install Straddle Over Packer
Case description
Well E-9 is completed as a WAG well. The casing configuration
departs from a regular casing program as a simplified casing
configuration has been used. A leak through the tubing was
observed in August 2004 as water contaminated with gas. The leak
was reported across the production packer (SABL-3) and a straddle
packer was set in November 2004. Another leak was observed
across the PBR in December 2004. There is an exception from
PTIL to continue water injection with low pressure (76 bar at
wellhead). The well is currently injecting water and the future plan
is to set another straddle over the PBR.
Explanation
This well is WAG well. First the well was put on gas injection and
then on water. Therefore, there should be high temperature
changes, and it seems that the leak occurred just after injection
fluids changes. Therefore, the possible reason for leakage through
PBR can be thermal load on completion string
Solution (to task)
High thermal and pressure loads during operation (leak through
PBR)
Experience
It is important to consider the effect operation conditions on load
calculations on completion tubing components (PBR) for WAG
wells, where the pressure and temperature variation are high. The
design condition of completion components MUST meet the
requirement for real well condition during different operations.
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
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administration
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administration
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Well E-11 
Well E-11 is completed as a WAG well. The casing configuration departs from a 
regular casing program as a simplified casing configuration has been used. A leak 
through the tubing was observed through on of the GLM in November 2004 when used 
for gas injection (GI). A straddle was set over GLV in June 2005. The well is currently 
closed. The future plan is to use the well for gas injection if no leak is found. The 
reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergies 515084, 592200, November 
2004”. Case E-11 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.7. 
Table A. 7 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-11 (unsolved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-11
Well name Well E-11
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak November 2004
has pointer Synergy 515084, 592200
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Unsolved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Fluid Communication from Tubing to Annulus-A
Observations 2 Leak Crossing GLV
Observations 3 WAG well
Observations 4 Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 5 (rep. act) Install Straddle Over GLM
Observations 6 High Well Pressure Changes
Observations 7 Leak Discovered During Operation
Observations 8 High Well Temperature Changes
Observations 9 Leak Crossing Tubing PBR
Observations 10 Multiple Leaks
Observations 11 Downhole Leak
Observations 12 TB System F
Observations 13 Long Directional Well
Observations 14 Leak Crossing GLV
Observations 15 Leak Crossing Tubing PBR
Observations 16 Leak Discovered During Operation
Observations 17 Long Directional Well
Observations 18(act) Install Straddle Over GLM
Case description
Well E-11 is completed as a WAG well. The casing configuration departs from a
regular casing program as a simplified casing configuration has been used. A
leak through the tubing was observed through on of the GLM in November 2004
when used for GI. A straddle was set over GLV in June 2005. The well is
currently closed. The future plan is to use the well for gas injection if no leak is
found.
Explanation
This a WAG well. The fluid communication between tubing and annulus-A was
observed on November 2004 (completion date March 2001). The leak was only
observed during gas injection. During water injection, no leakage was observed.
This case could be considered as Case E-9. 
Solution (to task) GLV Leak
Experience (LL E-11)
Relation-type
ConclusionTe
xt
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Well E-14 
The well application of well E-14 is WAG which originally completed as a tubing and 
annulus-A injection. A leak was observed from tubing to annulus-A (both with gas and 
water injection). ASV and X-over sleeve (topside in wellhead) were reported as leak 
cases. There is an exception from PTIL to continue water injecting. The well is 
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currently injecting water. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergies 
541904, 592204, November 2004”. Case E-14 is presented in symbolic form in Table 
A.8. 
Table A. 8 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-14 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-14
Well name Well E-14
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak January 2001
has pointer Synergy 541904, 592204
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case
Observations 1 Long Directional Well
Observations 2 Leak Crossing Tubing Hanger Seal
Observations 3 Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Observations 4 Elastomer TBG Seal Type
Observations 5 Leak Discovered Drilling / Installation
Observations 6 Testing Wellhead Seal Is Not OK
Observations 7 TB System F
Observations 8 Leak Just After Start-up Injection
Observations 9 Gas Injection Well
Observations 10 Elastomer TBG Seal Type
Observations 11 Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Observations 12 13 %-Cr CSG
Observations 13 Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 14 Well E-14
Observations 15 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 16 Single Leak
Observations 17
Observations 18(act)
Case description
The well application of well E-14 is WAG which originally completed as a
tubing and annulus A injector. A leak was observed from tubing to annulus A
(both with gas and water injection). ASV and X-over sleeve (topside in
wellhead) were reported as leak cases. The well is currently injecting water.
Explanation
Solution (to task)
Experience (LL E-11)
Relation-type
ConclusionTe
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Well E-15 
The original well application of well E-15 is oil producer with gas lift. A 10-3/4” tie-
back was run. Production without gas lift was started in August 2000 and in December 
2001 gas lift system was commenced through the GLV number 1. In February 2003, 
GLV number 2 was started to operate. 
 
A pressure build-up in annulus-B was observed in March 2005. A leakage was observed 
in 10-3/4” seal assembly (cavity) in Jan 06. Additional leaks are believed above and 
under ASV according to ASV test. As a result, gas lift system was stopped and 
investigation program is ongoing. Well is currently producing without using gas lift. 
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Note: pressure date when leaking:  WH = 25.6 barg, annulus-A = 131 barg, annulus-B = 
100 barg. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergies 589537, 612355, 
March 2005 and January 2006”. Case E-15 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.9 
and Table A.10. 
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Table A. 9 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-15 (unsolved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-15a
Well name Well E-15
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak March 2005
has pointer Synergy 589537
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Unsolved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case
Observations 1 Pressure Build Up in Annulus-B
Observations 2 Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal
Observations 3 High Pressure Difference A-B
Observations 4 Tie-Back System A
Observations 5 (rep. act) Testing wellhead Seal Assembly -Not Ok
Observations 6 Constatnt Leak Pressure in Annulus-B
Observations 7 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 8 Steady State Well Condition
Observations 9 Carbon Steel CSG
Observations 10 NSCC CSG Connection
Observations 11 Deep Well Depth
Observations 12 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 13 Producing With Steady State Condition
Observations 14 Pressure A & B Are Not Same
Observations 15 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 16 Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Observations 17 Leak During Production
Observations 18 Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal
Observations 19 Leak Discovered During Operation
Observations 20 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 21 Leak During Gas Lift Period
Observations 22 Long Directional Well
Observations 23 Wellhead Seals Leak
Observations 24 (act)
Case description
The original well application of well E-15 is oil producer with gas lift. A 10-3/4” tie-
back was run. Production without gas lift was started in August 2000 and in
December 2001 gas lift system was commenced through the GLV number 1. In
February 2003 GLV number 2 was started to operate.
Explanation
The well E-15 is an OPGl well and production started on August 2000. Gas lift 
started in Dec 2001 and Feb. 2003 from SPM1 and SPM 2 respectively. One 
surface leak was observed and treat on well head seal assembly.
Solution (to task) Leak Through Wellhead seal assembly, not-fit-for purpose
Experience
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
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Table A. 10 Summarized case information given in the case template for well E-15 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case E-15b
Well name Well E-15
Field name OS E
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak January 2006
has pointer Synergy 612355
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Pressure Build Up in Annulus-B
Observations 2 Leak Through Casing Body
Observations 3 High Pressure Difference A-B
Observations 4 Tie-Back System A
Observations 5 (rep. act) Flow Testing of ASV
Observations 6 Constant Leak Pressure in Annulus-B
Observations 7 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 8 Producing With Steady State Condition
Observations 9 Carbon Steel CSG
Observations 10 NSCC CSG Connection
Observations 11 Deep Well Depth
Observations 12 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 13 Pressure A & B Are Not Same
Observations 14 Leak Discovered During Operation
Observations 15 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 16 Downhole Leak
Observations 17 Wet Gas lift
Observations 18 Leak Crossing Casing
Observations 19 Leak During Production
Observations 20 (act) Testing Wellhead Seal Is OK
Case description
This is a late leak, and well is OPGL. The leak crossing from annulus-A to
annulus-B through the casing base on some indication: pressure chart of annuli
and ASV flow test.
Explanation
The well E-15 is an OPGl well and production started on August 2000. Gas lift
started in Dec 2001 and Feb. 2003 from SPM1 and SPM 2 respectively.
Additional leak was observed. This leak could be at depth of 341 mMd crossing
CSG (TB) by using pressure chart in annulus-A and annulus-B. Flow test of ASV
showed also that the position of leak should be above the ASV. The important
observation for this case is: the difference of pressure in annulus-A and annulus-
B after equilibrium
Solution (to task) Carbon steel CSG (Corrosion as possible root cause)
Experience
Relation-type
Observations
Conclusion
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Well F-14 
Well F-14 is a WAG well and was completed in May 1999.  The well was pre-drilled 
well and gas injection started in October 2000. A pressure build was noted in annulus-A 
in November 2000 with a rate of 100 bar / day. The annulus pressure was bled-off and 
the return fluid was gas. The leak was localized below the BSA. The well was converted 
to water injector in May 2001 and operations continued until October 2004 with an 
acceptable leak rate. The well was re-completed excluding the PBR and has been used 
for GI since December 2004 and is currently injecting gas. 
 
The completion report is not available to check how the completion string was run and 
tested. The initial completion string was with a 7-5/8” tubing 13 % chrome and NSCC 
connections. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 206272, 
November 2000”. Case F-14 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.11. 
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Table A. 11 Summarized case information given in the case template for well F-14 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case F-14
Well name Well F-14
Field name OSS
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak November 2000
has pointer Synergy 206272
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Pressure Test with Mud
Observations 2 Pressure Build-up Annulus A
Observations 3 Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Observations 4 High Leak rate
Observations 5 (rep. act) Running New Completion String Without PBR
Observations 6 Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 7 Leak Crossing Tubing PBR
Observations 8 TB System A
Observations 9 Insufficient Integrity Pressure Test
Observations 10 Gas Injection Well
Observations 11 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 12 Leak During Injection
Observations 13 Short Pressure Test Time
Observations 14 (act) Injecting Gas Through Tubing
Case description
F-14A was pre-drilled well from a floating rig, and completed from the platform for WAG
application. The well started with gas injection and suddenly pressure build-up
observed in annulus-A.
Explanation
Well history:
07- Oct- 2000:    Gas injection started
Feb 2001:   Tubing to annulus leakage detected
May 2001:   Converted to water injection
Nov. 2004:  Workover (recompletion)
03-Dec-2004: Converted to gas injection.- The annulus pressure was bled-off and
the return fluid was gas. The leak was localized below the BSA. The well was converted
to water injector in May 2001 and operations continued until October 2004 with an
acceptable leak rate. The well was re-completed excluding the PBR and has been used
for GI since December 2004 and is currently injecting gas.                   
Solution (to task) Leak Through PBR
Experience
Relation-type
Observations
Conclusion
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Well F-16 
Well F-16 is a pre-drilled WAG well completed in December 2000 with a 9 5/8” x 10 
3/4” tie back. The gas injection started just after the completion date. Drilling fluid 
came out of annulus-C & D and the X-mas three was observed to rise when the well 
was put on operation. The well was converted to water injector in July 2002. A leak was 
observed in annulus-B in April 2003 (0.03 l/ min) and the well was re-completed at the 
same time. The well was used for water injection until September 2004. In November 
2004 gas injection was started and again backflow of drilling fluid from annulus-C to 
the surface was noticed and X-mas three raised 20 cm. In March 2005 well was 
converted to water injection. The well is currently closed due to high reservoir pressure.  
 
Initial completion and later re-completion report is not available. This is rather long well 
and two packers were used in the initial completion string (SABL-3 & HP1). The inner 
casing is 13-3/8” with steel quality P-110 and NSCC connections. 
 
The leak has been reported when using gas. Annulus-C was filled with two fluids; sea 
water above the seabed to the wellhead and OBM below the seabed. It is reported that 
there is no pressure communication between the tubing and annulus-A to annulus-C. It 
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is believed that the leak can be through the seal assembly in the subsea wellhead. In 
addition, the lock ring was not installed for 13-3/8” seal assembly. 
 
It is believed that there is an oil-based fluid communication between the disposal well 
F-2 and this well. The horizontal distance between the two wells at the injection point of 
F-2 at1273 mTVD is 650 m. Well F-16A is not cemented at this depth. The reference 
for this case in Synergy System is “Synergies 457666, 495584, 498709, November 
2000”. Case F-16 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.12. 
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Table A. 12 Summarized case information given in the case template for well F-16 (unsolved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case F-16
Well name Well F-16
Field name OS S
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak December 2004
has pointer Synergies 457666, 495584, 498709
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage
Case statues Unsolved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Find Cause of Leak
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 WAG Well
Observations 2 Pressure Build-up Annulus A
Observations 3 Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Observations 4 Low Leak rate
Observations 5 (rep. act) Performing BSV Flow Test - Leak Below BSV
Observations 6 Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 7 Very Deep Well
Observations 8 Slant Well
Observations 9 Downhole Leak
Observations 10 Complex Leak
Observations 11 TB System C
Observations 12 Pressure Test with Mud
Observations 13 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 14 Pressure Build-up in Ann.-B
Observations 15 Leak Just After Start-up Injection
Observations 16 Short Pressure Test Time
Observations 17 Leak During Injection
Special observation Lifted up Wellhead After Starting GI
Observations 18 (act) Injecting Gas Through Tubing
Case description
Well F-16 is a pre-drilled WAG well completed in December 2000 with a 9 5/8” x 10 3/4”
tie back. The gas injection started just after the completion date. Drilling fluid came out of
annulus C / D and the X-mas three was observed to rise when the well was put on
operation. The well was converted to water injector in July 2002. A leak was observed in
annulus B in April 2003 (0.03 l/ min) and the well was re-completed at the same time. The
well was used for water injection until September 2004. In November 2004 gas injection
was started and again backflow of drilling fluid from annulus C to the surface was noticed
and X-mas three raised 20 cm. In March 2005 well was converted to water injection. The
well is currently closed due to high reservoir pressure. This is rather long well and two
packers were used in the initial completion string (SABL-3 & HP1).
Explanation
Well history:
06-Feb-2001:      Start-up gas injection (reported, but not documented (P = 310 bar, T = 
125 C)
observation; drilling fluid seeped out of annulus C/D on surface, and xmas tree was raised)
18-Jul-2002:      Converted to water injection
Sep. 2002:  Tubing to annulus leakage detected
April 2003: Workover (re-completion)                                                                                   
17-Sep-2004:      Water injection stopped
14- Nov-2004:     Converted to gas injection
25-Nov-2004:      Backflow of drilling mud from annulus C to surface
started. At about the same time, a tubing to annulus leakage was detected.
23-Feb-2005:      Gas injection stopped because xmas had risen (~ 20 cm ?)
5-Mar-2005: Converted to water injection
Solution (to task)
Experience
This case is complex case and need deep investigation. It is believed that the leak can be
through the seal assembly in the subsea wellhead. In addition, the lock ring was not
installed for 13-3/8” seal assembly
Relation-type
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Well F-22 
Well F-22 was originally completed as an oil producer with gas lift and the operations 
started in April 2003. Some special observations were made: sand production, fairly 
stable well flow and the sudden increased slugging during production. A pressure build 
up in annulus-B was noted in January 2006 after the pressure had been stable for a long 
time without bleed-off annulus-B. Leakage paths were found in the X-mas tree and in 
the topside piping. The well is currently in normal operation. The reference for this case 
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in Synergy System is “Synergy 595070 dated January 2006”. Case F-22 is presented on 
symbolic form in Table A.13. 
Table A. 13 Summarized case information given in the case template for well F-22 (unsolved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case F-22
Well name Well F-22
Field name OS S
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak January 2006
has pointer Synergy 595070
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage
Case statues Unsolved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case No Further Problem
Observations 1 Surface leak
Observations 2 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 3 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 4 Leak Through Wellhead
Observations 5 (rep. act)
Observations 6 Wellhead Seals Leak
Observations 7 Pressure Build-up in Ann.-B
Observations 8 Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Observations 9 Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal
Observations 13 Observed Slug Flow
Observations 14 (act)
Case description
Well F-22 was originally completed as an oil producer with gas lift and the operations started 
in April 2003.A pressure build up in annulus B was noted in January 2006 after the pressure 
had been stable for a long time without bleed-off B. Leakage paths were found in the X-mas 
tree and in the topside piping. The well is currently in normal operation. F-22 is an oil 
producer with a long horizontal section.
Explanation
Well history:
30-Apr- 2003:     Start-up of oil production
30-March 2004 Gas Lift started                                                                                                   
Since July 2003: sand production, possibly sanding in of the horizontal section in May 2004.
From July 2004 to September 2005: severely slugging well flow
Sep- to mid. Dec. 2005: fairly stable well flow Mid. December 2005: sudden increase in 
slugging
13- Jan-2006:     Pressure build-up on B-annulus observed
Leakage stopped during investigation of possible leakage paths in xmas-tree and in topside 
piping.
Well is currently in normal operation.
Solution (to task) Wellhead Seal Assembly
Experience
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
Sy
m
bo
lic
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od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
 
 
Well F-24 
Well F-24 was originally completed as an oil producer with gas lift and the operations 
started in July 2002. Scale inhibitor was used in the gas lift system and pumped through 
annulus-A. Sand production started in April 2003. A pressure build up was noted in 
annulus-B in November 2005. The well was shut-in during this time for logging. The 
detection log (TecWel) was run but results were inconclusive. Believed reason for the 
leak is corrosion due to the use of sour scale inhibitor.  In January 2006 a leak detector 
revealed a micro-annulus around the production packer. The well is currently under 
workover for re-completion. 
 
The downhole chemical injection line failed during running the completion string. It 
was then decided to mix the scale inhibitor with the gas at surface and inject through 
annulus-A instead of using the CIV. The inner string consists of 9-5/8” liner and 10-
3/4” tie-back L-80 material and NSCC connections. The reference for this case in 
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Synergy System is “Synergies 578233, 594205, 596872 dated October 2005, January 
2006, ”. Case F-24 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.14. 
Table A. 14 Summarized case information given in the case template for well F-24 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case F-24
Well name Well F-24
Field name OS S
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak October 2005
has pointer Synergies 578233, 594205, 596872
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 1 OPGL
Observations 2 Pressure Build-up in Annulus-B
Observations 3 TB System C
Observations 4 Leak Though CSG
Observations 5 (rep. act)
Observations 6 Downhole Leak
Observations 7 Steady State Well Condition
Observations 8 Low Cr Casing
Observations 9 NSCC CSG Connection
Observations 10 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 11 Medium Well Depth
Observations 12 Slant Well
Observations 13 Leak During Production
Observations 14 CIV Failed
Observations 15 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 16 Leak Crossing Casing Body
Observations 17 Leak Crossing Casing
Observations 18 Low pH of Gas Lift Well
Observations 19 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 20 Producing With Steady State Condition
has deviation Scale Inhabitor Injection With Gas Lift Instead of CIV
Observations 21 (act) Producing Oil with Gas Lift
Case description
Well F-24 is an oil producer (start production 20 July 2002. Later, a pressure build-up
on B-annulus was detected early in November 2005. Testing indicated annulus A to B
leakage both above and below the ASV. As a result of this, F-24 was shut-in on Nov.
10. The well was recently logged for leakage detection, but the logging was
inconclusive. A workover is planned within the next month.
Explanation
Well F-24 was originally completed as an oil producer with gas lift and the operations
started in July 2002. Gas lift started 20.06.2004). Scale inhibitor was used in the gas lift
system and pumped through annulus A, instead of CIV line, because CIV line was
damage when completion the well. A pressure build up was noted in annulus B in
November 2005. The well was shut-in during this time for logging. The detection log
(TecWel) was run but results were inconclusive. Believed reason for the leak is
corrosion due to the use of sour scale inhibitor. In January 2006 a leak detector
revealed a micro-annulus around the production packer. The well is currently under
workover for re-completion.
Solution (to task) Scale Inhabitor Injection With Gas Lift Instead of CIV (leak through casing. The mainreason is corrosion)
Experience
The downhole chemical injection line failed during running the completion string. It was
then decided to mix the scale inhibitor with the gas at surface and inject through
annulus A instead of using the CIV.
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
S
ym
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
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Well F-29 
Well F-29 was originally completed as an oil producer with gas lift and the operations 
started in December 2005. A pressure build-up in annulus-B was noted with a rate of 15 
bar / 2 hours. A leak detection log (TecWel) was run but the results were inconclusive. 
It is believed that the leak depth is below ASV. The GLV was retrieved and a dummy 
was set and the tubing qualified as a barrier. The inner string is 10-3/4” tie-back with L-
80 material and VAM-TOP connections. The reference for this case in Synergy System 
is “Synergy 597342 dated December 2005”. Case F-29 is presented in symbolic form in 
Table A.15. 
Table A. 15 Summarized case information given in the case template for well F-29 (unsolved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case F-29
Well name Well F-29
Field name OS S
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak 25-Dec-2005
has pointer Synergy 597342
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Unsolved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 1 OPGL Application
Observations 2 Pressure A & B Are Not Same
Observations 3 Low Leak Rate
Observations 4 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 5 (rep. act)
Observations 6 Carbon Steel CSG
Observations 7 NSCC CSG Connection
Observations 8 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 9 Multilater Well
Observations 10 Deep Well
Observations 11 Slant Well
Observations 12 Long Horizontal Well
Observations 13 Long TD
Observations 14 Leak is Not Detectable
Observations 15 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 16 Leak During Production
Observations 17 TB System C
Observations 18 (act)
Case description
Well history: 25-Dec-2005: start-up oil production. 27-Dec-2005: pressure build-up on 
annulus-B was observed. 15-Jan-2006: leakage detection logging (inconclusive).
Gas lift valves were retrieved and replaced by dummy valves. Tubing qualified as
barrier. This means that gas-lift operation is cancelled.
Explanation
Well F-29 was originally completed as an oil producer with gas lift and the operations started
in December 2005. A pressure build-up in annulus B was noted with a rate of 15 bar / 2
hours. A leak detection log (TecWel) was run but the results were inconclusive. It is believed
that the leak depth is below ASV.
Solution (to task) Casing / (tie-back ?)
Experience
Because the leak occurred in early time of production, the reason for leakage can be related to
equipment and installation testing. Because the flow test of ASV show the leak can be either
above and under ASV, the leak can be through the CSG-connection.
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
Sy
m
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
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Well F-30 
Well F-30 was originally completed as an oil producer. However, the reservoir testing 
during completion showed a tight reservoir rock. Bullheading with the gas was tried in 
summer 2005 but it was unsuccessful. The well was then fractured using LTO (similar 
to diesel) in order to improve the injectivity. The well was used as water injector in 
September 2005 with maximum wellhead pressure of 100 bar. A pressure build-up was 
observed in annulus-A (00 bar). Water injection was continued until January 2006. 
TecWel was run to detect the leak and the result showed a micro leak around the packer. 
The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 570798 dated October 2005”. 
Case F-30 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.16. 
 
Table A. 16 Summarized case information given in the case template for well F-30 (solved). 
 
Format Value
Name of case Case F-30
Well name Well F-30
Field name OS S
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak December 2005
has pointer Synergy 570798
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2) Verify Location of leak
Outcome of case Early Leak (Few Days After Completion)
Observations 1 WAG Well
Observations 2 Leak Around Packer
Observations 3 Changing Well Application (GI-WI)
Observations 4 Carbon Steel CSG
Observations 5 (rep. act) Running Leak Detection Log
Observations 6 High pressure Fracturing
Observations 7 High Well Temperature Changes
Observations 8 High Pressure Variation
Observations 9 Long TD (6559 Mmd)
Observations 10 Non Cr Casing (p-110)
Observations 11 VAM-Top Thread
Observations 12 Slant Well
Observations 13 High Well Pressure Changes
Observations 14 NSCC CSG Connection
Observations 15 Leak Crossing Packer
Observations 16 Long Directional Well
Observations 17 Leak Crossing Tubing to Ann.-A
Observations 18 High Thermal and Pressure Loads During Operation
Observations 19 Leak Crossing Packer
Observations 20 Downhole Leak
Observations 21 (activity close to failure) Fracturing Operation
Case description
Well history:
Because F-30A was drilled into the oil zone, the well was initially
hooked up as an oil producer. However, the well did not flow, and
several attempts during the summer of 2005 to bullhead the well using
gas were unsuccessful.
While waiting for topside hook-up to water injection, in July 2005 the
well was fractured using LTO in order to prove infectivity.
In late September 2005 F-30A was converted to a water injector.
Explanation
A pressure build-up on the A annulus was detected in October 2005.
Investigation of pressure history indicated that leakage had occurred
already during the initial fracturing with LTO.
Water injection continued until January 2006, when logging for leakage
detection was performed. A leakage through the production packer
was detected.
After the intervention, the well has been operated on a provisional
internal "Avvik", but is currently being prepared for workover.
Solution (to task) Leak Around Packer. The reason can be pressure and thermal loadduring fracturing operation
Experience Casing wear (casing ovality) and low packer tolerance could be alsoreasons for this case
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
S
ym
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
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Well A-4 
This well was completed on 1993 as producing well. On Dec. 2006, a pressure build up 
in annulus-B was observed around 42-73 bar in 24 hrs. Wellhead type used in Brage is 
FMC. FMC did a test investigation in the wellhead based on test program by Hydro 
(Koldal, 2007). The conclusion was that the leak between annulus-A and annulus-B 
occurred through the SBMS-2 in tubing head and 10-3/4” pack-off. The leak was high 
as that the pressure did not go up (build-up pressure did not reach). FMC claimed that 
there is possible to reduce leak rate by pumping seal material (packing off material) in 
10 3/4” and 13 3/8” pack-offs; however, there is not possible to perform the same for 
SBMS-2. The reference for this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 693291 dated 
January 2007”. Case Brage A-4 is presented in symbolic form in Table A.17. 
Table A. 17 Summarized case information given in the case template for well A-4 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case Brage A-4
Well name Well Brage A-4
Field name Brage
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak January 2007
has pointer Synergy 693291
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case Pending
Observations 1 Carbon Steel Hanger Seal
Observations 2 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 3 13 %-Cr CSG
Observations 4 Low Leak Rate
Observations 5 (rep. act) Testing Wellhead Seal Is Not OK
Observations 6 Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Observations 7 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 8 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 9 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 10 Leak During Production
Observations 11 Leak Rate Is Inconsistent
Observations 12 Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal
Observations 13 Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal
Observations 20
Observations 21 (activity close to failure)
Case description
This well was completed on 1993 as producing well 6. On Dec. 2006a pressure build up in 
annulus-B was observed around 42-73 bar in 24 hrs. Wellhead type used in Brage is FMC. 
FMC did a test investigation in the wellhead. The conclusion was that the leak between annulus-
A and annulus-B occurred through the SBMS-2 in tubing head and 10-3/4” packoff. The leak 
was high as that the pressure did not go up (build-up pressure did not reach). FMC claimed that 
there is possible to reduce leak rate by pumping seal material (packing off material) in 10 3/4” 
and 13 3/8” Packoffs; however, there is not possible to perform the same for SBMS-2.
Solution (to task) Carbon Steel Hanger Seal
Experience
This is late leak (leak occurred after some years of production). The wellhead seal assembly was
elastomer seal type and carbon steel hanger. So the corrosion or fatigue can be the cause of the
leak crossing hanger seal.
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
Sy
m
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
 
 
Well A-6 
The leak between annulus-A and annulus-B was observed. The location of leak was 
uncertain; however, the leak rate was low. FMC has not yet performed the integrity of 
wellhead for possible leaks. Generally, experience has showed that many leaks have 
been observed at the wellhead seal assemblies (test port / pack-off). The reference for 
this case in Synergy System is “Synergy 693291 dated January 2007”. Case Brage A-6 
is presented in symbolic form in Table A.18. 
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Later, FMC perform wellhead integrity test according to Hydro procedure (Koldal, 
2007). The similar leakage as well A-04 was found, i.e. leakage crossing SBMS-2 and 
pack-off in the wellhead area. However, the rate of leak was much lower that the leak 
rate in well A-04. 
Table A. 18  Summarized case information given in the case template for well A-6 (solved). 
Format Value
Name of case Case Brage A-6
Well name Well Brage A-6
Field name Brage
Wellhead Location Platform
Time of leak January 2007
has pointer Synergy 693291
Country Norway
Failure of case Well Leakage Failure
Case statues Solved Case
Task of leak (option 1) Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Task of leak (option 2)
Outcome of case
Observations 1 13 %-Cr CSG
Observations 2 Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal
Observations 3 Carbon Steel Hanger Seal
Observations 4 Low Leak Rate
Observations 5 Elastomer CSG Hanger Seal
Observations 6 Leak Crossing Ann.-A to Ann.-B
Observations 7 Leak During Production
Observations 8 Leak Fluid Is Gas
Observations 9 Leak Through Internal Wellhead
Observations 10 Late Leak (Years After Completion)
Observations 11 Oil Producer With Gas Lift
Observations 12 Testing Wellhead Seal Is Not OK
Observations 13 Leak During Production
Observations 14
Observations 15 (activity close to failure)
Case description
This well was completed on 1993 as producing well 6. On
Dec. 2006 a pressure build up in annulus-B was observed
around 42-73 bar in 24 hrs. Wellhead type used in Brage is
FMC. FMC did a test investigation in the wellhead. The
conclusion was that the leak b
Solution (to task) Carbon Steel Hanger Seal
Experience
This is a late leak (leak occurred after some years of
production). The wellhead seal assembly was elastomer seal
type and carbon steel hanger. So the corrosion or fatigue
can be the cause of the leak crossing hanger seal.
Relation-type
Observations
ConclusionTe
xt
S
ym
bo
lic
 c
od
e
Process 
administration
Technical 
administration
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Case production template 
 
A template for facilitating case production has been built for all cases. The template is 
filled by findings of cases after all cases are transformed from knowledge-level to 
symbolic-level. The template is shown in Table A. 19 to Table A. 21. 
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Table A. 19 Case information filling in case production template.  
Case features Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Case Name Case E-2a Case E-2b Case E-3 Case E-4 Case E-7 Case E-9
Field OSE OSE OSE OSE OSE OSE
Well name E-2 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-7 E-9
Country Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway
Wellhead location Platform Platform Platform Platform Platform Platform
Time occurrence of 
failure May 1999 March 2005 Dec. 2005 June 2005 August 2005 August 2004
Case Description Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box
Explanation to Case Exp. E-2a Exp. E-2b Exp. E-3 Exp. E-4 Exp. E-7 Exp. E-9
Lessons learned LL E-2a LL E-2b LL E-3 LL E-4 LL E-7 LL E-9
Case Status Solved Unsolved Unsolved Solved Solved Solved
Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure
Task Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Solution Elastometer Casing Hanger Seal
Mixing Scale Inhibitor 
with Gas lift Non Cr Hanger Seal
High Thermal & Pressure 
Loads
Outcome Fully understood Partially understood Partially understood
Plan Use Metal to metal Hanger Seal
Do not Inject 
Chemical Fluid in GL Use 13% Cr Hanger Seal
well type OPGL OP OPGL OPGL OPGL WAG
Time of leak Early leak Late Leak Late Leak Late Leak Late Leak Early leak
Time of leak Leak Just After Start-up Production
Leak During 
Production
Leak During 
Production
Leak During 
Production Leak During Production
Leak crossing 
volume A-B A-B A-B T-A
Leak component Leak Crossing Caning Hanger Seal Leak Crossing CSG
Leak Crossing Caning 
Hanger Seal Leak Crossing PBR
Type of casing 
hanger Elastometer Seal Elastometer Seal
Leak fluid system Gas Gas
Test fluid Water
Activity To Reveal 
Leak Wellhead Test-Not Ok Wellhead Test-Ok
Casing Type 13% Cr CSG 13% Cr CSG Non Cr CSG 13% Cr CSG
Leak Rate Small
Tie-back System TB System E TB System E TB System A TB System A TB System A
CSG Connection NSCC NSCC NSCC NSCC
Observation pressure build-up in B pressure build-up in B Leak Crossing Packer
Observation Not-same Pressure A-B Multiple Leak
Observation Same Pressure trend A-B
Observation Surface Leak Downhole Leak Downhole Leak Surface Leak Downhole Leak
Observation Increasing Corrosivity of GL Sidetrack Well
Observation Unsteady State Well Condition (GI-WI)
Observation High Pressure Variation
Observation CIV Failed High Thermal Variation
Deviation
Mixing Chemical 
Fluid With GL instead 
of CIV
Non Cr Hanger Seal
Deviation Increased Gradually Leak Rate
Increased Gradually Leak 
Rate
Deviation Wrong Material Selection Corrosion Corrosion
Deviation Wrong Hanger Seal Wrong procedure Wrong Hanger Seal  
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Table A. 20 Case information filling in case production template. 
Case features Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12
Case Name Case E-11 Case E-14 Case E-15a Case E-15b Case F-14 Case F-16
Field OSE OSE OSE OSE OSS OSS
Well name E-11 E-14 E-15 E-15 F-14 F-16
Country Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway
Wellhead location Platform Platform Platform Platform Platform Platform
Time occurrence of 
failure November 2004 January 2001 March 2005 March 2005 November 2000 Dec. 2000
Case Description Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box
Explanation to Case Exp. E-11 Exp. E-14 Exp. E-15a Exp. E-15b Exp. F-14 Exp. F-16
Lessons learned LL E-11 LL E-14 LL E-15a LL E-15b LL F-14 LL F-16
Case Status Unsolved Solved Solved Solved Solved Unsolved
Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure
Task Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Solution Elastometer TBG Hanger Seal
Elastometer Casing 
Hanger Seal Non Cr CSG
High Thermal & 
Pressure Loads
Outcome 50 % Partially understood Fully understood
Plan Use Metal to metal Hanger Seal Use 13 % Cr
Re-completion Without 
PBR
well type WAG GI OPGL OPGL WAG WAG
Time of leak Late Leak Early Leak Late Leak Late Leak Early leak Early leak
Time of leak Leak Just After Start-up Injection Leak During Production Leak During Production
Leak During Gas 
Injection
Leak During Gas 
Injection
Leak crossing 
volume T-A T-A A-B A-B T-A T-A
Leak component Leak Crossing GLM Leak Crossing TBG Hanger Seal
Leak Crossing Casing 
Hanger Seal Leak Crossing CSG Leak Crossing PBR
Type of casing 
hanger Elastometer Seal
Leak fluid system Leak Gas Gas Gas
Test fluid
Activity To Reveal 
Leak
Testing Wellhead seal is 
Not OK Wellhead Test-Not Ok Wellhead Test-Ok
Casing Type Wellhead seal Leak A-B Non Cr CSG
Leak Rate High leak rate Low Leak Rate
Tie-back System TB System F TB System A TB System A TB System A TB System C
CSG Connection NSCC NSCC
Observation pressure build-up in B pressure build-up in B pressure build-up in B
Observation Not-same Pressure A-B Not-same Pressure A-B pressure build-up in C
Observation
Observation Surface Leak Raising Wellhead
Observation
Observation Surface Leak Steady State Well Condition
Steady State Well 
Condition
Observation High Pressure Variation High Pressure Variation
Observation High Thermal Variation High Thermal Variation
Deviation
 lock ring was not 
installed for 13-3 / 8” 
seal assembly
Deviation
Deviation PBR Not Used
Deviation  
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Table A. 21 Case information filling in case production template. 
Case features Case 13 Case 14 Case 15 Case 16 Case 17 Case 18
Case Name Case F-22 Case F-24 Case F-29 Case F-30 Case Brage 4 Case Brage 6
Field OSS OSS OSS
Well name F-22 F-24 F-29 F-30 Brage A-4 Brage A-6
Country Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway
Wellhead location Platform Platform Platform Platform Platform Platform
Time occurrence of 
failure January 2006 November 2005 Dec. 2005 Oct. 2005 2007 2007
Case Description Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box Given in case text box
Explanation to Case Exp. F-22 Exp. F-24 Exp. F-29 Exp. F-30 Explain Brage A-4 Explain Brage A-6
Lessons learned LL F-22 LL F-24 LL F-29 LL F-30 LL Brage A-4 LL Brage A-6
Case Status Solved Solved Unsolved Solved Solved Solved
Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure Well Leakage Failure
Task Finding Cause of Well Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Finding Cause of Well 
Leakages
Solution Mixing Scale Inhibitor with Gas lift
High Thermal & 
Pressure Loads
Elastometer Casing Hanger 
Seal
Elastometer Casing 
Hanger Seal
Outcome Partially understood Fully understood Fully understood
Plan Use Metal to metal Hanger Seal
Use Metal to metal 
Hanger Seal
well type OPGL OPGL OPGL OPGL OPGL
Time of leak Late Leak Late Leak Early leak Early leak Late Leak Late Leak
Time of leak Leak During Production Leak During Production Leak During Production Leak During Production
Leak crossing 
volume A-B A-B T-A A-B A-B
Leak component Leak Crossing Casing Hanger Seal Leak Crossing CSG Leak Crossing Packer
Leak Crossing Casing Hanger 
Seal
Leak Crossing Casing 
Hanger Seal
Type of casing 
hanger Elastometer Seal Elastometer Seal
Leak fluid system Gas Gas Gas
Test fluid
Activity To Reveal 
Leak Wellhead Test-Not Ok Wellhead Test-Not Ok
Casing Type Non Cr CSG Non Cr CSG 13% Cr CSG 13% Cr CSG
Leak Rate Very Low Leak Rate Very Low Leak Rate
Tie-back System TB System C TB System C TB System E
CSG Connection NSCC NSCC NSCC
Observation pressure build-up in B pressure build-up in B
Observation Inconsistent Leak Behaviour
Observation Leak Was Sensitive to Pressure
Observation Surface leak Downhole Leak Downhole Leak Leak Was Sensitive to Temperature
Observation Repeated Bleed-off Caused Increasing in Leak Rate
Observation Steady State Well Condition Deep Well
Observation Slug Flow High Pressure Variation
Observation CIV Failed High Thermal Variation
Deviation Mixing Chemical Fluid With GL instead of CIV
Well Application Was 
Changed (OP-WAG)
Deviation
Deviation
Deviation  
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Drillstring failures (DSF) increase drilling cost dramatically 
especially in high drilling cost environment. The types of 
failure experienced and reported in this study were drillstring 
wash-outs, cracks and twist offs. As often is the case in 
drilling, the consequence of one drilling problem induced 
another. The consequence of DSF can be; loss of bottom hole 
assembly (BHA), fishing, bit balling and hole instability. One 
of the main consequence of DSF was hole instability in term 
of hole wash-out due to time consuming operations leading to 
interaction between mud and formation.  
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Abstract There are two main processes that can lead to DSF; fatigue 
and corrosion. The drillstring is subjected to different types of 
forces. One of the harmful forces is vibration. Improper BHA 
design and wrongly selected drilling parameters in hard rock 
or sticky formation can lead to intensive vibrations. In Iran, as 
also in several parts of the Middle East, the rate of DSF is 
reported to be high mainly due to hard rock and sticky 
formation1. In this paper we will report a case study of 
extraordinarily many DSF while drilling through a specific 
formation which we will refer to as either the hazardous 
formation or simply M1. In the M1 formation the rate of 
failure in some distinctive parts of two fields, called field A 
and B, out of about 30 neighboring fields, were extremely 
high; from 10 to 70 DSF per well. In others field the rate of 
DSF was relatively low, typically 1 or 2 DSF per well. This 
relatively low failure rate was also observed in field A and B 
outside three distinctive areas within field A and B. These 
distinctive areas cover only approximately 20 % of the total 
area of field A and B. The M1 formation exists in most fields 
in Southern Iran placed below the surface formation and 
normally penetrated with the 17-1/2” BHA. The relevant 
potential causes of DSF are discussed and we will suggest 
some solutions which are easy to implement. In the mean time, 
several methods have been tested out in order to decrease 
washout frequency. These methods were; 
High frequency of wash-outs and cracks in drillstring has been 
experienced in a specific formation in oil fields located in the 
Southern part of Iran. The rig time consumed on this challenge 
was high due to time spent on replacing damaged pipes. In a 
few cases fishing operations were necessary to recover twisted 
off drillstrings. The majority of drillstring failures happened 
during top hole drilling (17-1/2” hole section). So far several 
solutions have been tried out to overcome the drillstring 
failure, which to some extent has decreased the washout 
frequency.  
 
In this work we tried to define the challenge as precisely as 
possible; where, how and why the problem occurred. The 
state-of-the-art with respect to cause/solution to pipe washouts 
is included in the paper. Possible reasons and practical 
solutions to this challenge are evaluated. 
 
Analysis of relevant factors that affect drillstring failure 
revealed that drillstring vibration in torsional mode is the most 
probable factor to induce drillstring failure in the hazard 
formation. This factor is therefore discussed in detail. 
Inasmuch as the failure occurred just in one particular 
formation, the lithology that induced vibration is another 
factor that was investigated and analyzed in this study. The 
complete understanding of the cause of the problem has 
however still not been reached. ¾ Use of downhole mud motor  
¾ Changed BHA (increased stiffness) 
¾ Use of corrosion inhibitors 
¾ Increased bit lubricity (up to 2 % oil) 
¾ Changed bit type 
¾ Changed  to brand new drill pipe 
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¾ Decreased axial tension by reduction weight of BHA  
 
Some of the tested methods have been partly successful, 
especially the applying of down hole motors, while we saw a 
failure rate decrease of approximately 25 – 30 % was 
observed. However, the problem can be characterized as 
unsolved.   
 
Formation 
The formation age is Pliocene-Miocene which consists mainly 
of gray marl (more than 70 %) with minor silty and limestone 
interbeds. The marl is quite sticky when mixed with filtration / 
filter cake from the mud. Bit balling is frequently experienced 
in this formation. The top formation was found at a depth 
varying from 700 to 1500 mTVD with an average thickness of 
650 m. A typical well sketch is shown in Figure1. 
  
Characteristic of Failure 
Tables 1 to 3 and Figure 2 demonstrate failure rate in 3 wells 
in fields A and B. The frequency of DSF is high and at some 
time reached 13 failures per every 100 m drilled. Most failures 
happened in formation M1. After passing formation M1 the 
failure rate decreased to zero. A typical BHA used for drilling 
the17-1/2” hole is presented in Table 4. The same drill pipe 
(grade E and G) was used for the whole well. Since no failure 
happened below M1, we can say that poor pipe quality is not 
the reason for the failures. 
 
The majority of the failures are shaped like a straight, single 
crack, 1 to 7 cm long and most of them are visible with the 
eye. Approximately one third of the cracks were parallel and 
two thirds perpendicular to the drill pipe axis (see Figure 3).  
The most of the DSF were located within the first three stand 
pipes above the BHA; however, some cracks were observed in 
BHA even in stabilizer. Tables 1 to 3 show the location and 
type of failure versus well depth.  In some cases the crack 
developed into a complete twist off. This occurred when 
surface recognition of initial progress of wash-out was poor or 
torque value reached to tortional limit suddenly. The only 
surface indication was a sudden pressure drop in the 
circulating system. No down hole recording was installed. 
 
Potential Causes 
There are a lot of factors which affect DSF. In this case study, 
we have listed relevant factors based on severity level as 
shown below. 
 
Severity level         Remarks 
 
0 No concern 
1 Potential 
2 Non critical 
3 Influence 
4 Critical 
5 Severe 
 
 
 
Factors which 
affect DSF 
Severity 
level  Comment  
Chemically  0 Non-corrosive environment  
Tortuosity 
(crooked hole)  1 Variation of rock hardness  
Fatigue (cyclic 
stress)  1 Vertical well (but not straight)  
Pipe quality 
(internal upset 
length) 
1 Failure in slip area related to stress concentration in internal  upset 
Rock hardness  2 Gray sticky marl  
Bit & BHA 
selection  3 
Mass-imbalance - Bit cutter 
concentration  
Axial vibration (bit 
bounce)  3 Due to stick-slip (coupling effect)  
Lateral vibration  3 Due to stick-slip (coupling effect)  
Accurate bit 
parameters  3 
Critical WOB & RPM to avoid 
stick-slip  
Tortional vibration 
(stick-slip)  5 Due to sticky clay and WBM  
Mud type  5 WBM induces swelling problems  
Sticky rock  5 Sticky clay induces stick-slip  
 
We have picked four of the most important factors for further 
discussion in this paper. 
 
Fatigue (cyclic stress)  
Fatigue is the progressive structural change that occurs at a 
highly stressed location in the material when subjected to 
fluctuating stress and may result in cracks or fractures after a 
finite number of stress cycles. Fatigue cracking may occur at 
stress levels that are well below the drill pipe yield stress. 
Stress concentrations in a drill pipe are usually caused by slip 
cuts, short tapers at the internal upset, corrosion pits etc.  In 
practice most of the failures occur in slips area where the 
concentration of stress is high. The Wohler’s diagram for 
steel2 (see Figure 4) shows how alternating stresses reduce the 
resistance to fatigue. Under normal conditions we see that this 
can not be cause, because the normal cyclic stress level is far 
below σ fatigue. In fact, if cyclic stress is the reason of the 
problem, this problem should have continued after passing the 
M1 formation.  
 
Pipe Quality 
A comprehensive database on drillstring failures has been 
complied by IADC/API3. The objective of the task group was 
to establish relationships between the internal upset length and 
drill pipe failure and explore the cause that lead to such 
failures. The result of this study showed that the length and 
radius of internal upset is important for stress concentration in 
slips area. The database showed that the failure frequency is 
high happens in slips area approximate 20 inch below from top 
pipe box. This failure concentration is confirmed through our 
findings. 
 
Bit and BHA Selection  
Three boundary conditions are considered during BHA design; 
1) maximum weight on bit (WOB) as recommended by the 
manufacture is seldom or never surpassed, 2) the neutral point 
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(tension / compression) is designed to be placed inside the 
drilled collar (75-80% of the BHA weight is used for WOB), 
3) Clearance size between hole size and outside DC which 
stiffness of BHA is considered4. Since all three boundary 
conditions of BHA design have been met and supervised, this 
cannot be the reason for high failure frequency, although 
improper BHA design can enhance lateral vibration in term of 
“mass imbalance”5.  
 
Vibration 
It is commonly known that severe vibration frequently occurs 
at the bottom of the drillstring during drilling. In drilling 
operations there are four types of vibration which may be 
generated either by the bit-formation interaction or by string-
formation interactions further up in the drillstring6. These four 
vibrations are; torsional (stick-slip), axial (bit bounce), lateral 
(bending) and eccentric (BHA whirl). In the present case 
torsional vibration is the main mode of vibration and the most 
probable cause of DSF while drilling in M1. This is discussed 
in detail in the next subchapter. 
 
Stick-slip 
 Stick-slip is defined as an alternate slowing and acceleration 
of the BHA rotation. Stick-slip occurring while drilling with a 
tri-cone bit is usually due to drillstring or wellbore contact. A 
typical stick-slip vibration phenomenon is presented in Figure 
57. Drillstring vibration in tortional mode is the most probable 
reason of failure in Iranian oil fields due to two reasons. 
Firstly, failures occur only in a specific formation while in 
other formations not, even if the BHA is identically designed, 
secondly, rock characterization of the M1 formation is sticky 
and hard compared to formations above and below the M1. 
Whereas drillers want to have constant rotary speed (RPM) in 
a specific interval they will in practice seldom obtain the 
constant RPM due to bit stick-slip motion of the drillstring. 
The surface RPM is quite different from bit RPM. The rotary 
speed can be zero or even negative for a fraction of time. The 
main reason of stick-slip motion is the high friction force 
excreted on the bit and the rest of the BHA. High friction 
depends on many factors, but in our case the sticky gray marl 
is important. The estimation of stick time fraction for typical 
drilling parameters in M1 formation is presented in appendix. 
 
In our work this was not been studied any further due to 
limited data and time issue. 
 
Discussion  
We have shown above that stick-slip is the major cause of the 
problem. The washout problem is purely a mechanical 
problem; different type of corrosion can be ruled out for two 
reasons; 1) the pipes are regularly inspected and replaced 
wherever a pit is detected, 2) the H2S level while drilling the 
M1 formation is zero. The dynamic forces in terms of 
vibration require therefore a full program for analyzing and 
monitoring it before we can quantify the vibrations in different 
modes.  
 
The formation lithology contains sticky clay, and clay is very 
sensitive to water (absorb water from WBM).  The WBM was 
a mixed salt water mud with density and viscosity typically 
1.2 kg/l and 7 cp respectively. Sticky formation has the 
potential to create stick-slip motion (torsional vibration type) 
due to high friction between BHA and the formation. When 
mud motor was applied, the friction on the BHA above the 
motor was eliminated, causing a reduction in slip-stick motion. 
The length of the drillstring is importance for stick-slip 
induction. Short strings (shallow well depth) are more critical 
than longer strings for similar condition (e.g.; force, torque, 
hole size and etc.). Stick-slip is much more critical in the 
fields A and B than in the other fields, since the top M1 
formation depth is shallower here than in the other fields. 
 
Since slip-stick and associated bit bounce is quickly 
destroying the drillstring, there are two obvious ways to 
reduce the problem of drillstring wash-outs: 
 
1. Monitoring vibration (downhole and surface). It is vital 
to use equipment to identify down hole vibration in real 
time. By having those data, it is possible to adjust 
accurately surface drilling parameters; RPM and WOB. 
These parameters are essential in controlling drillstring 
vibration.  
2. Reduction vibration by a) using a downhole mud motor 
and / or b) using oil based mud instead of WBM.  
 
These two countermeasures will a) completely change the 
spring characteristics of the drillstring and b) reduce the 
friction and thereby the “stick” part of the stick-slip motion. If 
no stick there will be no slip, and accordingly no bit bounce.  
 
Conclusion 
This study concludes that vibrations in the drillstring are the 
main factor leading to DSF for the two fields being 
investigated in Southern part of Iran. To reduce DSF the 
following recommendations are given: 
 
¾ Use OBM in the hazardous formation. Selection of 
OBM is purely based on technical reasons; oil will now 
be the wetting phase of both the borehole wall and the 
cuttings, the interaction between clay and water and the 
friction between bit and rock will be largely reduced. 
¾ Require full statistical analysis in hazardous formation 
concerning DSF phenomena.  
¾ Light weight BHA is preferable to avoid tensile stress 
(use low WOB in the M1 formation). 
¾ Use mud motors whenever possible.  
¾ Use stiffer BHA to avoid hole deviation (approach a 
straight hole), and consequently, reduce lateral and 
torsional vibration.  
¾ Use downhole thrusters / shock absorber. 
¾ Find critical rotational speeds if possible, and change bit 
parameters (RPM and WOB). For this purpose there are 
now available several devices on the market. 
 
Downhole vibration monitoring will be beneficial for further 
investigation and optimization. Some of the systems 
available are;  
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 String Dynamics Control (SDC), AGIP / Mud Logging 
Services8. 
 Soft Torque Rotary System (STRS), Shell9. 
 Co-pilot, Baker Hughes10. 
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Appendix: Stick Time Fraction Calculation 
A mathematical model presented by Kyllingstad et al.11 were 
applied in the estimations. 
 
Input Data 
Length of drill pipe section  1385 m 
Length of drill collars section  115 m 
Drill pipe momentum (5” OD, 4.125”ID) 11.8E-06 m4 
Drill collar momentum (10” equivalent OD, 3”ID) 405E-6 m4 
Shear modulus of steel    81.4E+9 pa 
Density of steel    7890 kg/m3 
Extra starting torque    4 kNm  
Rotary speed (120 RPM)   12.6 s-1  
 
Output Data 
Static torsional stiffness   620 Nm/rad 
Pendulum frequency   0.149 Hz 
Slip-stick period    6.77 s 
Sticking time fraction   0.152 
 
Variable rotary speed (constant torque = 4 kNm). 
Rotary speed (RPM) 150 120 90 60 
Sticking time fraction 0.122 0.152 0.2 0.29 
 
Variable torque (constant RPM = 120). 
Torque (kNm) 4 5 6 7 
Sticking time fraction 0.152 0.188 0.223 0.257 
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                    Fig. 1 - Typical well sketch in fields A and B. 
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                    Fig. 2 - Failure frequency in tree wells. Depth intervals of M1 formation are; well A18: 1437 – 2200 m, well A27: 1360 – 2100 m  
                                 and well B21: 630 – 1140 m. 
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Fig. 3 - Crack direction and relative positions. 
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Fig. 4  - A Wohler’s diagram. A pipe break due to fatigue if cycled 10e6 times at a stress level of fatigue. 
 
 
Fig. 5 - Bit RPM vs. time showing stick-slip vibration (RPM=60). 
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Table 1 - Details of drillstring wash-outs (one complete twist off) recorded in well A27 (67 failures totally). 
Well- A27 
Well depth (mTVD) Fatigue type and its relative location of drillstring failure Formation 
0 - 782 No drillstring failure 
782 Drill pipe (body) 
813 Drill pipe (body) 
888 Drill collar (body) 
929 Drill pipe (body) 
994, 1053, 1062, 1067 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1086, 1095, 1151, 1181 Drill pipe (slips area) 
Non-hazard formation
1365, 1393, 1400, 1430 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1489 Drill pipe (slips area) + drill collar 
1501 Drill pipe (slips area)- 2 points 
1528 Drill pipe (body)- 2 points 
1535 Drill pipe (body) 
1541 Drill pipe (body)- 2 points 
1543 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1554 Drill pipe (body)- 2 points 
1556 Drill pipe (body)- 2 points + drill collar 
1566 DP-slips area 
1569, 1576, 1580, 1631 Drill pipe (body) 
1637 Twist off from DP 
1684, 1697 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1713, 1717 Cross over sub 
1721 Drill pipe (slips area) - 2 points 
1738, 1748, 1759 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1770 Drill collar 
1781, 1795, 1833, 1850 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1851, 1853, 1864, 1865, 1868 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1870.5 Drill collar 
1873, 1878, 1884, 1889, 1892 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1925 Drill collar  
1929 Drill pipe (slips area) 
1931 Drill pipe (slips area) - 2 points 
1962 Drill pipe (slips area) + drill collar 
1966, 1970 Drill pipe (slips area) 
2031 Drill pipe (slips area) - 3 points 
2036 Drill pipe (slips area) - 2 points 
2100 No drillstring failure 
Hazardous formation 
(M1) 
2100 - 3500 No drillstring failure Non-hazard formations 
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Table 2 - Details of drillstring wash-outs recorded in well A18 (9 failures totally). 
Well - A18 
Well depth ( wash-out points), meter Type and location of drillstring failure Formation 
0 - 698 No drillstring failure 
698 Drill pipe (body) 
816 Drill pipe (body) 
1046 Toll joint (drill pipe) 
Non-hazard formation
1436 Cross over sub 
1453 Drill pipe (body) 
1606 Stabilizer 
1625 Drill pipe (body) 
1645 Stabilizer 
2150 Drill collar 
Hazardous formation 
(M1) 
2150 - 3500 No drillstring failure Non-hazard formation
 
 
 
Table 3 - Details of drillstring wash-outs (and two complete twist off) recorded in the well B21 (25 failures totally). 
Well - B21   
Well depth ( wash-out points), meter Type and location of drillstring failure Formation 
0- 476 No drillstring failure 
476 Drill pipe (body) 
523 Cross sub 
588 Twist off - drill collar 
629 Twist off - drill pipe 
Non-hazard formation
634 Drill pipe (body) 
684, 741 Cross sub 
750, 907 Drill pipe (body) 
925 Cross sub 
931 Drill collar 
934 Drill pipe (body) 
938 Cross sub 
961, 972, 974, 980 Drill pipe (body) 
984 Cross sub 
1109 Drill pipe (body) 
1112 Cross sub 
1123, 1127, 1130, 1139, 1139.5 Drill pipe (body) 
Hazardous formation 
(M1) 
1140 - 3200 No drillstring failure Non-hazard formation
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Table 4 - Typical bottom hole assembly in the 17-1/2 “hole section in M1 formation. 
Items Size (outside) Length 
  inch meter 
Drill pipe (grade e) 5 Drill pipe (grade E and G) 
Heavy weigh drill pipe 5 130 
Cross over sub 8 - 1/2 * 5 1 
Drill collar 8 - 1/2 28 
Cross over sub 9 - 3/4 *  8 - 1/2 1 
Drill collar 9 - 3/4 54 
Cross over sub 11 * 9 - 3/4 1 
Drill collar 11 11 
Stabilizer 17-1/2 2 
Drill collar 11 20 
Bit sub 11 1 
Shock sub 11 1 
Bit (tricone - tooth) 17 - 1/2 0.4 
 
1 7 . 5 ”
1 1 ”
1 7 . 5 ”
9 . 7 5 ”
8 . 5 ”
5 ”
1 1 ”
5 ”
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Abstract 
Maintained pressure management and fracture network 
mapping are key issues for successful well construction in 
fractured carbonate reservoirs. Prediction and characterization 
of the fracture network prior to drilling is very difficult and 
challenge optimized well direction and placement in respect to 
the fractures. Avoiding productivity impairment by loss of 
drilling fluids is another major challenge. 
Later stimulation of a micro-fractured reservoir invaded by 
drilling mud is extremely difficult or even impossible. Open 
hole completion is generally preferred in these type of 
reservoirs. Underbalanced drilling (UBD) is therefore an 
interesting option for enhanced data acquisition, avoiding 
reservoir impairment and achieving completion contingency 
for optimized well production and added value. 
Locating and characterizing the natural fractures while 
drilling is a vital issue for appropriate well placement and 
selection of completion options during the field development 
strategy. Depending on the opening and extension of the 
fractures, the mud loss rates and volumes can differ from low 
to heavy. The associated fracture network is the main 
parameter contributing to well production.  
Underbalanced drilling is one of the main recommended 
technologies for further development of fractured carbonate 
reservoirs in South-West Iran. Flow drilling, allowing the 
hydrocarbons to flow to surface while drilling, will be 
advantageous. With sufficient reservoir pressure, this method 
enables better fracture characterization and a dynamic decision 
process can be applied for drilling horizontal wells with 
optimized well trajectory intersecting more fractures. 
Formation damage can be avoided and dramatically reduce 
unsuccessfully drilled wells.  
 
Introduction 
UBD is a drilling practice where the dynamic wellbore 
pressure intentionally is less than the formation pore pressure. 
Underbalanced drilling may improve drilling efficiency and 
enhance well productivity. However, for operational safety 
overbalanced drilling is generally preferred and the value of 
UBD is not yet fully acknowledged. At the same time UBD is 
increasingly used in many parts of the world. The technology 
involved is matured and the experience is increasing. UBD 
may be the only solution to unlock further drilling in depleted 
reservoirs with abnormal pressure ramps. UBD is applied for a 
variety of reservoir types at different complexity levelsP1P. 
For field development projects in Iran, underbalanced 
drilling has a great potential and the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) has initiated a UBD technology program. 
UBD projects are related to some partially depleted fields in 
the south of Iran. The motivation is to increase the drilling 
efficiency and to enhance production. Normal drilling 
procedures, even with minimum conventional mud density 
(0.8 s.g) is not possible in many of the fields due to heavy to 
complete mud loss. In practice, drilling horizontal wells with 
heavy mud loss creates two severe drilling challenges: 
 Stuck pipe due to cutting accumulation 
 Loss of data transmission 
In fractured carbonate reservoirs commonly found in Iran, 
non-producing wells are a major challenge either due to 
formation damage by loss of drilling fluids or not appropriate 
well placement and direction to intersect the fractures. The key 
aspects for promoting UBD in Iran are;  
 Improved drilling performance 
o Avoiding drilling fluid loss 
o Improved ROP 
o Less bit wear and tripping time 
 Improved reservoir fracture productivity 
o Early and improved fracture detection  
o Avoiding reservoir impairment  
o Allowing open hole completion 
o Reduced need for well stimulation 
This paper discusses the above mentioned challenges to 
Iran and in relation to underbalanced drilling as a tool for 
optimized drilling and completion contingency in fractured 
carbonate reservoirs. Data and experience from West-Zagross 
fields located in South-Western part of Iran have been used as 
a basis for the study. 
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Underbalanced Drilling Technology 
The UBD methodology involves two major technologies: 
 Types of UBD fluid; gas, foam, gasified- and one phase 
liquids 
 Circulating system; open system, closed loop system and 
snubbing unit  
There are two ways to create underbalanced conditions 
which are also dependant on the formation pore pressure: 
 Artificially underbalanced 
 Naturally underbalanced 
Artificially underbalanced operations apply to depleted 
reservoirs where the pore pressure gradient is less than the 
water pressure gradient.  Gas is then required and mixed with 
the drilling fluids. Natural underbalanced operations mean that 
the reservoir pressure is able to flow the well by itself. 
However, starting the underbalanced condition, the mud 
column of the well has to be unloaded by a lighter fluid. The 
method is referred to as “flow-drilling” P1P. 
UBD systems are modular and self-contained and can in 
principle be installed independently of the drilling rigs. Some 
extension of the surface pad is needed for the equipment 
involved. Top-drives are advantageous, avoiding the square 
drilling kelly running through the rotating control head (RCH) 
creating extra wear on the seals. A standard UBD package is 
designed as a closed loop system. Flexibility is a key issue 
allowing production while drilling and reservoir testing. 
Drilling with volatile fluids (high GOR) and managing HB2 BS 
environments are important safety issues. 
 
 
Well Construction Challenges in Fractured 
Carbonates 
Maintaining underbalance in both drilling and completion 
is a complex and challenging operation. Due to this 
complexity, some underbalanced drilled wells may be 
completed in overbalance and the initial production 
capabilities of the well may be lost. Underbalanced conditions 
are important for all phases of the well construction 
comprising:  
 Drilling 
 Tripping (in and out) 
 Logging and formation testing 
 Running casing and pumping cement 
 Perforation and completion 
Hard rock drilling and low rate of penetration (ROP) is a 
common challenge in the Middle East. In tight carbonated 
reservoirs in Iran an ROP of one meter per hour has been 
experienced. This low ROP impacts the drilling costs and is 
also very relevant to the formation damage issue due to 
increased time of exposure of mud to the reservoir. The bit life 
is generally low and several bit runs are required. UBD can 
dramatically reduce drilling time and up to 10 times 
improvement has been reportedP2, 3P. P 
Abnormal pressurized salt water formations and depleted 
and fractured reservoirs need to be carefully addressed. 
Logistic is a very important issue and impacts the drilling 
efficiency and the ability to handle critical well operations. 
With UBD it is possible to manage unforeseen pressure 
regimes and mitigate the logistics challenge related to heavy 
mud loss.    
Mud losses occur when fractures are encountered ahead of 
the bit.  Depending on the fracture characteristics the mud loss 
rates can vary. DykeP4P described three types for fracture 
apertures. With micro-fractures (less that 250 µm) mud will 
block the fracture near the wellbore without any detectable 
mud loss. Fracture openings between 250 and 500 µm can be 
detected by monitoring the mud loss, but will be blocked by 
the mud after some time. When the fracture opening is larger 
than 500 µm, mud can not seal the fracture by itself and lost 
circulation material (LCM) may be required to stop losses. 
However, using LCM can destroy the conductivity of the 
fractures damaging the production potential of the well. This 
risk need to be balanced with the potential drilling hazards 
such as stuck pipe and gas blow out. In some cases the data 
acquisitions programme has to be cancelled due to mud loss. 
During well completion, back flushing is generally carried out 
to clean the well. A successful clean up or stimulation of the 
fracture network is hard to achieve. This is demonstrated with 
field data in the further discussion. 
Optimized well direction and placement in respect to the 
fracture network pattern is very important.  Experience has 
shown that predicting and characterizing the fracture network 
prior to drilling is very difficult. UBD can assist for early 
detection and assessment of the fractures.  
 
 
Field Study 
90 % of the discovered fields in Iran are in carbonate 
reservoirs putting Iran as one of the largest carbonate 
producers in the worldP5P. The normal production mechanism of 
carbonate reservoirs is through natural fracture networks with 
high conductivity. The dense matrix usually feeds the fracture 
network.  If the well trajectory does not intersect any fractures, 
production will be low or even absent. In such cases, field 
experiences have shown that stimulation efforts like acidizing 
often are unsuccessful. 
New master development plans (MDP) have been 
developed for upgrading of seven Iranian oil fields in south 
west of Iran. A location area map is shown in Figure 1. 
Although the production history has been poor, the potential of 
the fields have been found to be high, but dependent on 
efficient exploitation methods like horizontal wells, 
underbalanced drilling and smart data acquisition programs. 
 The Dehluran (DH) field is a relevant field for UBD 
operations because of the nature of the field and the long and 
problematic production history. DH is located in the south-
western part of Iran close to the Iran-Iraq border. The field is 
20 km long and 9 km wide with an average reservoir thickness 
of 300 m.  The DH field map is presented in Figure 2. The 
field was discovered in 1970 and 22 wells have been drilled so 
far. Only 13 wells have reached the reservoir target. The rest 
of the wells have been abandoned due to serious drilling 
challenges like high salt pressure and also due to the Iraq-Iran 
war (1980-1988). The estimated recoverable oil is 15 % by 
natural depletion. So far only 10 % of recoverable oil is 
produced. To date, horizontal wells have not been drilled. 
The integrated study showed: 
 The majority of wells has poor production history 
 General lack of fracture knowledge 
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 Uncertainties apply with respect to reservoir 
compartments and fluid contacts 
Only a few wells have shown a reasonable production 
potential. It is assumed that the exposure to the fracture 
network govern the well productivity. It was not possible to 
explain the production capabilities from the available 
petropysical log data.  
Fractures can be identified and characterized by different 
methods. With formation image logs the fractures can be 
visualized directly. Accurate mud loss detectors combined 
with annulus pressure sensors near the drill bit can give a 
continuous log of minor to severe losses.  Small fractures may 
however be difficult to detect by this method. The micro-
fractures will be filled and blocked by mud within few seconds 
when the mud is non-NewtonianP4P.  
Mud loss logs or image logs were not available for the 
Dehluran field. Mud loss data, extracted from the daily drilling 
reports was thus studied as an approach to characterize 
fractures. The wells were ranked with respect to mud loss rate 
as follows: 
 No mud loss (zero) 
 Partial mud loss ( 1 to 9 bbl / hour) 
 Moderate mud loss (10 to 49 bbl / hour) 
 Severe mud loss (50 bbl / hour to complete mud loss) 
The results are shown in Table 1 together with the 
cumulative production. The mud loss distribution is 
summarised in Figure 3 and shows that 65 % of the wells had 
no mud loss to partial mud loss while 35 % of the drilled wells 
had severe to moderate mud loss. The rapid and unexpected 
mud loss observation is the main indication for existence of 
fractures. The complete mud loss probably happened when 
large fractures were hit. 
The productive wells and the mud loss history are 
indicated on the field map in Figure 2. A correlation is found 
between the mud-loss and production history. It seems as the 
northern part of the field has higher probabilities of fractures. 
No systematic regional fracture pattern can however be 
deduced. 
 
Fracture Interpretation in Well DH-5. Out of the 13 wells 
reaching the reservoir in the DH field the well DH-5 has been 
selected for an in-depth study. A simple well sketch is shown 
in Figure 4. This well was chosen due to the following: 
 A successfully drilled well with a reasonable production 
rate 
 Available production tests with draw-down and build-up 
tests and production logging (PLT) 
 Available cores 
 Complete drilling history with daily mud loss data 
 Production rate history 
The entire mud loss history of the pay zone was 
interpreted.  The net thickness of the pay zone was about 350 
m. 2600 bbl mud was lost in this interval by 250 bbl/day 
average loss rate and with 15 % solid by volume. The mud 
properties are summarized in Table 2. The mud rheology is 
non-Newtonian and can be considered as Bingham. 600 sacks 
of LCM (mica) were pumped to reduce the mud losses. The 
differential or normalized daily mud loss, new mud loss rate 
minus old ones, was used for fracture analysis. The data is 
shown in Figure 5. There are five mud loss peaks at different 
depths which are assumed to represent fractures. They are 
named fracture 1 to 5 in the figure. There is a possibility that 
only one fracture (fracture 1) is present, being opened in 
succeeding time periods. Therefore, the fracture interpretation 
was done for two cases; one case which considered only one 
fracture and a second case with five independent fractures. 
The well was perforated in five intervals. Perforation intervals 
were probably selected mainly from petrophysical logs with 
porosity indications. However, only one perforation interval 
was placed exactly against fracture indications (fracture 1) 
taken from the mud loss analysis. The PLT log showed that 
95% of total flow was produced from this perforation. The 
second perforation interval produced 5% and the rest of the 
intervals did not contribute to any production. The length of 
both producing perforation intervals is 21 m. 
A temperature survey also indicated an anomaly from 4040 
to 4070 mMD which corresponds to fracture 1. Therefore, the 
first fracture was verified from four sources: 
 PLT log 
 Mud loss 
 Temperature survey 
 Well test  
A production test, including draw-down and build-up tests 
in three periods, was carried out in well DH-5 after well 
completion. The calculated result showed negative skin (-3 to -
5) which indicates fracture conductivity. The corresponding 
fracture permeability is 70 to 120 mD.  As the mud losses 
continued for a long period we assume the fracture networks 
can be treated as infinite acting conductivity. 
The fracture permeability, fracture porosity and fracture 
extension are essential parameters for the reservoir evaluation 
and the field development. In addition, these parameters are 
vital for the driller to select LCM and to design the well 
trajectory. 
MuskatP7P and JonesP8P have shown that the fracture 
permeability ( )fk and porosity ( )fφ  for parallel fractures 
spreading horizontally are given by: 
)24/(3 pfp wk δ=     (1) 
δφ /wf =      (2) 
whereas the permeability for conjugated fracture patternP9 P is 
given by: 
)12(/3 cfc wk δ=     (3)  
The average fracture spacing can be obtained by dividing the 
net pay zone thickness with the number of fractures. Since five 
fractures were indicated during drilling 350 m of pay zone, the 
average fracture spacing in DH-5 is 70 m. The reservoir 
geology is layered with interbedded shale. The main 
producing interval is 100 m thick and the first fracture was 
indicated in this layer. The well test was also carried out here. 
Therefore, in the well DH-5 case the fracture spacing can be 
100 m.  It has been shown that there is a relation between 
fissure pseudoskin and fractures spacing in the absence of mud 
loss and LCM. This skin is only related to the nature of the 
fracture network and is always negativeP10 P: 
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)/2(ln)/21(2/ δδπ wwf rrS +−=  (4)                       
When the fracture spacing is known, fissure pseudoskin can be 
obtained. The obtained value for skin will be between -4 to -5 
by using fracture spacing 70 to 100 m which is in good match 
with the well test result. 
During overbalanced drilling most of the fractures will be 
immobilized by mud or LCM.  To make all the fractures 
produce it is required to perforate all fractured intervals and to 
stimulate the different fracture systems individually. It is 
assumed that lack of perforation as well as insufficient 
stimulation is a major contribution to poor productivity in 
many of the DH wells. 
 
Dehluran Logistics. The drilling logistic issue is very 
important when operating in remote and desert areas like the 
Dehluran field. Rough terrain with long access roads and also 
military regulations due to the closeness to the Iraqi border is a 
challenge. The logistics are related to both human support and 
securing of needed equipment and materials. A downtime 
analysis from daily drilling reports shows that while hole 
condition problems was the major issue for early wells, the 
logistics are the major area of concern for the later wells. The 
major factors involved for the logistics are transportation and 
the availability and quality of materials and spare parts.  
Figure 6 shows downtime analysis of nine DH wells. The 
downtime is caused by severe mud losses and securing water 
supply is the most predominant issue and impacts the ability to 
handle critical drilling operations.  
 
Validating Underbalanced Well Construction 
Different field and formation characteristics need to be 
screened with respect to the potential benefits of 
underbalanced well construction:  
 Fields or formations where UBD can obviously offer 
advantages; depleted formations, hard rock formations 
and formations subject to damage. 
 Fields or formations which need in-depth evaluation; low 
permeable formations, very permeable formations, 
macro-fractured formations and abnormal pressurized 
formations. 
 Fields or formations where UBD is not recommended; 
highly unconsolidated formations and swelling 
formations. 
Before commencing drilling operations the following 
considerations need to be carefully addressed: 
 Wellbore collapse or enlargement 
 Drilling operation safety  
 Net present value (NPV) 
UBD operations should be evaluated for different 
contributions to validate the enhancements: 
 Short-term enhancement related to drilling ability and 
ROP achievements  
 Long-term production enhancement related to improved 
well productivity.  
In the seven fields study UBD solutions for production 
enhancement have been addressed. The fields have been 
screened and drilling and production histories were evaluated 
for UBD applications. Fracture characteristics and pressure 
gradients have been analysed and Table 3 summarizes the 
findings. Three out of the seven fields have more than 5 wells 
drilled while the rest still are in an exploration phase. 
Recommendations with respect to UBD application in the 
seven fields are summarized in Table 4.  
 
Flow Drilling. In fractured reservoirs, the reservoir fluid can 
flow easily when exposed to an underbalanced condition due 
to the high flow conductivity of the fractures. The observed 
reservoir pressures in DH are between 414 – 428 bar at the 
datum depth of 3900 mss. Normally 10% overpressure in the 
reservoir is required to achieve underbalanced conditions.   
For safety issues criteria for hole collapse and procedures 
for surface handling of the fluids need to be clearly defined. 
The open hole production history in the field shows that the 
rock is generally stable and the use of crude oil fluid should be 
acceptable and recommended both with respect to reservoir 
evaluation and rock compatibility. Surface handling of fluids 
need to be carefully assessed by the service contractor. 
 
Fracture Characterisation by UBD. The Dehluran study 
showed the importance of precise positioning and 
characterization of the intersected fractures. This is of special 
importance if the reservoir section is completed with a casing 
and the production intervals are perforated. 
When the flow-drilling method is applied, influx to the 
well will increase rapidly after the bit intersects fractures. By 
monitoring the rate of flow at the surface fracture 
interpretations can be made. This evaluation may be integrated 
with data from the Logging While Drilling tool (LWD) in real 
time and comprehensive fracture knowledge can be achieved. 
Micro-fractures which are difficult to detect by overbalanced 
mud loss may be observed by flow-drilling. 
 
Completion and Stimulation. Later stimulation of a micro-
fractured reservoir invaded by drilling mud is extremely 
difficult. Open hole completion is generally preferred in these 
competent formations and type of reservoirs due to larger 
reservoir exposure. Drilling overbalanced contaminates the 
fractured reservoir and open hole stimulation is difficult. An 
effective treatment requires selective stimulation of each 
fracture. To perform this in open hole time consuming straddle 
pack operations are required.  A liner is normally set and 
perforated. In natural fractured reservoir one needs to 
perforate in the exact position of the fractures which is very 
difficult to achieve. Underbalanced well construction will help 
to avoid reservoir impairment maintaining the option of an 
open hole completion. Moreover, production diagnoses are 
simpler in complex fields by applying UBD and flow-drilling. 
With UBD, fracture monitoring can be done while drilling and 
it is possible for completion and reservoir engineers to make 
dynamic decision how to complete the wells. 
 
Logistics with UBD. Downtime due to logistics problems 
represents a challenge as shown in the Dehluran field. UBD 
can help to reduce this downtime if an appropriate technique is 
selected.  For example, using foam as the UBD drilling fluid 
does not need conventional water amounts. A closed UBD 
system will minimize waste of drilling fluids and improve 
environmental issues. 
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The specific field locations need attention as an UBD 
equipment package needs some extra space. However, 
assembling an UBD system onshore is simpler than offshore 
due to less space limitations.  
UBD operations require a more careful planning than a 
conventional drilled well. It is therefore possible to reduce the 
downtime significantly and to improve the drilling efficiency 
and safety. As discussed before the root causes of mud losses 
or blowouts are unknown or not well-known fractures and 
associated pore pressure. UBD is an operation which plays 
with the well hydraulics, and thus adjusts the well pressure to 
the pore pressure.  
 
UBD Time and Cost. Introducing UBD will add service cost 
to the drilling campaign. However, simple time and cost 
estimates can also illustrate potential cost savings in addition 
to improved well performance. Table 5 compares estimated 
rig days with conventional drilling and with UBD for a DH 
well and Table 6 compares the total drilling costs for the same 
well. It is assumed that rate of penetration with UBD will be 
twice compared to conventional drilling. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that additional daily rates of UBD is comparable to a 
rig rate of 25000 $. Saved time on drilling and tripping in the 
reservoir interval without stimulation needs sums up to 12 rig 
days saved and a total cost almost equal to a conventional 
drilled well. 
As most of the advantages of UBD come in the production 
phase a reasonable net present value calculation of UBD 
should be as a lifetime calculation of the well. 
 
Conclusions 
In the evaluation of productivity improvements of fractured 
carbonate reservoirs in Iran UBD technology has been 
identified as a promising tool. The value has been found to be 
mainly related to: 
 Improved fracture network identification and 
characterization  
 Improved well productivity avoiding fracture 
contamination  
 Avoiding time consuming and risky stimulation 
operations 
 While drilling decision support for optimized well 
placement and completion contingency 
 Less need for drilling water supply and mitigating 
logistics related to mud materials 
 Faster drilling with less rig days 
A pilot program for a suite of wells may be needed to justify 
the associated mobilization costs. 
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Nomenclature 
w = fracture opening, m 
δ = fracture spacing, m 
rBwB = wellbore radius, m 
SBfB = fissure pseudoskin, dimensionless 
kBfB = fracture permeability, mD 
ΦBfB = fracture porosity, percent 
 
Subscript 
p = parallel 
c = conjugated  
 
Reference 
1. McLennan, J.: “Underbalanced Drilling Manual”, Chicago, Ill.: 
Gas Research Institute, GRI reference: GRI-97/0236, 1997. 
2. Mathes, R.A. and Jack, L.J.: "Successful Drilling of an 
Underbalanced, Dual-Lateral Horizontal well in the Sajaa Field, 
Sharjah, UAE", paper SPE 57569 presented at the 1999 
SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology Conference, Abu 
Dhabi, Nov. 8 – 10. 
3. Luo, S., Hong, R., Meng, Y., Zhang, L., Li, Y. and Qin, C.: 
"Underbalanced Drilling in High-Loss Formation achieved Great 
Success – a Field Case Study”, paper SPE 59260 presented at the 
2000 IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, New Orleans, Feb.23 – 25. 
4. Dyke, C.G., Wu, B. and Milton-Tayler, D.: "Advances in 
Characterizing Natural Fracture Permeability from Mud Log 
Data", paper SPE 25022 presented at the European Petroleum 
Conference 1992, Cannes, Nov. 16 – 18. 
5. Jamshidnezhad, M.: “Horizontal Drilling Proves Non- Specific 
Application in Iranian Carbonate Reservoirs” Oil and Gas 
Journal, (Dec 2002) 43. 
6. Beda, G. and Carugo, C.: Use of Mud Microloss Analysis While 
Drilling to Improve the Formation Evaluation in Fractured 
Reservoir'', paper SPE 71737 presented at the 2001 SPE Annual 
Technical Conference and Exhibition, New Orleans, 30 Sep. - 3 
Oct. 
7. Muskat, M.: ''Physical Principles of Oil Production'' McGraw-
Hill Book Co. İnc., New York, 1949, page 246. 
8. Joens, F.A., :A Laboratory study of the Effects of Confiding 
Pressure on Fracture Flow and Storage Capacity in Carbonate 
Rocks'' Journal of Petroleum Technology, Jan 1975, pp 21-27.  
9. Lietard, O.: ''Permeability’s and Skins in Naturally Fractured 
Reservoirs: An Overview and an Update for Wells at any 
Deviation'', paper SPE 54725 presented at the 1999 SPE 
European Formation Damage Conference, Hague, 31 May – 1 
June. 
10. Lietard, O., Ayoub, J. and Pearson, A.: '' Hydraulic Fracturing of 
Horizontal Wells: An Update of Design and Execution 
Guidelines'', paper SPE 37122 presented at the 2 PndP International 
Three-Day Conference and Exhibition on Horizontal Well 
Technology, Calgary, Alberta, 18-20 Nov. 1996. 
6  SPE/IADC 91579 
Table 1  Dehluran cumulative production and mud loss 
2 19.4 3796 Severe WBM
3 9.7 1898 0 OBM
4 21 4110 0 WBM
5 40 7828 Severe OBM
6 0.01 2 0
11 0.14 27 0 OBM
12 0 0 0 OBM
14 0.004 1 0 NA
16 0.75 147 Severe WBM
17 0.004 1 Moderate WBM
18 0.46 90 Moderate WBM
19 0 0 0 OBM
20 0.05 10 Partial OBM
21 0.02 4 Partial OBM
91.538 1280
Mud type
Dehluran
Mud loss Well Cumulative production (MMSTB)
Average 
daily rate 
(BOPD)
NA
 
Table 2 Mud properties in well DH-5. 
Mud density Plastic viscosity Yield point Solid Oil / water
s.g cp lb / 100 sq.ft. % volume ratio
1.2 19 8 15 70 / 30   
 
 
Table 3 –Summary of seven fields screening for UBD application. 
1 22 Yes Partially develop Small to medium low 11,8
2 6 Yes Limited develop Small to medium very low 11,8
3 5 Yes Limited develop Small to medium low 11,8
4 3 Limited Exploration Large very low 8,8
5 2 Limited Exploration Large NA 8,8
6 1 Limited Exploration NA (sandstone) NA 11,8
7 1 No Exploration Large NA 9,8
40
Size of fracture Frequency of fractures
Pressure 
gradient (Kpa / m)Field
No. Of 
wells
Production 
activity
Development 
status
 
 
Table 4 – Resulting and recommendations after fields study. 
1 one phase Flow drilling Formation damage
2 one phase Flow drilling Formation damage
3 one phase Flow drilling Formation damage
4 two phase Foam Mud loss and safety
5 two phase Foam Mud loss and safety
6 NA NA NA
7 two phase Aerated Mud loss and safety
UBD method UBD applicationUBD fluidField
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Table 5- Historical conventional drilling operation time compared to plan UBD in DH field. 
Items Nomenclature Unit OBD case UBD case
UBD interval length L m 1000 1000
Rate of penetration in reservoir interval Rr m / hour 3 6
Total drilling time T hour 333 167
Tripping time in reservoir interval Ttr hour 24 0
UBD installation time Tiubd hour NA 24
Stimulation time Ts hour 120 0
Completion time Tc hour 120 120
Total reservoir drilling time Tr hour 597 311
Saved rig - days Delta T day 12  
 
 
Table 6- Historical conventional drilling operation cost compared to plan UBD in DH field. 
Items Nomenclature Unit OBD case UBD case
UBD service cost Cubd $ /day NA 25 000
Rig cost Crig $ /day 25 000 25 000
Location cost Cloc $ / well 150 000 200 000
Stimulation cost Cs $ / well 50 000 NA
UBD service cost Cubd $ NA 323 611
Rig cost Crig $ 622 222 323 611
Total reservoir drilling cost Cres $ 822 222 847 222
Additional cost Delta C $ 25 000  
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Dehluran field
Seven fields area
 
Figure 1- Location of the seven fields area. The Dehloran field was selected for evaluation. 
 
 
Figure 2- Dehluran field map showing wells with mud loss (red circle) and production wells (blue circle). Wells not reaching the reservoir are  
indicated with pink squares 
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44 %
21 %
14 %
21 %
No mud loss
Partial
Moderate
Severe
 
Figure 3- Mud loss type distribution in the DH field wells (reservoir section). 
 
 
Perforation From (m) To (m) Flow %
1 4050 4061 95 1 4056 230
2 4066 4071 5 2 4083 350
3 4119 4125 0 3 4169 128
4 4174 4183 0 4 4297 56
5 4186 4191 0 5 4335 103
Production test
Drilling mud loss
Fracture Depth (m)
Normalized Mud loss 
rate (bbl / day)
 1
  9 - 5/8 ''
2875 m
     5 ''    
     4390 m
packer @ 2558 m
Top pay = 3823 m
All depths are in drill depth
RKB = 192 m
 1
 2
 23
 3
 4
 4
 5
5
 
Figure 4- Well sketch with perforation intervals and fracture depths. 
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Figure 5- Drilling mud loss in the pay zone of well DH-5 (normalized and actual). 
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Figure 6- Analysis of root causes for drilling downtime. 
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Maintained Well Integrity, Meeting the Urge for Extended Well Life 
Cycle and Changing Well Applications 
 
J. Abdollahi, P. Randhol, and I.M. Carlsen, SPE, SINTEF Petroleum Research 
 
Appendix D is a poster prepared and presented at the SPE 2006 Forum Series I and II in 
Dubrovnik on “Low Cost Reservoir Access and Intervention” and “From Casing Design 
to Well Life Prediction?” The poster summarises topics covered in different research 
projects at SINTEF and NTNU and is related to maintained well integrity for different 
operations and situations during a lifecycle of a well. The project work was done for 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PTIL) and Statoil. 
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Jafar Abdollahi, Preben Randhol and Inge Manfred Carlsen,
SINTEF Petroleum Research, NO-7465 Trondheim, Norway
Well integrity
The application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce the risk of 
uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of the well. 
(NORSOK standard)
Contact person e-mail: inge.carlsen@iku.sintef.no
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Well Stimulation Effects
Complex well tubular loads during well stimulation
- Completion design envelope 
- Thermal effects of well fluids
- Hydraulic loads
- Well life cycle and effects on well completion components
TTRD Challenges
Re-use of the well infrastructure
- Window exit scenarios
- Tubular and equipment wear
- Well barrier maintenance
Small size well construction
- Less contingency 
- Avoiding completion telescope effects
- Pressure integrity in multiple reservoir targets
Subsea intervention
- Dynamic loads
- Bit and drill string performance
- ECD and surge and swab
Impact of Well Chemistry
Scale
- Scale blocking safety valve (BaSO4, CaCO3)
- FeSx corrosion-scale
Scale treatments
- Acid stimulation
- Milling
Corrosion
- CO2 in gas lift and CO2/WAG injection
- Sulphide/SRB  
Mercury
- Reacting with iron oxide corrosion products 
- Amalgamates with metal surfaces
Case Based Reasoning (CBR)
Bridging the limited TTRD experience
- Using artificial intelligence for experience transfer
- Re-using of previous experience and knowledge base
No slot available
Template
Depleted 
reservoir
New targets
Cap rock 
Faults
Water coning 
Unwanted liner 
M
ot
he
r-b
or
e
1
2
3
4
Reservoir
Surface
Tu
bi
ng
 p
at
h
A
nn
ul
us
 p
at
h
DHSV
Packer 
Window exit 
below packer
Window exit 
above packer
TTD barrier status
Wellhead
SPE FORUM SERIES: Forum I: Low Cost Reservoir Access and Interventions, Forum II: From Casing Design to Well Life Prediction?, 
Dubrovnik, 3 – 15 September 2006
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
